

TIBET

The Great Game and Tsarist Russia

Tatiana Shaumian

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To the memory of my parents
Elena and Leon Shaumian

Preface

It is with a sense of deep emotion that I take this opportunity of making my book on the historical events of the early years of this century, in researching which I devoted almost thirty years of my life, accessible to English speaking readers just as the century comes to a close.

I started my work in the early 1960s as a post graduate student at the Institute of Oriental Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences. In Asian politics this period was turbulent and tension-filled because India and China, two great neighbouring powers, who had just previously enunciated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the cornerstone of their foreign policies, were in a state of war.

Professor G.L. Bondarevsky was my research supervisor, and I owe him the deepest gratitude for all his help then, and subsequently during the most crucial moments of my work. It was his suggestion that I study India-China border problems and analyze the events associated with the Shimla Conference of 1913–14 which was crucial to events in the Himalaya.

I began my research at the Lenin Library and subsequently worked at the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian empire. There I discovered numerous files of documents on Tibet, on the Dalai Lama, and regarding the visits of his emissary Agvan Dorjieff on special missions to the Russian Tsar and the like. All these documents had a direct or indirect bearing on the Shimla Conference, but in themselves, it appeared to me, were so interesting in terms of the general problems of Asian politics and Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia, that I decided to concentrate my attention on Russian-Tibetan relations.

After defending my thesis in 1966, I was required to study the current problems of international relations in south and central Asia and the Himalaya, but continued collecting materials on Russian-Tibetan relations on the eve of the twentieth century. Taking Professor Bondarevsky's advice, I collected documents from the National Archives of India (NAI), and I am extremely grateful to NAI officials for their assistance. These documents in essence confirmed the information I had gleaned from the Russian archives and considerably broadened my knowledge regarding the reaction of the Anglo-Indian government and the British cabinet to Agvan Dorjieff's missions to the Russian Tsar. The result of my research was a book I published in 1977 entitled *Tibet in International Relations at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century* (Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, 1977). This is a substantially revised and expanded version of that book translated into English.

There is of course a very substantial body of Western, Indian, and Russian literature relating to Tibet and Russian-Tibetan relations as an important component of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia. I should add that interest in this region has demonstrably increased since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new independent actors in Asian politics in the form of the former Central Asian republics of what used to be the Soviet Union. I can scarcely agree with those scholars who, while analysing Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, seek to place the full responsibility for this on the Russian side and maintain that Russian policy in Central Asia was aimed at conquering India, 'The Pearl' of the British colonial empire. At the same time, it is difficult to agree with the attempts of some Russian scholars to rewrite our history and to paint Russia as absolutely blameless; as a country that had never courted 'rivalry' with anybody, anywhere. Such a 'new' conception of Russian policy in Tibet is expounded in Professor N.S. Kuleshov's book *Russia and Tibet at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century* (Moscow, 1992) as well as in his articles. The author sees in the Russian position towards Tibet and the Dalai Lama only religious interests and nothing more. Documents in the Russian foreign policy archives and the National Archives of India, the correspondence between Russian, British and Chinese diplomats and politicians, paint quite a different picture. The truth is that the Russian authorities never contemplated direct military intervention in Tibet, nor did they nurture plans to conquer India, but skilfully and often successfully exploited the Tibetan question to

exert pressure on Great Britain and thereby obtain concessions in other regions that were more germane to their military-strategic and political interests. It was no accident that the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, a very important international document of the eve of the First World War, contains a special clause on Tibet.

In preparing this book for publication in English I was supported and helped by friends and colleagues. Once again I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Bondarevsky, and to Professor B.P. Gurevich, who helped me with materials and good advice. I am very grateful to Mr Charles Lewis, with whom I started negotiations about the possibility of having my book published by Oxford University Press. In translating the manuscript into English I was assisted by Dr Purobi Roy and other members of the Centre for Russian Studies in Calcutta headed by her, and my old friend and colleague M. Ya. Tarkhova. I thank my Tibetan friend Dr Nawang Rabgyal for his interest in my work, and my friends and like-minded persons from the Centre for Indian Studies. I must thank my family—Masha, Fred, and little Tanya—who bore with patience and fortitude my preoccupation with this work.

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CHAPTER ONE

Tibet Caught between China and British India at the End of the Nineteenth Century

Situated in the heart of Asia and bordered by the mighty Himalaya, Tibet is a junction between the largest Asiatic civilizations. It remained inaccessible, 'forbidden', to Europeans and through the centuries was shrouded in a veil of mystery and enigma. Here is preserved a unique socio-political and economic structure based on feudal relations, with political and economic supremacy of the Lama church. The religious head, the Dalai Lama, is a living divine being and also the temporal ruler of Tibet. Tibet accounts for over three thousand lamaist monasteries with 100,000–200,000 lamas—the largest of which are the Drepung, with about 10,000 lamas, Sera, with about 5000, and Ganden, with about 2000. The monasteries are the traditional centres of politics, religion and economic activities around which towns have sprung up. In the beginning of the twentieth century, lamas comprised about 10 to 20 per cent of the 3-4 m. male population of Tibet.

Lamas occupied a privileged position, but even between the lamas there have been sharp divisions. Feudal lords, i.e. the local governing bodies, superior lamas, and aristocrats accounted for only 5 per cent of the population while serfs and peasants constituted the balance. Local authorities owned 40 per cent of the land and ownership of 60 per cent of the land was vested with the monasteries and aristocrats. Few peasants owned land.¹

Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, had a lay population of about ten thousand. The governmental institutions of the country, the mint, the court, the prison etc., were all located there. The famous Potala palace, a grandiose edifice of red bricks and golden roof, is one of the 'seven wonders of the world'. It has also been the residence of the religious and temporal ruler, the Dalai Lama. The soul of the pontiff never dies; it is reincarnated and migrates from one body to another. The semi-mystical ceremony of selecting the infant from among those born after the death of the Dalai Lama, to whom the latter's soul has moved, is conducted with the participation of Tibet's highest lamas in accordance with the predictions of an oracle or, since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, also by a cast of lots.

The Dalai Lama is the ruler of the principal part of Tibet with approximately one and a half million inhabitants. The second religious and political centre, Tashilhunpo near Shigatse, is the residence of the Panchen Lama, the second highest religious and political functionary in the church hierarchy. Historically, the relationship between the two supreme members of the hierarchy of Tibet has been one of mutual distrust and rivalry.

The principal legislative and executive bodies of the country are situated in Lhasa. They are the Tsongdu or the National Assembly, largely elected by the representatives of the large monasteries of Tibet, and the Council of Ministers, the Kashag, which comprises four lifelong Council Ministers, Kalons, of whom three are lay and one is a monk. Kashag is the supreme executive body to which the Assembly submits its recommendations for consideration and subsequent approval by the Dalai Lama. The Kashag also supervises four principal departments: finance, law, defence, and external affairs. In the Dalai Lama's absence or during his infancy till he attains adulthood, the Assembly appoints a regent, who must be a priest, to make decisions on all the important issues facing the state. In this way the state system also reflects the united rule of the religious and the temporal powers.²

The people of Tibet have been engaged in cattle breeding and farming. Nomads and semi-nomads breed yaks, sheep, horses, goats etc, and the balance, who constitute half the population, lead a settled way of life as farmers. They grow rice, maize, millet, barley, wheat and vegetables. The difficult climatic conditions and primitive agricultural methods have, however, meant low productivity in agriculture. Right up to the mid-twentieth century only 3 per cent of the land was cultivated. Domestic and cottage industries flourished,

producing wool, large felt mats, garments, rugs, ceramics, jewellery, and various other items of carved wood and stone.³

Tibet has mineral resources: gold, silver, borax, salt, etc., but in the early twentieth century the production of these was insignificant.

Trade with China and India had a long history. Tibet exported the famous Tibetan wool, gold dust, silver, stone salt, borax, medicinal herbs and animal products, while importing tea, silk, porcelain, enamel, footwear and garments from China, and cotton and woollen cloth, tobacco, sugar, glass and metal utensils, firearms etc. from India.

Tibet, important as the home of the Lamaist religious head, the Dalai Lama, was visited by many pilgrims not only from neighbouring India, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, but also from Mongolia, Russia, the Trans-Baikal area, and the Kalmyck steppe. This was used as a general subterfuge by the governments of Great Britain and Russia to conceal the true motives for their interest in Tibet, i.e. its favourable strategic position in the heart of central Asia, which is the central theme of this work.

Tibetan and Chinese historical documents and chronicles, monographs and research works by Tibetan, Chinese, Western and Russian scholars deal with the history of Tibet's relations with the outside world. This work cannot therefore claim to be an exhaustive analysis of this problem and offers only a schematic historical outline necessary for an understanding of subsequent events, touching also, in the most general way, upon the history of Tibet's relations with China and the appearance of Britishers on Tibet's political horizon.

Tibet emerged as an independent state in the international arena at the beginning of the seventh century when Songtsen Gampo, the young ruler of a principality located in what is today modern Lhasa, consolidated the small principalities in AD 630, to form a large state with Lhasa as its capital.⁴ Direct relations with China were established in AD 635, when Songtsen Gampo married a Chinese princess during the rule of the T'ang dynasty (AD 618–907). It is known that during that period Chinese civilization came to Tibet and subsequently substantially influenced Tibetan culture. Tibetans learned to make paper and writing ink, silk, and vine. Scholars from China were invited to the Tibetan court and some Chinese classics were translated into Tibetan.

The Tibetan empire gradually expanded in various directions. In AD 633 Tibetan troops defeated the Mongolians and captured the

Kokonor region,⁵ and in AD 648 marched into India.⁶ By AD 755–97 the Tibetan state was at its height and occupied all the territories of Sinkiang and the contemporary province of Gansu.⁷

During the eighth and early ninth centuries Tibet signed about eight bilateral treaties with China, the first between 705 and 710, and the last and most important in 821–2. These agreements strove to create a ‘great and eternal’ prosperous world, to strengthen the good-neighbourly relations and to establish an alliance between the two states. Tibetan and Chinese texts of the Treaties were engraved on a stone slab which to this day stands in front of the palace in Lhasa.⁸

In the mid-ninth century, when the ruler Songtsen Gampo died in 842, a struggle for power began among the various princely families of Tibet, as a result of which the Tibetan empire disintegrated into separate states.⁹ The most important of these were the Tangut empire founded in 875, and state of Tufan in Kokonor and Gansu.¹⁰

Evaluating the relations of Tibet with China during the rule of the T’ang and later the Sung dynasties (from the seventh century to 1279), a Chinese representative in Lhasa, Ho Lin, writes that in that period ‘there were friendly relations between China and Tibet but Tibet was not then numbered among the vassals of China’.¹¹ Direct contacts between the Tibetans and the Chinese authorities were, however, insignificant.

After the Mongolian conquerors captured Tibet and China, and during the rule of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1367), Tibet was gradually drawn into the orbit of the influence of the Mongolian authorities in Peking and closer politico–religious contacts were established between the two countries. Lamaism that had entered Tibet in the eighth century, became the official religion of the Mongolian empire in China.¹² During the rule of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) religious links between China and Tibet grew stronger, with Tibetan monks of various ranks often visiting Peking, though the Ming emperor had no political control over Tibet.¹³ In 1576 the title of ‘Dalai Lama’ was conferred on the Chief Lama.

The relations between Tibet and China changed with the installation of the Manchu Ch’ing dynasty (1644–1911). Dalai Lama V, born in 1616, sought the help of the Mongolian army during the civil war that raged between the Tibetan local rulers, and consolidated his position in Tibet. He established closer relations with the new Manchu dynasty in China. The Ch’ings wanted to annex Tibet and to unite it

with the Manchu empire. This, according to Chinese historians, might have served 'to protect Ch'ing-hai, Yunnan and Szechuan' and also to take advantage of the natural resources of Tibet.¹⁴ The Manchus realized that strengthening their relations with Tibet, because of its enormous religious influence and prestige, would help China to gain final victory over the rival Mongolians.¹⁵ The Ch'ing authorities sent repeated invitations to the secular ruler of Tibet and the Dalai Lama. Eventually the latter visited Peking in the autumn of 1652, staying there for almost six months during which period he was twice received by Emperor K'ang-hsi, and before his departure was officially proclaimed the Dalai Lama by an imperial edict.¹⁶ The celebrated American traveller and secret service agent William Rockhill, writing about this visit on the basis of Chinese sources, noted that the Dalai Lama was received as an 'independent Sovereign' and his temporal and religious power was not doubted by the Chinese emperor.¹⁷ Nevertheless, the relations between Tibet and China in that period remained relatively cool.

After the death of Dalai Lama V in 1682, Tibet became an arena of civil wars. Power was divided between a military and a feudal group, one in league with the Mongols and the other with the Manchu emperor's court. In the struggle that followed, the pro-China group received support from the people of central Tibet and from the neighbouring province of Amdo. Complying with this group's request Emperor K'ang-hsi in 1708 sent special representatives to Tibet who concluded that a special Manchu official should be sent to Lhasa to help the local rulers.¹⁸ In 1709, the emperor dispatched its first Manchu commissioner to Tibet, with instructions that he should initially support stooges of the Manchu court fighting the Mongols. This mission may be regarded as the first instance of successful direct Chinese interference in Tibetan affairs. However, the Mongolian population in Kokonor, supported by the Lamas of the three largest monasteries of Tibet—Drepung, Ganden and Sera—sought the help of the commanders of the Dzungar army who came to north Tibet with six thousand men and, after besieging Lhasa for ten days, captured it at the end of November 1717.¹⁹

The addition of Tibet to the already formidable territories of the Dzungar in Central Asia created a direct threat to the Chinese Manchu empire. China sent two military expeditions to Tibet. The first, in the spring of 1718–autumn 1719, was poorly armed and had no support from the rear, and was routed by the Dzungar army near the Tibetan

town of Nagchukha. The second expedition (1720) with a strength of ten thousand men was more successful, capturing Lhasa. It drove off the Dzungar army and established power under the Chief Commander of the Manchu army General Yansin. In 1720–1 these military rulers routed the supporters of the Dzungars and delivered power to their protégé, Dalai Lama VII, and then initiated administrative reforms. The post of regent, established during the rule of Dalai Lama V, was abolished and a new government headed by a four member council of ministers was set up. All the senior positions in the local administration were occupied by supporters of the Manchus. The military garrison, comprising three thousand soldiers, was stationed at Lhasa.

With these measures the emperor's government considered Tibet to be under Chinese control, and to commemorate this event, a special edict was engraved on a stone slab that was installed at Lhasa.²⁰ Simultaneously, two high ranking Chinese officials, Ambans, were stationed there as political residents. W. Rockhill quotes the 'Chinese States Records' as saying that an

Amban will consult with the Tale Lama or Panshen Rinpoche on all local questions brought before them on a footing of perfect equality. All the officials, from the rank of Kalon [minister] down, and ecclesiastic holding official positions must submit all questions to him for his decision. He must watch over the condition of the frontier defences, inspect the different garrisons, control the finances of the country, and watch over Tibet's relations with the tribes living outside its frontiers.²¹

Almost two centuries later Dalai Lama XIII, reviewing the situation of Tibet at that time, asserted:

United Tibet having its own independent ruler was not a vassal of K'ang-hsi, but a fully independent ally of China, and it was only in the course of time that China acquired a firmer footing in Tibet and considered it to be its semi-dependent state. In the history of these two countries there was neither a conquest by arms nor a state act or a document, acknowledging Tibet's dependence on China unless unilateral commands by Chinese rulers 'of administrative nature are regarded as documents.'²²

In another case the Dalai Lama pointed to 'the absence of a state act acknowledging the dependence of Tibet on China'.²³ In a letter to the Chinese emperor and empress he wrote that 'Emperor K'ang-hsi and Dalai Lama V were in full solidarity and like the Sun and the

Moon went hand in hand. The latter enjoyed unparalleled patronage of the ruler.²⁴

During the reign of the next Manchu emperor, Yung-cheng (1723–1735), Sino–Tibetan relations underwent a considerable change due to the serious financial difficulties the Chinese were facing. In 1723 Chinese troops were withdrawn from Tibet. This again aggravated the civil war in Tibet which lasted for two years (1727–8). The Chinese rulers discovered that their control of eastern Tibet, established in 1720, was not sufficiently effective. In 1727 a new boundary was established between the Chinese province of Szechuan and Tibet along the watershed of the Yangtse and Mekong rivers, uniting the territories to the east of it with China proper, to be administered by the local leaders under the supervision of the Chinese rulers of Szechuan. The territories to the west of the watershed remained under the jurisdiction of the Lhasa rulers. It was thus in this period that for the first time there were marked changes in Tibetan territory.²⁵

In order to end the civil war, the Chinese army was again inducted in 1728 in Tibetan territory, this time numbering 15,000 troops, and control of the local administration was delegated to the Commander-in-Chief of that army. This period saw the final establishment of the institution of Chinese Ambans, with a two thousand strong Chinese garrison permanently quartered in Lhasa. At the time the Ambans 'were, in effect, little more than observers with the duty of reporting to Peking on events in Lhasa',²⁶ who also looked after the interests of Chinese settlers in Tibet.

Further consolidation of Chinese power in Tibet took place in the mid-eighteenth century, when the reforms of the Manchu rulers considerably strengthened the power of Chinese Ambans, who received a 'definite right' to participate in the administration of the country.²⁷ In 1757 the institution of Regents to the infant Dalai Lamas was restored, and from the very outset they were under Chinese influence. 'Ambans', as A. Waddell said:

were the wire-pullers behind the throne, and the real driving power of the machine of state behind the figure head of the time serving Regent. They even regulated the selection of the new Dalai Lamas if not actually privy to the policy of assassination of the old which now began.²⁸

After the Tibet-Gurkha war of 1788–92, when the Chinese emperor sent ten thousand soldiers to assist Tibet in expelling the Gurkhas from the country, Manchu control over Tibet increased. The Chinese

authorities, assuming that Britain had a hand in the Gurkha invasion, started isolating Tibet. Represented by two Ambans in Lhasa, they also assumed military, political, economic, and administrative powers. In conformity with the emperor's edict, the Ambans were authorized to directly participate in the administration of the country, 'to consult the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama on all issues concerning Tibet on equal footing'. Tibetan secular and religious officials were pledged to submit all important issues (appointment of higher officials, judicial, financial, and other affairs) to the decision of the Ambans who were in turn responsible to the Peking authorities for the defence of the borders, the management of finances, taxation, and controlling of external relations and trade. The Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama were unable to communicate with the Chinese emperor directly and could do it only through the Ambans.²⁹ It need hardly be said that the reforms of 1792–3 completely subordinated the functioning of the Tibetan government in all important spheres to the central Chinese government.

In Peking there was a special chamber for vassal affairs to look after the collection of taxes, affording court tutelage to the Tibetan nobility, according representatives of the Tibetan authorities an audience with the emperor, supervising Tibet's trade with the other countries and China proper. The Ambans in Lhasa were subservient to and assisted by the authorities of the neighbouring province of Szechuan.³⁰ To effectively implement the policy of isolation of Tibet from intervention from the outside world, in the early nineteenth century, at the time of Dalai Lama X (1816–37), a decree was issued by the Chinese government prohibiting Tibet's authorities from maintaining any relations with foreigners.³¹ In 1846 the missionary M. Huc received an order from the Chinese emperor that 'no Moghul, Hindostani [Indian], Pathan or Feringhi [European] should be admitted into Tibet'.³²

While touring Tibet in 1811 an Englishman, Thomas Manning, wrote:

It is very bad policy thus perpetually to send men of bad character to govern Tibet. It has no doubt displeased the Grand Lama and Tibetans in general, and tends to prevent their affections from settling in favour of the Chinese Government. I cannot help thinking, from what I have seen and heard, that they would view the Chinese influence in Tibet overthrown without any emotions of regret.³³

Other travellers, in particular an Indian, Sarat Chandra Das, who toured Tibet in 1881–3, noted the hatred the Tibetans bore for the Chinese Amban and the military who were plundering and humiliating the local population, and enjoying all the rights and privileges.

In the nineteenth century, and particularly during the latter half, China, which during the rule of the Manchu dynasty had annexed the territories inhabited by national minorities, herself became the victim of the colonial expansion of Western powers. Towards the end of the nineteenth century China's partition began and this was testified to by a number of Anglo-Chinese conventions, the defeat of the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894–5, the Boxer Rebellion and subsequent foreign intervention. Great Britain, the USA, France, Germany, and Russia divided amongst themselves the principal ports, roads, and strategic regions of China.

The general crisis of the Chinese empire could not but affect Sino-Tibetan relations. China remained the formal suzerain of Tibet, but steadily lost its influence there, with power being gradually seized by the Dalai Lama and his retinue. The Chinese government, on its part, was not in a position to take measures to tighten its loosening grip on Tibet. The Russian newspaper *Novoye Vremya* wrote in 1901 about the nominal character of China's 'Protectorate' in Tibet.³⁴ Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, considered this Chinese suzerainty in Tibet to be a 'Constitutional fiction'.

In 1876 Thubten Gyatso was anointed Dalai Lama XIII. He had learnt to read and write at an early age and had then received higher theological education. For the study of Tibetan philosophy the Dalai Lama usually invited teachers from the seven academies in the three large monasteries of Sera, Drepung, and Ganden. Khambo Ngawang Dorjieff, a Baikal Buriat of Russian origin, was assigned by the Drepung monastery, and this I shall have occasion to discuss latter in greater detail.

In 1894, at the age of eighteen, the Dalai Lama, aware of the fate of his predecessors, managed to mobilize his supporters to imprison the regent and seize the Tibetan state seals. After seizing power, the Dalai Lama forbade the participation of the Chinese Ambans in state affairs. A. Waddell, an English participant in the expedition to Tibet in 1903–4, wrote that after that he 'openly refused to be guided by the Chinese who now have to admit the decline of their power in Tibet, and the undisguised contempt in which the Tibetans have come to regard their authority, which is reduced to an empty farce, the shadow of a shade'.³⁵

The sharp weakening of the position of the Manchu empire in Tibet at the end of the nineteenth century, on the one hand, and on the other, the strategic significance of the world's largest tableland located in the heart of Asia at the border of India and China, and its influence as the world centre of Buddhism, had the inevitable effect, at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, of attracting the interest of such powers as Britain and Russia in developing relations with Tibet.

Britain's colonial authorities took an active part in the division of China, competing with Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and the USA. They succeeded in winning access to Chinese economy and trade, made enormous profits by exploiting China, and consolidated their position in the strategic eastern coast of the country. It was after the close of the eighteenth century that the British attempted to penetrate China from Indian territory across the Himalaya, and the adjoining region which practically freed them from the rivalry of other countries of the West and of Japan.

Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal and Tibet separated British India from China. Tibet was the geographical, historical, economic, and religious centre of the Himalayan region. Trade and religious links between Tibet and India had existed since the mid-sixteenth century, and Britain had vested interests in developing bilateral trade with these countries. A large number of Buddhists lived in India and they compelled the British colonial authorities to establish firm links with Lhasa, which would also promote and consolidate British power and influence in India.

In April 1772, Warren Hastings, after being appointed Governor of Bengal, issued instructions that closer ties be established with Tibet. The first diplomatic contact between Tibet and Britain was established when the Tibetan Panchen Lama sent a message to Warren Hastings when the Bengal Governor dispatched an Anglo-Indian armed detachment to Bhutan. The Panchen Lama wrote that it was not necessary to send troops to Bhutan whose inhabitants were subjects of the Dalai Lama, and that to preserve peace in the region the British troops should leave Bhutan.³⁶

Warren Hastings, taking into consideration the great interest of the East India Company in establishing connections with Tibet as a potential supplier of gold and silver, heeded the message. Besides,

the leadership of the Company foresaw that it could pave a route to China through Tibet, so Hastings in 1774 sent a mission under George Bogle to further contacts and to explore the possibilities of expanding trade. In 1775, Bogle contacted the Panchen Lama in the Tashilhunpo monastery, west of Lhasa, but failed to establish contact with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa because of the resistance of the regent and the Chinese Ambans. Bogle's visit to Tibet played an important role in the history of relations between Britain and Tibet because, for the first time, direct personal relations were established by the Anglo-Indian authorities with a supreme Tibetan Lama. George Bogle has left very interesting diaries with a detailed description of his travels in Tibet, the situation there, and the relations of Tibetan rulers with the Chinese authorities, and the like.³⁷

To continue the discussions initiated by Bogle, Warren Hastings sent Samuel Turner to Tibet in 1793 but he, like Bogle, could not go beyond the Tashilhunpo monastery.³⁸

Despite the fact that towards the end of the eighteenth century, after the Tibetan-Gurkha War, the Chinese authorities had adopted a policy of fully isolating Tibet from the outside world, individual foreign travellers (or intelligence agents) succeeded in penetrating that forbidden land. Thus, an Englishman, Thomas Manning, went to Lhasa in 1811, and stayed there for a few months and even met the Dalai Lama. However, on a special instruction from Peking, he was sent back to India. His diary was made public by George Bogle's account.³⁹

Throughout the nineteenth century attempts by individual travellers to penetrate deep into Tibet and reach Lhasa failed, but some secret service agents, under the guise of travellers, gathered information about the outlying districts of Tibet that lay along the borders of China and India, and examined the possibility of constructing roads, and other communications, strategic facilities, etc.⁴⁰

Since the mid-nineteenth century the Anglo-Indian authorities had set out to actively and regularly penetrate the Himalayan region and, gradually seizing parts of the territory of the Himalayan principalities, reached nearer and nearer the Tibetan borders. As a consequence of the Anglo-Nepalese War and the Treaty of Segauly of 2 December 1815, the British were given a part of the territory of Sikkim. In 1865 the Anglo-Bhutan Treaty was signed under which all external relations of the principality were entrusted to Britain. Both Sikkim and Bhutan had traditionally been in the sphere of the

Tibetan government's influence, and had close ethno-religious and political ties with Tibet.

The 1876 Anglo-Chinese Chefoo Convention was the first international document signed between China and a foreign state in which Tibet figured. According to the last article of that Convention, the British government could send a mission to explore Tibet, while it enjoined the Chinese government and the Chinese authorities in Tibet to assist in the successful outcome of the mission.⁴¹ In 1886 an Anglo-Chinese convention was signed regarding Burma and Tibet, which envisaged the expansion and further development of trade between India and Tibet.⁴²

An important stage in the strengthening of the position of the Anglo-Indian authorities in the Himalaya was the 1888 campaign against Sikkim and Tibet concluded by the signature of a Convention on 17 March 1890 between Britain and China formally proclaiming Sikkim a protectorate of Great Britain. The first article of the Convention established the border between Sikkim and Tibet. This:

shall be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta and its effluents from the waters flowing into the Tibetan Monchu and northwards into other rivers of Tibet. The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nepal territory.⁴³

The Convention also provided for talks to be held between India and Tibet regarding trade relations and pasturelands.

It may be noted that when the Convention of 1890 was being negotiated, in talks that had a direct bearing on Tibet's interests, not a single Tibetan official participated. The text of the Convention was signed by the Chinese Amban in Tibet and the Viceroy of India, and that was subsequently to influence the relations of Britain, Tibet, and China.

In addition to the 1890 Convention, Regulations regarding Trade, Communication, and Pasturage were signed in Darjeeling on 5 December 1893, envisaging the establishment of a mart in Yatung which was to be open 'to all British subjects for purposes of trade from the 1st day of May, 1894'. It clarified the rights of the British subjects in the field of trade and specified the commodities that could be sold at the mart, etc. It also set out rules relating to contacts and correspondence between the Indian government and Tibet's Chinese authorities, and the terms for pasturing cattle in Sikkimese

territory. Although the Regulations dealt with trade and relations with Tibet, and a Tibetan, Lachag Paljor Dorje Shatra, was sent to Darjeeling to study the situation and was present at the talks, the negotiations were carried out only between the British and Chinese,⁴⁴ without any Tibetan representatives participating. According to point six of the Regulations, all 'trade disputes arising between British and Chinese or Tibetan subjects in Tibet ... shall be inquired into and settled in personal conference by the Political Officer for Sikkim and the Chinese Frontier Officer' (again excluding the Tibetans!).

In the following years, concerned about the further consolidation of its position in the Himalaya, the British Cabinet in London repeatedly asked the Anglo-Indian government about the implementation of the terms of the 1890 Convention and the 1893 Regulations, but it was virtually impossible to execute them because the Tibetan authorities had not been signatories to the Convention and Regulations, and therefore did not consider them to be binding. In particular, the Convention had dealt with the question of demarcation of borders between Tibet and Sikkim.⁴⁵ On 11 October 1898 the British political representative met the Chinese and Tibetan officials in Yatung, where the British resident announced that his government was eager to preserve India's friendly relations with Tibet and to speedily resolve the border problem. These discussions revealed the differences between the sides regarding the form and methods of the work of the border commission, and the British representative concluded that Tibet in fact did not want to resolve the border issue satisfactorily (from the British point of view!).⁴⁶ Besides, the Tibetans vehemently opposed the opening by the British of the market in Yatung, of which the Anglo-Indian authorities were duly notified.⁴⁷

In 1898 Lord Curzon became the Viceroy of India. It is well known that the British government in London only broadly determined the policy of Great Britain in central Asia. Concrete implementation of it lay in the hands of the Viceroy of India. It is not surprising that by the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, the Asian policies of Great Britain reflected the political views of nationalist circles of the British bourgeoisie, of whom Lord Curzon was a worthy spokesman.

Lord Curzon's principal task in India was to further expand and strengthen the British possessions. In the second half of the nineteenth century Russia's active penetration into central Asia was used by Lord

Curzon to propound the theory that the conquest of India was Russia's principal objective, and central Asia was a springboard for attacking that British colony.

As is known, there were no common borders between Russian possession in Asia and India, those being divided by Sinkiang and Tibet which were in the sphere of influence of Ch'ing China. Curzon was therefore extremely watchful of the success of Russian policy in Sinkiang and of the signs of growing Russian influence in Tibet.

Coming to power and discovering 'the exasperating hostility and insolence of the Lamas',⁴⁸ who strove to prevent Britain from implementing the terms of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Regulations of 1893, Curzon attempted to settle the controversies by contacting the Tibetan authorities via the Chinese Amban. On 15 April 1899 the British political representative in Sikkim arrived at Yatung with a letter from Curzon, seeking to arrange a meeting with high ranking Chinese officials, including the Amban.⁴⁹ During their discussion the Amban said that Tibet had protested against the transfer of the British market from Yatung to some other place in Tibet. He also added that if the British representatives insisted on concluding the border agreement without considering the demands of the Tibetan side, Tibet might seek assistance from Russia with whom they had already held discussions. On the eve of the meeting between the British representative and the Chinese Amban, the former also met four Tibetan monks who also spoke about the Tibetan contacts with Russia which had repeatedly offered Tibet assistance.⁵⁰ This was how the British colonial authorities first learnt of the existence of direct contacts between Tibet and Russia.

This revelation motivated Curzon to redouble his efforts to establish relations with the government of Tibet. In 1900 he had first written to the Dalai Lama, but the letter was promptly returned to him by a Tibetan official without being delivered to the Dalai Lama in Lhasa. In June 1901, availing of the services of the ruler of Bhutan Ugyen Kazi, Curzon again sent two letters to the Dalai Lama, one for a second time and another written anew. In August 1901 Kazi came to Lhasa and personally delivered the letters to the Dalai Lama, who however refused to open them:

without consulting the council and the Amban and, as he knew they would not agree, he did not wish to call them, as he said he was afraid the Chinese

Amban would make a fuss and probably create a disturbance, in which case he could not be responsible for my life, and, he added, he was precluded from writing any letter to any foreign government.⁵¹

Both Curzon's letters were thus returned unopened.⁵²

This unfriendly attitude of the Tibetan ruling circles evoked the sharp displeasure of the Anglo-Indian administration headed by Curzon, particularly as British agents, and later the Russian press, reported that the Dalai Lama had sent letters written by him to the Russian Tsar through special Tibetan missions. Lord Curzon was at the end of his tether when the Russian governmental newspaper *Journal de Saint Petersburg* in October 1900 published a brief news item that on 30 September 1900 the Russian emperor Nicholas II had received Ngawang Lozang Dorjjeff, the first Tsenyi Khenpo, attached to the Tibetan Dalai Lama, in Livadia palace.

Thus the British, who justified their expansion in Central Asia to the north-west and north-east of the border of British India, as a measure to protect the Indian borders, faced Russian interests seeking to strengthen Russia's position in central Asia. So it was that the relations of the Anglo-Indian colonial authorities with the borderland territories greatly exceeded the limits of local border conflicts and were determined by the terms of the so called 'great game', the Anglo-Russian rivalry in central Asia, which also directly affected the European interest of both the powers. According to the American author P. Fleming, by strengthening its position in Central Asia, Russia had inevitably weakened the British positions in India and therefore Britain's bargaining power in Europe.⁵³

According to the British version, Britain was only defending her Indian possessions, while Russia, by seizing one central Asian region after another sought also to add India, 'the Jewel in the Britain Crown', to their possessions. This viewpoint is at least disputable. It appears that Russia and Britain pursued offensive policies from the strategic point of view, in the interest of developing trade and acquisition of new sources of raw materials and markets for their growing bourgeoisies, and it was in Central Asia that these two streams of expansion clashed. One of the episodes of that 'great game' is dealt with in this work.

CHAPTER TWO

The Far-Eastern and Tibet Policies of Russian Tsarism

In September 1900 a Tibetan mission went to Russia and was received by Nicholas II, an expression of the interest of Russian court circles in establishing relations with Tibet. It need hardly be said that Russia could not have had a direct strategic interest in Tibet because the nearest point of Russian territory was about 1500 km from Lhasa. However, insofar as trade was concerned, Russian merchants trading in Sinkiang had penetrated the Tibetan market and were trading in the town of Leh that bordered it; they participated too in annual fairs held in Gartok.¹ The leader of the British intelligence detachment, S. Turner, mentioned in his Diary, that after talking with the Tibetan high officials it turned out that Cathrine II had endeavoured to initiate in active trade not only with China but also with the internal regions of Tibet.²

In Russia, nearly a hundred and sixty thousand Buryats and nearly two hundred thousand Kalmyks were adherents of Lamaism. These religious communities of Lamaists maintained regular links with Lhasa and went on pilgrimages to Tibet. It is known that in 1741 Lama Damba Darzha Zayayev of Tsongol Datsan in Trans-Baikalia had toured Tibet. On returning home he did much to spread Buddhism and also received the approval of Empress Catherine II for his 'Regulations on Buddhist Clergymen in East Siberia'. These Zayayev diaries were published in the Buriat language by A.M. Pozdneyev in 1900.³

In 1891-4 Baza Monkochzhuev, a Kalmyk, toured Tibet. His work, *Tale About a Journey in the Tibetan Land of the Malo-Dorbot*

Baza-Bakshi, was translated and published in 1897 in Petersburg with notes by A. Pozdneev. In his preface Prof. A. Pozdneev wrote that of all countries of East Asia, Tibet 'since the last quarter of the century has been a "forbidden land" for the Europeans'. He went on to say that Russia had a Mongolian population that had lived here for generations who are related to Tibet if not in language or mode of living, but in creed and religion, and this religious affinity had motivated them to maintain relations with Tibet from time immemorial. Scores of Buryats, according to Pozdneev, 'are now rumoured go to Tibet annually to worship the sacred objects, to get initiated, and to improve their knowledge of the science'.⁴

It was profitable for the tsarist government to demonstrate its 'solicitude' for Buddhists, helping them to establish links with Tibet and thus consolidate their power in Siberia and the Trans-Baikal area and spread their influence in Mongolia. Many young Buryats were educated in Tibetan monasteries, and although this won them greater respect in their own country, the Tibetan authorities regarded them as foreigners and they were forced to live there illegally posing as Sikkimese and Nepalese pilgrims. This no doubt prompted the Russian authorities to activate their presence in Tibet on grounds of the necessity to safeguard the interests of their Buddhist subjects.

The role of Russian travellers in the exploration of Central Asia and Tibet was immense. Since the beginning of the 1870s several expeditions were organized there by: G.N. Potanin (1884–6), the results of whose investigations were set out in his work *The Tangut-Tibetan Outskirts of China*; the Grum-Grzhimaylo brothers (1886–90); V.A. Obruchev (1893–4), M.V. Pevtsov (1889–90), V.I. Roborovsky (1893–5). The travels of the most distinguished Russian among these, N.P. Przhevalsky (1876–8, 1879–80, 1883–5) won him world renown. Particularly interesting travels in Tibet and descriptions of these were provided by the Russian student of Asia P.K. Kozlov⁵ and G.Ts. Tsybikov.⁶

P.K. Kozlov, a member of the Imperial Russian Geographic Society, toured Tibet and Mongolia twice, in 1905 and 1909, and met the Dalai Lama. The principal purpose of his visits and books about them was, according to him, to establish firm Russian-Tibetan relations. The works of Kozlov are of great interest, providing as they do the impressions of a person directly witnessing events and having several meetings with the Dalai Lama. The author provides a brief history of Tibet and the Dalai Lamas, but does not discuss why the Tibetan

authorities had at a certain time appealed to Russia for assistance and what Russia's real interests were in establishing relations with Tibet.

From 1899 to 1902 the Buryat G. Tsybikov and the Kalmyk Ovshe Norzunov toured Tibet, visiting Lhasa and other Tibetan holy places. It should be emphasized that G. Tsybikov was no ordinary Buddhist pilgrim but a highly educated man who had graduated from the Oriental Studies' Department of the St Petersburg University and was a Professor at the Oriental Studies' Institute in Vladivostok. His work *A Buddhist Pilgrim in the Tibet's Sanctuaries* (1918) contains his diaries illustrated by unique photographs taken both by himself and O. Norzunov which are of immense value. The book is a rich storehouse of the geography of Tibet, descriptions of its largest cities, and monasteries, and ways of life. He also provides a short history of Tibet and the Dalai Lamas.

In all fairness it should be noted that a majority of the scientific expeditions mentioned above were at the same time intelligence missions: the Russian geographers and scholars often received assignments from the General Staff and the Russian Defence Ministry. This could be a testimony to the fact that individual, and generally rare, journeys of pilgrims and travellers from Russia to Tibet was not able to give any serious impetus to the activization of the Russian-Tibetan ties. The true reasons for establishment of Russian-Tibetan relations should be looked for in tsarist policies towards the East and the direction they took.

The burgeoning economic development of Russia, entering a new, imperialist stage of capitalism, needed new markets, new sources of raw materials, and new areas for capital investment. The Russian bourgeoisie aspired to penetrate deeper and deeper into the East. In the second half of the nineteenth century Russia adopted various means to make Central Asia unify with it, and by so doing was moving directly towards the borders of Persia, Afghanistan, and India. At the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries the Siberian region and the Far East up to the Pacific coast were gradually involved in tsarist military, political, and economic interests. In 1890-3 the Trans-Siberian Railway was being constructed to link Europe with the Pacific. In 1892 S. Yu. Witte became the Russian Finance Minister, and represented the bourgeois tendency of the Russian ruling circles and strove to utilize all the power of tsarism to develop capitalism in the Far East.

At S. Witte's initiative a Russo-Chinese Bank was created in 1895

with the object of attracting, under the sponsorship of the tsarist autocracy, foreign-French-capital, and interesting it in tsarist political plans in the Far East. The Russo-Chinese Bank was headed by Prince Esper Ukhtomsky, a rabid champion of aggressive policies in the Far East.

S. Witte, who held in his hands all the strands of tsarist Far Eastern policies, aspired to capture the Far Eastern markets financially and economically with the aid of banks, while paying lip-service to opposition to territorial annexation. S. Witte did not, or pretended not to, understand that both these methods were intimately linked. For example, he opposed the lease of Port Arthur by Russia, regarding which an agreement had already been signed on 27 March 1898, believing that this step might lead Russia to a war with Japan for which Russia was totally unprepared.

In that early period of Russian expansion in the Far East a Tibetan doctor, P.A. Badmayev, played a role in that orientation of policies. He was a Buryat who had graduated from the Eastern Language Department of St Petersburg University and was close to court circles. As is known, in parallel with making 'miraculous' medicines, greatly admired at court, he was also engaged in a large concessional business. As B.P. Semennikov writes in the Introduction to the collection of documents from Badmayev's Archives, the Tibetan doctor 'hardly belonged to the people, able to understand the complicated issues of policy'⁷; 'all his brains and energy Badmayev addressed to various shady transactions'.⁸

In connection with the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, Badmayev suggested a plan to link Russia with China, Tibet, and Mongolia. Following 'advice' from above, he suggested that a branch line be built to Lan-chow-fu that would serve as a key to Tibet, China, and Mongolia. Badmayev based his fantastic plan on the belief that the Manchu dynasty would soon fall and that Russia should lose no time in getting a stop ahead of the Western powers by organizing an uprising against the Manchus, overthrowing them, and annexing a considerable part of China, Tibet, and Mongolia. He sent a report to Alexander III regarding the objectives of Russian policy in East Asia.⁹ S. Witte, the supporter of 'cautious policy', considered Badmayev's views 'very important', 'raising a new point of view regarding practical issues of policy'.¹⁰ Moreover, when Badmayev appealed to the government to allot him two million roubles in gold to establish 'P.A. Badmayev & Co' trading house in the Trans-Baikal area to prepare the ground

for uniting China with Russia, he was granted this sum (actually in instalments), and on 11 November 1893, the trading house 'Badmayev & Co' was founded in Petersburg with its principal office in China. Badmayev sent teams of armed Buryats and Mongols to Mongolia, China, and even to Tibet.¹¹ S. Witte supported Badmayev, believing that establishing relations with Lhasa through Badmayev's trading company would be of 'very great political significance'. On 3 May 1896, S. Witte reported to Nicholas II that 'although the Buryats sent by Badmayev openly called themselves Russian subjects, they reached Lhasa and were received there affectionally'. He went on to say that

the geographical position of Tibet is politically greatly important to Russia, especially in view of the British attempt to penetrate into that country and bring it under their political and economic influence. Russia, according to my conviction, should make every effort to foil the British attempt to establish her influence in Tibet.¹²

As may be seen from the report, S. Witte at that time did not attempt to raise the issue of annexation of Tibet by Russia (as had been suggested by Badmayev), but only wished to prevent the strengthening of the British position in Tibet.

In 1896, however, after the contract for construction of the 'KWZHD' (East China Railway, ECHR) had been signed on Witte's initiative, Badmayev's enterprise began to get in the way of the Finance Minister's plans, in the sense that it might adversely affect Russo-Chinese relations and create competition to the ECHR. Badmayev was therefore debarred from participating in Witte's Far East Undertakings.

At the beginning of 1898 a new group emerged in the ruling circles of Russia called the 'Bezobrazov gang', comprising extremely chauvinistic elements, who sought the broadest possible expansion in the Far East, which would inevitably mean an open conflict with the British. Among the members of that group there were the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, Count E.E. Vorontsov, Rear Admiral Abaza and, finally, A.M. Bezobrazov, subsequently State Secretary of Nicholas II. Badmayev also joined this group.

The Bezobrazovites were from the very outset ardent opponents of Witte and his policies. It should however be said that the struggle between these two groups did not affect the unity of their aims. Both of them attached paramount importance to 'Russia's mission' in the

Far East and in spreading Russian influence throughout northern Asia including northern China. They actually aspired to divide China, one group, China's banking capital, and the other, its territory, especially because the acquisition of new markets in China promised great profits.

The struggle between these two groups, as the future chain of events showed, affected virtually all issues not only in relation to tsarist policy in the Far East but also in terms of relations with the European countries. Bezobrazovites' 'Anglophobia and the striking Germanophile stand'¹³ greatly affected the entire course of Russian international relations on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War.

If the very fact of establishment of Russo-Tibetan ties is viewed in the context of the activation of tsarist Far Eastern policy, its implications went far beyond the Far East. The geographic location of Tibet, its long common border with British India, and the activated British policy in the Himalaya and Tibet at the turn of the century determined a special place for it in international relations in the first decade of the twentieth century. Pursuing its active policy in Tibet, the Russian government could not but take that into account.

The international scene was favourable for the expansionist drive of the Russian bourgeoisie in the Far East. On 11 October 1899 the Anglo-Boer War started, whetting the 'appetites' of all British competitors who feverishly attempted to take advantage of this opportunity. In June 1900, the Boxer uprising in China opened up to outside forces an opportunity for armed intervention. The Russian authorities too sent their troops to Manchuria to the displeasure of Britain, Japan, and the USA. It must be said, that in view of this, Witte and Lamsdorf were ready to withdraw the Russian troops from Manchuria in exchange for certain concessions on the part of the Ch'ing rulers, but the Bezobrazovites used all the means in their power to scuttle this move.

NGAVANG LOZANG DORJIEFF AND HIS ROLE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RUSSO-TIBETAN RELATIONS

In 1900 a Tibetan mission led by Ngawang Dorjjeff came to Russia.

Ngawang Lozang Dorjjeff (henceforth Agvan Dorjjeff) was born in 1853 (Tibetan calendar, 1854 in the Christian) in Kurba village in the Russian Trans-Baikal region. His family belonged to the Galzut

clan of the Khori Buryats. In 1872–3, at the age of 19, Dorjjeff went to Tibet as part of a caravan of pilgrims to seek higher Buddhist education realizing that Buryat and Mongolian lamas who study at Tibetan monasteries attain high power at home, and hold high positions in the Church hierarchy. The young pilgrim on his way from Buryatia had to overcome great physical difficulties, traversing the virtually inaccessible region of the Gobi and Alashan deserts, Koko-Nor lake, and the Tibetan upland. He and his fellow travellers faced untold miseries on their way, not only from the extreme heat and cold but also from illness and assaults by robbers.

It might be mentioned that there has been no written evidence of the journey undertaken by the Trans-Baikal Buryats to Tibet till the later part of the nineteenth century; which was because of the strict rule prohibiting the entry of foreigners. Dorjjeff was therefore compelled to conceal his identity and presented himself as a Mongol. That made it possible for him to get admission to the philosophic school in one of the largest monasteries in Tibet—the Drepung monastery that accommodated nearly ten thousand lamas. There he studied the fundamentals of dogmatic Lamaism, Tsanit. His great ability to imbibe Buddhist scholasticism soon attracted the attention of his teachers, the eldest lamas.

Dorjjeff's illegal existence however made it difficult for him to sustain himself and he was forced to return to the Trans-Baikal region to collect the necessary finance. Subsequently, in 1876, he returned to Tibet to complete his studies in the Drepung Theological Academy. In the course of his journey, he made friends with a Tibetan who was going to Lhasa to become a Mongolian interpreter at the court of the Dalai Lama. He spoke at length with his fellow traveller and tried to explain to him the difference between British and Russian policies. Dorjjeff asserted that Britain was apprehensive of Russia, and that the Tibetans should maintain friendly relations with the latter in order not to fall into British hands, clearly trying to win over the Tibetan to Russia's cause. According to Dorjjeff, the Manchu emperor, too, held the Russian Tsar in high esteem, and sent him gifts and in exchange received guns and rifles. He asked the Tibetan to inform the Dalai Lama accordingly. As a student Dorjjeff had made the acquaintance of the young Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, and some high officials and, seeking to win their confidence, told them about all the wonders of Russia in order to win them over. He told them that Russian Buryats who came to Tibet to pursue ecclesiastical studies were forced to live illegally during their

student years, and had to bribe the Mongolian lamas to obtain accommodation. Dorjjeff requested them to change the existing order, taking into consideration the great contribution of the Buryats to the development of Lamaism as a whole.

Given his outstanding abilities, Dorjjeff was able to master the spiritual subtleties of Lamaism, as also Tibetan and Sanskrit. He also knew Buryati, Mongolian, Kalmyki, Manchurian, Russian, and could speak Chinese.¹⁴

In 1888, at the age of 35, he completed his studies at Drepung Theological Academy and received the highest degree of Lharam Geshe ('Master of Metaphysics'). According to the ritual, seven scholars with the Lharam Geshe degree were required to teach the philosophy of Tsanit and literature to the twelve year old Dalai Lama. In 1889 Dorjjeff was included among the seven Lharam Geshe and from that time on came very close to the Dalai Lama and later even became one of his councillors. However, he soon had enemies who alleged that Dorjjeff, as a Russian, was giving the Dalai Lama a pro-Russian orientation and demanded his dismissal and repatriation to his native country. It was only intervention by the Dalai Lama that saved him, and everything reverted to what it had been. Dorjjeff continued to persuade the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan high officials that they 'should give preference to Russia, under whose patronage Buddhism has spread amongst the Buryats and Kalmyks, and that by so doing they would render indispensable service by initiating relations'.¹⁵ It appeared likely that he would be able to make the Dalai Lama develop a broader outlook, give him a clearer insight into the surrounding world, and keep abreast of international events.

In 1898 the group, 'noticing China's position', sent Dorjjeff to familiarize himself with life in China, Russia, and France. Dorjjeff left for the Trans-Baikal region through India and China. At the Indian border he was detained and interrogated by the British. He introduced himself as a Mongolian Chinese subject, showed a ticket purchased from the Chinese representative in Tibet, and told the British that he was the first Mongolian who had decided to travel from Tibet via India and that others would follow him.

Dorjjeff arrived in Petersburg. As already mentioned, Russia had at that time launched an active policy in the Far East. The arrival of a Tibetan representative attracted the attention of certain circles in the Russian bourgeoisie supporting the policy of expansion in the Far East. With the help of Prince Ukhtomsky, Dorjjeff was received

even by Tsar Nicholas II, but that reception took place in a 'restrained and distrustful' atmosphere. Nicholas II informed him that all the requests for help and support from the Dalai Lama should be made officially in writing. In all probability at this time Russian diplomats had not realized the benefits of Russian penetration into Tibet. However, Dorjjeff's idea of Russo-Tibetan rapprochement was favourably received only by those who were close to Sergei Witte and Prince Ukhtomsky, who realized that Tibet might be used as a means of strengthening Russian influence in the Far East.

Prince Ukhtomsky was of the view that an ambassador should be despatched to Tibet immediately, but the Russian foreign office did not even discuss that matter, and Dorjjeff himself considered such a step to be 'fruitless and risky'.¹⁶ It should be stated that Dorjjeff argued that implementation of a plan for rapprochement depended solely on the wishes of the Tibetan authorities, and that 'only after two trips, using a cautious and well handled approach, would a third trip may make it possible to bring Tibet on the Russian side'.¹⁷ Actually, on the first trip Dorjjeff did not achieve the desired result largely because of the restrained and cautious approach of the Russian government, who during that period was apprehensive of involving itself in undertakings in the Far East that threatened to strain Russian relations with Japan and Britain. Besides, Russia was not yet confident of Dorjjeff as a mediator in consolidating Russo-Tibetan relations.

Dorjjeff despatched the Kalmyk Ovshe Norzunoff from Russia to Tibet with a letter and gifts for the Dalai Lama. The letter recounted in detail the reception accorded to him by the Russian emperor and the friendly attitude of the 'Russian people' towards Tibet. He also mentioned 'the critical position of China'. He concluded that 'rapprochement with Russia would bring great benefit to Tibet in the future'. Dorjjeff then went to France to familiarize himself with her 'way of life'. In 1899 he returned to St Petersburg as did Norzunoff from Tibet, bringing the Dalai Lama's reply, in which the Dalai Lama requested Dorjjeff to return to Tibet to acquaint himself with conditions there. In December 1899, travelling through Peking, Calcutta, and Darjeeling, Dorjjeff reached Lhasa. The Dalai Lama welcomed him wholeheartedly and installed him as 'Senior Khambo' with a full voice in 'all the affairs of policy and religion'. Although there was a discord among the Tibetan ministers, Dorjjeff's pro-Russian policy won a greater number of supporters, and

therefore Dorjjeff continued the implementation of that political line.

Towards 1900 the situation in Asia changed dramatically. Britain went to war with the Boers and had to concentrate on South African affairs. In China, the Boxer rebellion broke out and the Russian government seized the opportunity to activate its political influence in Manchuria. The situation was ripe for a new attempt to be made to establish firm relations with Tibet.

In March 1900 the pro-Russian group in Tibet assigned Dorjjeff the task of going to Russia a second time, but the British authorities had already heard of his activities, and in Calcutta Dorjjeff received the news that Norzunoff, who was taking to Tibet goods bought in Europe, had been arrested in Darjeeling by the British as they took him to be Dorjjeff.¹⁸ He was released at the intervention of an influential Lama and sent to Russia. The goods were delivered to Tibetan border authorities, and Dorjjeff was forced to journey back by a different route. He could not go via Peking due to the Boxer rebellion and therefore travelled via Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, across Amur and Sretensk, to St Petersburg.

In September 1900 he arrived in St Petersburg. In the absence of Prince Ukhtomsky, he appealed to the Vice-President of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society, Academician Semenov, who wrote a letter to the Foreign Minister V.N. Lamsdorf on 16 September, requesting that Nicholas II accord an audience to Dorjjeff.¹⁹ On 30 September Nicholas II received Dorjjeff at Livadia palace, regarding which the government newspaper *Journal de Saint Petersburg* published an item in its issue of 2 October 1900. The publication of such a report in the governmental newspaper testified to the fact that the Russian ruling circles wanted to utilize Tibet to pressurize China, on the one hand, and as the trump card against the British in Asia which was of vital importance to Russia, on the other. Great Britain's difficult situation in the international field and hope for easy spoils in China because of the Boxer rebellion made it possible for the Russian authorities to speak openly about it.

In St Petersburg, Dorjjeff delivered the Dalai Lama's personal letter to the Russian Tsar, in which the Dalai Lama expressed gratification that 'the Russian Tsar so ably ruling his numerous subjects in accordance with the faith they preach, and showing a special care about Buryats and Kalmyks', which promotes the spread of the Buddhist religion. Along with his wishes for 'good health and

happiness, he presented the Tsar with pearls, turquoise, gold dust, miracle pills, etc.²⁰

Dorjief had a talk also with the Foreign Minister, V.N. Lamsdorff, Finance Minister, S.Yu. Witte and the Defence Minister, A.N. Kuropatkin. According to the Russian Foreign office, 'patronage' to Tibet in the present situation could be promised only on condition that a Russian consulate was opened there. That itself testified to a shift in Russian policy on the Tibetan issue in contrast to 1898 when the foreign office did not even examine Ukhtomsky's proposal regarding a Russian Embassy in Tibet. The successful implementation of tsarist Russia's economic undertakings in the Far East (the functioning of the Russo-Chinese Bank, construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, etc.) had created the necessary conditions for the Russian expansion in the Far East, as a consequence of which the stand of the court circles vis-à-vis Tibet changed to some degree.

Dorjief however made it clear that in the event of Russia opening a consulate, other foreign powers would also demand that they be permitted to do so, and therefore a Russian official be sent to Kandin, a point on the trading route between Tibet and China connected to Peking by railway.

Apprehending criticism in the foreign press, Dorjief asked Lamsdorff to accelerate a reply to the Dalai Lama's request that friendly relations be established between Tibet and Russia.²¹ The Russian authorities however did not want to make any written commitments to the Dalai Lama and therefore no letter was sent, only gifts. After numerous consultations with Dorjief, it was decided to send him a gold watch with diamonds and a signet ring bearing the emblem of Nicholas II.²² At the Tsar's command, Dorjief was given the right of free travel throughout Russia and was offered a sum of two thousand roubles which the latter refused.²³ As Dorjief could not return to Tibet by sea fearing the British in Colombo and Calcutta, the Russian consulate in Urga was ordered to provide all support and assistance to him in the course of his journey through Mongolia.²⁴

In January 1901, after travelling for seventy days through Mongolia, Dorjief returned to Lhasa and informed the Dalai Lama about the results of his visit. The Dalai Lama expressed great gratification at his efforts, and Dorjief wrote in his Autobiography that 'all previous misunderstandings regarding making a protectorate were clarified and the opinion took hold that Tibet found a protector more stable and more reliable than China'. Dorjief again wanted to

show that it was on the Tibetan authorities that future relations with Russia depended.

Dorjief's subsequent visit to St Petersburg to conclude, according to the Tibetan envoys, a treaty between Russia and Tibet, was strictly confidential. Only the Dalai Lama, his four *Kalons* (ministers) and one or two other persons knew about that, for as Dorjief said, if the Tibetans learnt that he had gone abroad to deal with a foreign power, then it would be 'bad, very bad'.²⁵

In 1901 the Tibetan envoys reached Colombo.²⁶ On 18 May the Tibetan mission started from Colombo to Odessa aboard the *Tambov*. The Tibetan envoys carried plenary powers attested by the Dalai Lama, and letters to Nicholas II, the Foreign Minister, Finance Minister, and Defence Minister. They also brought gifts: gold dust, turquoise, Tibetan scarfs (*Khadakis*), etc. All these had to be concealed by being sewn up in their garments in the event of their being searched or arrested by the British authorities.²⁷

On 12 June 1901 the Tibetan mission arrived at Odessa. It consisted of Khambo Agvan Dorjief, second secretary to the Dalai Lama, Lubsang Kainchok, district administrator, Djantsang Piuntsok, Buriats Galsanov, and Dondunov, and a servant Tseren.²⁸ Though the Tibetan dignitaries Kainchok and Piuntsok were the formal Tibetan representatives, the mission was actually headed by Agvan Dorjief, an experienced man who enjoyed the Dalai Lama's complete trust, and was known in Russian governmental circles to be the leader of the pro-Russian group in the Tibetan ruling caucus.

In Odessa, the representatives of the local authorities arranged a grand reception for the envoys. On 13 and 14 June prominent Odessa officials accompanied the Tibetan guests on a sightseeing tour of the city. In his speech at the farewell dinner in Odessa, Dorjief expressed 'profound and heartfelt gratitude to the authorities and the representatives of the town local government for the hospitable reception'. Everything the Tibetan guests saw 'speaks of the success and the achievements of the Russian city in all spheres'. Dorjief said that all their impressions would be 'forever preserved in our hearts, and we leave Odessa with memories of the friendly reception'. The member of the Town Council N.P. Dmitriev wished them a happy journey and requested them to convey to their countrymen the warm feelings the Russian people have for them.²⁹

On 15 June the Tibetan mission left for St Petersburg accompanied by A.M. Shchekin.³⁰ All their travelling and living expenses were

borne by the Ministry of the court,³¹ and not by the Foreign office which showed that it was the court rather than the governmental circles who were interested in the Mission's arrival. On 17 June 1901 the Tibetan mission arrived at Petersburg.³²

On 18 June 1901 they were received by the Foreign Minister Count Lamsdorff and on 20 June by the Finance Minister S. Witte.³³ Dorjjeff also visited other high officials including the Director of the Foreign Religion Department A. N. Masolov.³⁴

Dorjjeff delivered the Dalai Lama's letter to Lamsdorff, in which, besides wishing him good health and happiness, he says that 'the British foreigners are bitter enemies and oppressors to the state of Tibet following the Buddhist faith ... Please deign to cautiously ... teach the two sent envoys³⁵ how we should gain peace getting rid of their bane and oppressive actions, and besides that, to make it known to the Great Tsar.³⁶

On 23 June the Tibetan guests were solemnly presented to the emperor and the empress in Peterhof palace.³⁷ The envoys delivered the gifts and a letter from the Dalai Lama and another two from Galun and Chopchib-Khambo, the Chief Manager of the court of the Dalai Lama, to Nicholas II.

The Dalai Lama wished him good health, admired the deeds of the Tsar and wrote:

The Tibetan State despite its adherence to Buddhism had drifted into war and has suffered greatly at the hands of outlanders the British. They continue to speak of this incessantly even now. Remaining loyal to Bogdikhán and having no sympathy or warm feelings for the hostile British, I have specially sent two envoys of high position who are clever and truthful and are capable of adeptly establishing a way, following which the Russians and Tibetans can join each other in peace and live in good unity.³⁸

Galun's letter also contained a request that the Tibetans be helped to attain peace and to oppose the British outlanders.³⁹ These letters reveal that the Tibetan mission was a political one of Tibet seeking aid against British attack, and at the same time also showed that Tibet was maintaining loyal relations with the Chinese emperor as a subject country. Tibet probably knew about the separate Russo-Chinese negotiations and the reluctance of tsarist diplomacy to endanger relations with the Ch'ing Government to guarantee their interests in Manchuria and, aware of the weakness of its suzerain, China, and its helplessness in the struggle with the British, sought Russian help.

While the Russian government planned its response to the Dalai Lama's communication the guests were sightseeing in St Petersburg, visiting the Hermitage, the Russian museum, and the Tsarskoye Selo.⁴⁰ They were also invited to meet Lamsdorff, the Director of the First Department of the Foreign Office, N.G. Gartvig, Defence Minister A.N. Kuropatkin, and visited the Aeronautic Park from where they *inter alia*, went up in an air balloon.⁴¹

On 4 July Nicholas II signed a reply to the Dalai Lama's letter saying:

I was glad to be informed about your wish to establish permanent relations between the Russian power and Tibet. I have ordered that necessary explanations thereof be given to your envoys who will deliver my reply and convey my regards to you. Being firmly convinced that friendly and favourable attitude of Russia will prevent any threat to Tibet's destiny and in future. I wish you good health and long life for the sake of glorifying the faiths and prosperity of all human beings.⁴²

The Foreign Minister, Lamsdorff, in his reply to the Dalai Lama, wrote that he had lost no opportunity in gleaning from the envoys the 'means of establishing relations with Tibet' and also expressed the hope that the 'measures taken and results achieved will fully conform to the stated wishes'.⁴³ 'I do not doubt', wrote Lamsdorff, 'that thanks to your wise and cautious care no evil would befall Tibet in the future, if there is a permanent feeling of benevolence to the latter on the part of the august monarch of Russia'.⁴⁴

These letters reveal that the Russian government, making no concrete commitments, had only in the most general terms promised help and support to Tibet with no mention of any active steps to defend Tibet against Britain nor of the signature of a Russo-Tibetan treaty.

While Tibet began to awaken the interests of sections of the Russian bourgeoisie bent on penetrating into the Far East, Russian diplomacy steered by Lamsdorff was apprehensive of a sharp worsening of relations with Britain because of Tibet, especially in the light of the intensified Russo-Japanese antagonism and Anglo-Japanese rapprochement.

Besides the letters, the Dalai Lama received gifts in the form of a bejewelled watch and brocade,⁴⁵ and rich gifts were also lavished on members of the mission.⁴⁶

On 13 July the envoys left for Moscow, on 18 July after a short

sightseeing stop-over, they left for home,⁴⁷ their passage to Tibet having been organized by the Russian consul in Urga Shishmarev.⁴⁸

On 13 July, the day of his departure, Dorjjeff requested Lamsdorff to assist in arranging for the free sojourn and work of the highly educated Tibetan Lama Lozang Djimbo, specially sent to the Trans-Baikal area by the Dalai Lama to teach the highest doctrines of Buddhism.⁴⁹

Dorjjeff did not return to Tibet with the other members of the mission, but stayed back in the Trans-Baikal area. In November 1901 he went to Petersburg for a promised new meeting with the Russian emperor, but this was postponed several times and did not eventually materialize.

On 26 January 1901 Dorjjeff wrote to Lamsdorff, among other things, saying:

Making the aim of my life the service to the people of my religion, I did my best to fulfil the task of bringing closer the Russian government whose lofty protection is enjoyed by the tribes professing Buddhism, and their head, whose spiritual authority and power strongly attract these peoples, and though I am well aware that the land of Tibet and the Dalai Lama's government are not yet sufficiently prepared to enter into any regular or direct relations with the Russian government, some steps taken in this respect were such a success that they are worthy of the attention of the tsarist power ...

I am happy that my humble efforts have been yielding some results ... I would not hesitate to declare before your excellency my full devotion to the cause of establishing regular and close ties with Tibet and my readiness to always and on the first demand to serve Russia jointly with her other subjects, to whom I have the good fortune and honour to belong by birth, ignoring any other considerations except the good of the people, making up a part of the great Russian power and always ready to ever be helpful in the enhancement of her glory.

Thinking of the subsequent progress of the cause which interests me, which no doubt has a bright future and to which I will continue to devote all my abilities and aspirations, I humbly request your excellency not to deny me your valuable instructions, to guide me in future, in order to do my work properly in accordance with the intentions of the Russian government, whose so experienced and enlightened representative you are, your excellency.⁵⁰

The letter has been quoted almost in full because it reveals the role played by the closest assistant of the Dalai Lama, Agvan Dorjjeff, in

establishing stable Russo-Tibetan relations and his influence in convincing the Dalai Lama and his retainers that Russia was ready to patronize Tibet. Dorjjeff, a Russian Buryat by origin in the service of the Dalai Lama had expressed his eagerness to serve Russia. In the future he was to become not only the ideologist, but a direct actor in initiating and implementing the policy of rapprochement between Russia and Tibet. The Russian foreign office utilized Dorjjeff's position and influence on the Dalai Lama to implement its own plans vis-à-vis Tibet.

A question inevitably arises: who essentially was Dorjjeff? Was he a Russian agent or a Buryat nationalist whose chief aim in life was to preach Buddhist values and defend the interests of the Russian Lamaists? Or had his long and fruitful sojourn in the company of the high priest of Tibet engendered in him a sense of Tibetan nationalism? There appears to be no definitive answer. In all probability he had really dedicated his life to preaching Buddhist values, for which it was necessary to have both the support of the Russian Lamaists in the Tsar's court for the cause that he faithfully served, and to defend the interests of the Dalai Lama of Tibet from those encroaching upon his independence and authority as the centre of world Buddhism.

In an article recently published in the magazine *Buddhism*, Russian historian Vladimir Baraev has related an interesting episode involving Agvan Dorjjeff. In 1901, when Dorjjeff, after a mission to Russia, arrived at Paris, he had as his companion a famous Russian poet Maximilian Voloshin who wrote in 1902 to one of his friends:

Here in Paris I have made acquaintance of a person whom I guide in Paris. You will ask: who? He is a Tibetan ambassador, the Khambo Lama of Tibet, i.e. one of the seven Lamas who rule Tibet, and the tutor of the Dalai Lama ... He told me much about Nirvana and has greatly changed my ideas. From him, for instance, I have come to know, that Buddhism regards any propaganda of ideas as an offence; as a violence against an individual. What a high morality level in comparison with Christianity, the religion of propaganda violence!⁵¹

Returning to Dorjjeff's visits to Russia in 1900–1, it should be noted that they were to a considerable degree an important stage in the strengthening of the Russo-Tibetan bonds, influencing the fate of Tibet and employed as a pretext for British troops to organize an armed intervention in its territory.

The texts of the documents, alluded to above, concerning the Tibetan mission to St Petersburg were, of course, all kept strictly confidential. It is interesting how the Russian press alluded to this visit. The St Petersburg newspaper *Novoye Vremya*, besides reporting the stay of the Tibetan guests in Russian towns, published accounts of a general nature about the significance and aims of the mission. As we know, *Novoye Vremya* reflected the struggle between rival groups within Russia's ruling class: the Witte followers and the Bezobrazov group. Its editor, A.S. Suvorin, repeatedly emphasized the need for 'independence' from government, opposing the move to bring the newspapers under the control of the latter, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Treasury spoke against censorship by the foreign office of articles dealing with the problems of external policies.⁵²

Suvorin appeared to be a real advocate of the independence of press and objectively in interpreting the facts, but in reality the position was different. The relations of Suvorin and the *Novoye Vremya* with Russian Foreign Minister M.N. Muraviev and later with Lamsdorff were quite strained. Some of the provocative articles in the *Novoye Vremya* on foreign policy, particularly on issues relating to Russo-Tibetan contacts and their vehement anti-British stance are reflected in Suvorin's comments in his diary ('British Scoundrels! How we hate you! We do not abhor any other nation, as we abhor you')⁵³ etc., and are remarkably similar to views of the Bezobrazovites. Seeing the growth of the latter's influence on the Tsar, and sympathizing with their aggressive, chauvinistic sentiments, Suvorin counted on that group and published articles inspired by them, propagating the aggressive plans of the Russian bourgeoisie in the Far East, clearly anti-British stance, etc.

On 17 June 1901 the *Novoye Vremya* wrote that Dorjjeff's second visit to Russia on an assignment for the Dalai Lama, showed that 'the impressions with which Dorjjeff returned to his native land from Russia, strengthened the desire of the supreme ruler of Tibet to establish and consolidate the friendly relations with Russia'. The author of the article considered this to be natural, especially since Tibet had learnt of Russian successes in Manchuria, etc.

Being, though almost nominally, a protectorate of China, Tibet, taking into account the unstable position of the Chinese government, naturally must have sought rapprochement with Russia, the only power able to resist the intrigues and urges of the British knocking at the doors of Tibet for a long

time and ready to seize the first opportunity to break them by force. Tibet was naturally looking for support from its neighbouring state who did not show such mercenary inclinations, is considered the mightiest power in Central Asia, and who by her traditional policies and attitude toward the Central Asian tribes ... won a good reputation and full trust.

The article went on to say:

Sketchy information in the press about the difficulties suffered by the Tibetan envoys while moving across the British India, clearly explain why Tibet who had already seen the British paws above its head, turned its eyes towards the kingdom of the White Tsar. Tibet was not extended the hand in goodwill or friendliness by the British, nor with a peaceful handshakes they approach it, and the paws of the British lion had threatened Tibet several times.

In its editorial of 19 June 1901 *Novoye Vremya* was already mentioning quite openly and frankly that two great powers were interested in Tibet, Britain, and Russia, for 'it was clear to both of them that due to Tibet's geographical position and its political conditions, the country must join one of these empires'. In articles published on 18 and 19 June 1901, Dr Badmaev attempted to explain the arrival of the Tibetan mission as being motivated by Russia's desire to preserve the integrity of the Chinese empire. So long as the Dalai Lama was a Chinese subject, wrote Badmaev, and the administration of Tibet was entrusted to two Chinese Ambans, the relations of Tibet with foreign states could only be effected through the Ambans. Hence, Badmaev continued, the Tibetan guests would be cordially received as the subjects of the Chinese empire, requesting that the integrity of China from 'every kind of infringements' be safeguarded.

Articles published in the *Novoye Vremya* were obviously provocative, aimed at aggravating the already strained relations between Russia and Britain, and also to justify or prove the necessity for close ties between Russia and Tibet. In them, Russia was presented as the defender of integrity of the Chinese empire.

Apparently, these publications expressed the interests of those groups of the Russian ruling elite who not only did not want to conceal the Tibetan mission to Russia, or cloak it under the guise of having solely religious aims, as the Russian foreign ministry officials had done, but on the contrary wished to stress its political and anti-British character. It cannot be ruled out that these reports were inspired by the Bezobrazovites, which compelled Foreign Minister Lamsdorff to

apologise to the British diplomats and demand special censorship of the reports in the newspapers on the question of foreign policy.

Dorjjeff's missions served as a pretext for Lord Curzon to organize an armed expedition to Tibet, appreciably influencing its future.

PRESS REPORTS ON RUSSIA'S SECRET TREATIES WITH CHINA AND TIBET AND BRITISH REACTIONS

In early 1902 the growth of rumours regarding the existence of Russia's secret treaties with China and Tibet further complicated the positions of the chess pieces centring around Tibet. In April 1902, a Reuter correspondent reported from Peking that the Russian envoy P.M. Lessar proposed to the Chinese emperor's court that they discuss the grant of independence to Tibet; a proposal, according to the report, that had the intention of bringing Tibet under Russian control in the near future.¹ That very month, a Chinese merchant who had just arrived in Darjeeling from Lhasa reported that recently Russia had concluded a secret treaty with the Dalai Lama, any discussion of which had been strictly prohibited in Lhasa.²

In May 1902, an exiled Chinese political leader K'ang Yuwei asserted in Darjeeling that the head of the Chinese Council, adviser to the Chinese Prince Yung Lu, had signed a secret treaty with Russia, making Tibet a protectorate of the former.³ Finally, on 18 July 1902 the Chinese newspaper *China Times* published the full text of the alleged 'Russo-Chinese Treaty'. The British envoy in Peking, E. Satow, reported to Lord Lansdowne about the treaty in early August and sent a cutting from the newspaper, adding however a postscript in which he said he had no reason to believe there was any truth in the report.⁴

The newspaper published twelve articles of the Russo-Chinese treaty, according to which the Chinese government, realizing that the Chinese power was becoming weaker, yielded all its interests in Tibet to Russia, in return for Russia's support and assistance in preserving the integrity of the Chinese empire; in the event of Russia's interests in Tibet being guaranteed, Russia took it upon herself to employ all possible means to defend the integrity of the empire. Russia committed herself to quelling any disturbances in China that the authorities were unable to control themselves; Russia would post its consular officials in Tibet, and China, too, would maintain consuls in Tibet. Russia committed itself to not using force to impose Christianity in Lhasa. All mines and railway

enterprises would be in the Russian hands, while the Chinese could only be shareholders in them. Russia committed itself not to demolish any temple and defile the sanctity of sacred places while constructing railway lines.⁵

Though Satow did not rely on the veracity of the newspaper report, he nevertheless believed that probably some form of unofficial negotiations had taken place between the Russian diplomats in Peking and the members of the Chief Council.⁶

On 20 August, Britain's political representative in Sikkim, J.C. White, also sent the text of the treaty to the Anglo-Indian authorities along with a postscript suggesting that the Chinese government could have signed such a treaty to recover Manchuria and therefore the British should seize the opportunity to intensify their efforts to establish relations with Tibet.⁷

On 1 September 1902 Satow received an instruction from Lansdowne, to warn the Chinese government against the conclusion of any such agreement, and to draw its attention to the fact that in the event of such agreement the British government would have to take all measures to safeguard their interests, even to the extent of occupying a part of China.⁸

On 8 September, Satow telegraphed Lansdowne that he had a talk with Prince Yung Lu and the Chinese ministers who categorically denied the signature of any such agreement, holding that nothing of that kind had been discussed by the governments of Russia and China.⁹

On 2 October 1902, the British envoy in St Petersburg, A.M. Scott, worried by the incoming information, told Lansdowne that he had a discussion with the Chinese envoy in Petersburg, who said that he had seen the text of the agreement in the Chinese newspaper for the first time and asserted that its form and content proved that the Chinese had nothing to do with it.¹⁰ The British scholar Angus Hamilton's study *Problems of the Middle East*, published in 1909, cited the text of the Russo-Tibetan treaty, supposedly signed during Dorjjeff's stay in St Petersburg in June 1901 and ratified by the Chinese government, through Prince Yung Lu, on 16 September 1902. The treaty comprised four articles.

The first of these stated that the territory of Tibet lay between central China and West Siberia and therefore China and Russia should maintain peace and tranquillity in the country, and in the event of disturbances China, after mutual consultations with Russia, would send troops to Tibet. The second article stated that in the event of an attack on Tibet

by a third state or if China was unable on its own to quell internal disturbances, Russia would send its units for joint operations.

The third article guaranteed full freedom both to Lamaism and the Russian Orthodox Church in Tibet, but all other religious teachings should be prohibited. For that purpose, it was necessary for the head of the Russian Orthodox Church mission in Peking and the Dalai Lama of Tibet to undertake joint action. The fourth stated that Tibet should be a truly independent and sovereign state with an independent government, to effect which the joint efforts of China and Russia were necessary. Russia would train the Tibetan troops in European methods of warfare and China would promote economic development, improve education, trade, etc. in Tibet.¹¹

In October 1902 Britain's diplomatic mission in Peking heard fresh rumours about an agreement concluded between Russia and Prince Yung Lu comprising four articles, providing that the Russians guaranteed the security of Yung Lu, his family, and his possessions from any infringement upon them by foreign states in connection with his treacherous behaviour during the suppression of the Boxer rebellion. In return, Russia would receive privileges in Tibet, Mongolia, and Sinkiang, which would fall under the sphere of the Russian influence. Besides, Russian officials, merchants, and missionaries would be entitled to freedom of movement within the Chinese empire.¹² Russia would provide assistance to China in suppressing revolutionary actions in the country. According to the rumours, that agreement was signed personally by Yung Lu but he had to submit it to the court for ratification. Meanwhile the agreement was being kept strictly confidential. This version confirmed the opinion of a famous Chinese political leader, Yuan Shih-Kai, who said that Yung Lu had sought to conclude an agreement with Russia to protect himself from punishment for his actions during the Boxer uprising.¹³

On 10 November 1902, the Charge d'Affairs of Great Britain in St Petersburg, Hardinge reported that from wholly reliable secret sources, he had learnt that rumours about the Russian-Chinese treaty were not entirely unfounded. In any event, if not a treaty, an agreement at least existed between Russia and Tibet. According to Hardinge's version, Russia had the right to have a say in the distribution of the Dalai Lama's finances because annually, large sums of money from Buryats and Kalmyks who lived in Russia were collected passed on to Tibet. In turn, the Dalai Lama agreed to let the Russian consul stay in Tibet and granted the freedom to spread the Orthodox religion.

According to Hardinge, it was agreed that Britain would send a 'semi-accredited secret agent' who would exert pressure on the Tibetan government as a substitute for a British consul in Lhasa.¹⁴

Hardinge's version, to a considerable degree coincided with the report of Satow, the British envoy in Peking, that according to information received, the Dalai Lama had approved the appointment of a Russian official in Tibet who was allegedly accompanied by a mining engineer, and escorted by Cossacks.¹⁵ The Russian ambassador in Peking made it clear to Satow that Russia had no intention of invading Tibet, but the Russian government had to take cognizance of the Buddhists living in its territory and their desire to maintain contact with their co-religionists in Tibet.¹⁶

The British intelligence service in China reported that in the beginning of 1903, a Russian group had gone from Peking to Lhasa to negotiate a new Russo-Chinese treaty relating to Tibet, which was presumably signed in Lhasa on 27 February 1903 between the Amban and the Russian representative.¹⁷ According to the *North China Herald* of 26 March 1903, the treaty comprised eight articles granting Russia the right to work Tibet's mines and to conduct geological prospecting within its borders which was to be financed by the Russo-Chinese Bank. China would receive ten per cent of the income from the operations. Russia could invest no more than 2 m. *taels* in mining in Tibet. The Chinese government would not tax the import of mining equipment and machines into Tibet. All prospecting in Tibet conducted by the Chinese and Russians should be approved by the Chinese authorities, who, in turn, had to consult the Russians about their mining operations there.¹⁸

That was the last treaty with Russian participation to be reported in the press. In British diplomatic circles, the reports and rumours of the treaties were linked to the activities of the Russo-Chinese Bank and were explained, *inter alia*, by Russian interest in Tibet's mineral resources, chiefly gold. It was known that the branch of the Russo-Chinese Bank in Mongolia that financed the mining of gold had shown an interest in a new enterprise in Tibet. The head of the Russian mining works in Mongolia, engineer De Grot reported in November 1902 that he had attempted to get China to agree to extension of the Trans-Siberian railway up to Tibet, but the Chinese government had refused.¹⁹ In October 1903 the British Minister in St Petersburg, Spring Rice, reported that De Grot was the 'chief organizer of the Russian penetration into Mongolia and Tibet'.²⁰

The materials from the Archives of Russian Foreign Policy (AVPRI) do not provide any documents confirming the existence of such treaties. An analysis of the texts published by the British show that many important points of the treaties outlined above were similar or almost tallied. They essentially deal with the issues negotiated by Russia with China and Tibet. The reports of the British diplomats in St Petersburg and Peking that a Russian official was sent to Tibet and of Russians travelling to Lhasa through Peking are similar to the materials in the Archives regarding the establishment of a Russian consulate in Kandin. The paragraphs in the treaties regarding the grant to Russia of the right to mine and to participate in the construction of the railway line, etc. evidently echoed the activities of the already mentioned engineer De Grot and the Russo-Chinese Bank, particularly its branch in Mongolia. There was a definite meaning in the paragraph relating to support of Lamaism, since Tibet annually received money collected by the Russian Lamaist, both Buryats and Kalmyks. If a Russian consulate was established, the construction of an Orthodox church (or churches) in Tibet would become possible, but it is incomprehensible how Russia could defile Tibetan sacred places or introduce Christianity by force? Finally, it seems incredible that China could agree to declare Tibet's independence when the principal aim of her collaboration with Russia was to find a way of preserving the integrity of the Chinese empire. At any rate, it was advantageous for the Anglo-Indian government to believe in the existence of the treaties, making the atmosphere surrounding Tibet more and more tense.

THE QUESTION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RUSSIAN CONSULATE IN KANDIN (DA-TSZIN-LU)

As has already been mentioned, in 1900 Dorjjeff visited St Petersburg for the second time and raised the question of establishing a Russian consulate in Kandin (Da-Tszin-Lu), situated on the Tibet-China border. On 26 June 1901, during his talk with Lamsdorff, Dorjjeff again raised that question saying that from the point of view of Tibetan interests, it was much more desirable to let the Russians open a consulate than to send Russian expeditions deep into Tibet, as other foreign states would also demand permission for similar expeditions. To set up a Russian consulate in Kandin or to post a political agent or consul there, according to Dorjjeff, could be useful in maintaining an amicable relationship between Russia and Tibet.¹

What made Kandin a suitable site for a Russian consulate? It was located in the main trade route between China and Tibet. Through it China sent silk, tea, etc. to Tibet and Tibet in return sent gold, furs, and wool to China. Kandin had telegraphic communications with Chengdu, from where the line branched off to Peking, Kuldzha, and Shanghai. Besides, there was a waterway from Kandin to Shanghai. From Kandin it took 20 to 25 days and sometimes 15, to reach Lhasa. In Kandin resided the prince of the Kham tribe who was under Chinese government control. There were three Buddhist monasteries in the city, which were administratively under Chinese control but under the spiritual orders of the Dalai Lama, as the Buddhist head.²

On 14 August 1901, the Russian ministry of foreign affairs formulated the 'Considerations' regarding the opening a consulate in Kandin with the aim of establishing direct relations between the Russian government and the Buddhist authorities in Tibet; keeping a constant watch on the development of relations between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese emperor and the Chinese central government. Apart from that, as Kandin was in the upper reaches of the Yangtze river, where the rival interests in China of the imperialist states were concentrated, the consulate there could keep an eye on French and British activities in the southern provinces of China, and could also undertake surveillance of the Russian pilgrims in Tibet and the development of economic relations between Russia and China through the Yangtze valley.³ We may thus presume that the principal objective of opening a consulate in Kandin was not so much to establish close relations with Tibet as to maintain vigilance on the activities of France and Britain in southern China.

Those 'Considerations' accentuated 'the special, secret nature' of the measure so as not to provide political justification to foreign states to open their consulates in Tibet.⁴

On 10 December 1901, Dorjjeff submitted to the Russian foreign office 'Information about the situation in Da-Tszin Lu [Kandin]'.⁵ According to Dorjjeff, a Russian agent had taken residence in one of the monasteries in Kandin under the guise of a pilgrim. He could familiarize himself with the country either directly or by talking with the local inhabitants. If he was to maintain direct contacts with Lhasa, he would have to deal with the Tibetan commission for foreign affairs. Dorjjeff contemplated presenting him personally to the Dalai Lama and other dignitaries, but for the time being there was no possibility of establishing direct contact with Lhasa. The Russian representative would

maintain relations with a special Tibetan agent who 'will be authorized to pass on to the Russian agent communications from his government and receive communications from the Russian agent'.⁶ It was noted in the information that the Tibetan government could allot an annual sum of 3000 roubles to the Russian government to maintain the consulate in Kandin.⁷

To help establish friendly relations between Tibet and Russia, Dorjjeff recommended Buddu Rabdanov, a former member of the office of the consul-general in Urga Shishmarev, who served as an interpreter at the board of the Manchurian railway and had participated in an expedition led by G.N. Potanin through Mongolia and China, up to the border of Tibet, and subsequently the editor of a Mongolian-Buryati newspaper, *Life in the Eastern Outskirts* published by R.A. Badmayev in Chita.

Rabdanov was then 45 years old, and was well-versed in spoken and written Russian and Mongolian, and also knew Chinese and the Tibetan. Besides, according to Dorjjeff, he was a cautious person who 'may win the confidence of the Tibetans'.⁸

The discussion on the questions of setting up a Russian consulate in Da-Tszin-Lu in the State Council and Foreign Ministry went on till November 1902.⁹ Finally, on 8 November, Lamsdorff presented an official Memorandum, that received Nicholas II's complete approval.¹⁰ The Memorandum read, *inter alia*:

Rabdanov's work, above all, will be to establish relations with Tibet and to support the movement favourable to Russia, help it as much as possible and to make use of it in time to serve our interests. In the relations of the Dalai Lama and his closest advisors with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rabdanov should serve, however, exclusively in a liaison/transmission capacity and as is seen from the Dorjjeff's explanations, the first written reports will be brought to him by a trusted Tibetan official residing in Da-Tszin-Lu [Kandin] and officially in charge of the local Tibetan affairs.¹¹

Rabdanov would collect information about Tibet, and might in future get to Lhasa, show an interest in activities of the foreign missionaries, Chinese government in Szechuan, etc.

As it was necessary to conceal Rabdanov's intelligence brief from the Chinese government, foreigners, and also from the Tibetans, excluding some close associates of the Dalai Lama, a few precautions had to be taken: the passport should be issued in the name of a Buddhist pilgrim, a Mongolian-Chinese subject; it was better to travel

across Manchuria, Port Arthur, Shanghai, Hankow, and to reside, as has been already mentioned, in a Buddhist monastery; to go occasionally on pilgrimage to the nearby Buddhist holy places. Hankow should serve as the intermediate point, from where Rabdanov would receive instructions through the local consul. All exchanges of letters should be effected through persons recommended by the Tibetan authorities. The codes, books, maps, etc. would remain in Hankow, till Rabdanov is well settled in Kandin.¹²

In the beginning of 1903, the Russian consul in Urga, Shishmarev, prompted by the Foreign Ministry, requested the local authorities to issue passports for Tibet to three Mongolian Buddhist pilgrims, one of whom was Rabdanov, the other two his assistants.¹³ The Urga authorities however replied that they did not have the authority to issue tickets for travel beyond the borders of Mongolia, because Tibetan authorities did not honour such tickets.¹⁴ On 23 February 1903, it became known that one common document could be received from the Chinese Ambans for three Mongolians to travel to Tibet on pilgrimage. On 3 March an official of the Russian consulate in Urga, B. Dolbezhev, reported to the Foreign Ministry that he had received one common document in the Mongolian and Manchurian languages, bearing the seal of the Chinese Ambans in Urga, in the name of three Mongolians travelling to Tibet to worship.¹⁵

On 2 April 1903, Rabdanov was already in Khailar, in Chinese territory, near the eastern border of Mongolia, from where he reported that he had not met Dorjieff in Urga, as it was difficult to get in touch with him in view of the poor means of communication. He was nevertheless maintaining regular correspondence with him and was being furnished with his 'good advice and instructions'. Rabdanov was satisfied with his stay at Urga where he had come into close contact with the Mongolian Khutukhta (the temporal and spiritual ruler of Mongolia) who had given a number of messages to Dorjieff 'to the effect that Mongolia was getting closer to Tibet, in order that the holy influence of the Dalai Lama should undoubtedly spread even more widely amongst Mongolian Buddhists'.¹⁶

On 12 June 1903, Rabdanov was already in Hankow, from where he sent 'Travel Notes of a Pilgrim'¹⁷ to the Foreign Ministry. In these he particularly mentioned meeting the former ruler of the Utaishan monasteries, a well-known Tibetan Lama with the title of Lkharambo, who was very benevolent to him and turned out to be a friend of Agvan Dorjieff, about whom, Rabdanov wrote, he asked 'with very

great interest, but I was not loquacious and tried to give vague replies'.¹⁸ Rabdanov reported, in particular, that 'according to rumours', a Russian lives in Alashan with a Buryati interpreter who had brought different commodities on more than a hundred camels last year. They said, they were sent by the Russian white Tsar and would open trade relations with Tibet.¹⁹

For a full picture of this episode concerning the appointment and activities of the Russian representatives in Kandin, it is necessary to interrupt the chronological sequence of events.

On 6 November 1903, the British government ordered its troops to begin crossing the Tibetan border. In connection with this, on 8 November 1903, the head of the first department of the foreign ministry of Russia N.G. Gartvig asked Rabdanov if he knew anything about British plans concerning intervention in Tibet, and whether he knew what the Tibetan and Chinese response was.²⁰ On 20 December, Rabdanov wrote to the Foreign Ministry from Kandin that since there was no news from Lhasa, he would for the time being take no action as Dorjjeff had promised to send someone from there to assist him.²¹

Finally, on 4 January 1904, Rabdanov received a letter from Dorjjeff expressing great pleasure at his arrival to Kandin, but saying that he was unable to write freely as there were disturbances in the country, four ministers had been arrested for allegedly disobeying the Dalai Lama and maintaining contacts with 'people from far away [foreigners], but with whom exactly was not known'.²² Dorjjeff wrote that he himself was not above suspicion, but they would not dare to act against him because 'of the kind disposition of the Dalai Lama to him'. With the permission of the Dalai Lama, Dorjjeff intended to send a Mongolian speaking person to Rabdanov, but at the moment, he considered this to be dangerous. According to Rabdanov, Tibetans treated the prospects of Russian help sceptically but the Dalai Lama 'stands unflinching'.²³

However, according to other reports from Tibet, received by the beginning of 1904, 'the Tibetans are hostile to all foreigners, and sympathize only with Russia, because she does not oppress its Buddhist subjects. According to rumours from Tibet, they are preparing for war, buying horses and provisions'.²⁴

In the letter of 8 April to the foreign ministry, Rabdanov wrote about the Tibetans' sentiments, about the preparations to rebuff the Britons, about the arrival of a Chinese detachment to Kandin consisting of about 500 men, who would proceed to Li-t'ang.²⁵

On 15 June 1904, Rabdanov reported, that there was no news from Dorjjeff, probably because fighting with the British in Tibet was underway. Rabdanov wrote to Dorjjeff in Lhasa that:

Russia was amassing a large force on the north-western frontier of India entering into friendly relations with the frontier Indian tribes, which undoubtedly would be useful to Tibet in the event of the Anglo-Indian invasion in Tibet, and also wrote about the prevailing strength and justice of Russia in the war against Japan.²⁶

This report was manifestly provocative and clearly revealed at whose initiative the consulate in Kandin had been opened. This action was meant to further provoke the British and worsen Anglo-Russian relations, and in the context of the Russo-Japanese war was intended to spread disinformation.

At Dorjjeff's request Rabdanov sought the permission of the foreign ministry to go to Lhasa.²⁷ It is known that Rabdanov's letters to Russia fell in Peking into the hands of the Russian envoy Lessar whose task it was to guide the functioning of all the consulates in China.

Therefore, on 2 July 1904, Lessar asked the foreign ministry from Peking to inform him whether Rabdanov should go to Lhasa, as the British were already there.²⁸ In response, on 28 July, Lamsdorff telegraphed that Lessar should take the decision himself on the spot,²⁹ and that judging by reports in British newspapers, wrote 'the line of the behaviour of England depends on the steps taken by other states', adding,

that was Rabdanov's situation is known and Dorjjeff would probably try to give his arrival a political character, which will make it difficult for him to pass information, and on the other hand, this might give Britain a pretext to avoid the execution of the agreement with us, it would be better if Rabdanov does not come.³⁰

On 11 July 1904 Rabdanov reported that of the four ministers arrested in Tibet, one had committed suicide, the rest were still languishing in prison awaiting punishment for treachery and for being bribed by the British. Dorjjeff's position had not changed: he was now in charge of Tibet's finances.³¹

On 15 December 1904, the Foreign Ministry received Rabdanov's note 'A Year in Da-Tzsin-Lu', in which he described the 'great importance' of that place in trade, which 'attracts people from all parts of the country'. He wrote about the Catholic mission, about

the situation in China, about his own activities, meetings with the Tibetans, etc.³²

As is known, on the very eve of the entry of the British forces into Lhasa, the Dalai Lama and some of his followers fled to Urga in Mongolia. Reading that, on 27 January 1905, Rabdanov, who was in Hankow, wrote that as he saw it:

the Dalai Lama's sojourn in Urga at the present moment is a direct result of the success of Agvan Dorjjeff's mission, tantamount to presenting the Dalai Lama, together with the followers of Lamaism, directly into the Russian hands, and that now everything seems depend on them.³³

Dorjjeff and the Dalai Lama were both worried about Rabdanov and invited him to come to Urga.³⁴ Further information on Rabdanov's activity revealed that in early July 1906 he was already in Olovyanaya station,³⁵ because the moment the Dalai Lama along with his associates came to stay in Urga, they were in close proximity to Russia, and therefore it became unnecessary for the Russian representative to be based in Da-Tszin-Lu.

The establishment of the Russian consulate in Da-Tszin-Lu gave an opportunity to the Russian ministry of foreign affairs not only to keep track of all Tibetan affairs, but also to receive information about the chain of events in China and the foreigners' activities in the Yangtze valley, etc. Besides, it showed too Tibet's interest in establishing contacts with Russia, its readiness to fully finance the consulate, to maintain continuing contact with it, and provide assistance in the collection of information.

Meanwhile, international events introduced correctives in the activities of Russian diplomacy in the Far East. Anglo-Japanese negotiations that began in the summer of 1901 were concluded with the signature of a treaty on 30 January 1902. Its preamble mentioned the interests of the two states in the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese empire and Korea. The treaty was clearly anti-Russian in character. Russian diplomacy were seriously concerned about the strengthening of the anti-Russian coalition in the Far East which was first manifested in the signature on 8 April 1902 of an agreement for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Manchuria.

However, by the end of 1902, the Bezobrazovites' influence in Russian ruling circles sharply increased and S. Yu. Witte was losing

ground. Under their pressure, despite serious opposition by S. Yu. Witte's associates, on 30 July/12 August 1903, it was formally decided to appoint a Governor-General in the Far East. The Governor-General, Admiral Y.I. Alekseev, a close associate of Bezobrazovites, was given charge of all affairs in the Far East, including relations with China, Korea, and Japan. The establishment of a Governor-General and the resignation of S. Yu. Witte, on 16/29 August 1903, were important victories for the Bezobrazovites, and showed that the autocracy was bent on intensified aggressive policies in the Far East. On the night of 8 and 9 February 1904, the Russian-Japanese war broke out.

Only a month and a half before the outbreak of the war, soon after British forces invaded Tibet, Badmaev addressed (evidently Nicholas II) a memorandum 'about resisting the British in Tibet'.³⁶ In it he said that Tibet had an important strategic significance being the

key to Asia from the Indian side. One who rules Tibet will rule Kokonor and Szechuan provinces, supremacy over Kokonor gives supremacy over the entire Buddhist domain, including the Russian Buddhists, and supremacy of Szechuan gives supremacy over the whole of China. Britain is apparently aware that having captured Tibet, she will, with a grip over Kokonor, Alashan, and Mongolia, have an influence in Turkestan, on the one hand, and Manchuria, on the other. Is it possible that a true Russian cannot apprehend the danger of the British in Tibet; and the Japanese issue is nothing compared to that of Tibet: tiny Japan threatening us is separated from us by water, while the strong British will be side by side with us.³⁷

Thus, clearly understanding that Russia was on the brink of war against Japan, Badmaev propagated the continuation and spread of activities in Tibet. These views had been actively accepted by a certain part of the ruling tsarist clique. It was there that plans for the creation of a Mongolo-Tibetan state under Russian protection and of strengthening Russian influence over the Dalai Lama, etc. were nurtured. Only the successive defeats of the Russian army and navy in the course of the war and the subsequent Anglo-Russian negotiations were able to stop the autocracy's further interference in Tibetan affairs.

The rule of the Governor-General in the Far East was abolished. Later on S. Yu. Witte wrote that the abolition of the Governor-General's post and dismissal of Alekseev 'had been nothing but a kind of further service over the ignominious dead venture of Bezobrazov and his associates'.³⁸

CHAPTER THREE

Russia's 'Threat to India' and Lord Curzon

The Anglo-Indian government and the colonial administration in Great Britain were fully aware that the development of Russian relations with Tibet—a very important geo-strategic region and a recognized centre of Buddhism—would significantly strengthen the Russian positions in Central Asia, including Mongolia, which for a long time had attracted the attention of the Russian bourgeoisie. Therefore, the reported reception of the Tibetan representative Dorjjeff by the Russian Tsar in September 1900 caused great anxiety in London and Calcutta. British diplomats in St Petersburg were instructed to ascertain its implications on the spot.¹ The British Charge d'Affairs in St Petersburg C. Hardinge got in touch with Dr Badmaev, and in a report to Marquis Salisbury in the foreign office on 31 October 1900, made it known that after talking with him, he had come to the conclusion that the mission, in contrast to the previous one, was official, although Badmaev asserted that it was a courtesey visit by Dorjjeff. Hardinge himself believed it was possible that Dorjjeff had visited St Petersburg to clear up purely religious issues between Lhasa and the Russian Buddhists. However, Hardinge wrote, whatever might have been the aim of the mission, the Russian government would benefit from it and seize the opportunity to propagate the view that it would be natural for Asiatic peoples to be under Russian protection.²

Curzon had initially received the report of the mission critically and even stated that Dorjjeff was a swindler and his mission to the

Tsar was 'a fraud' and entirely fabricated. He was of course aware that Russia had for a long time been attempting to penetrate Lhasa, but the presumption that the Tibetan Lamas might have cast away their habitual suspicions of Europeans and openly sent a direct mission to Europe, was from his viewpoint unlikely. Curzon was also convinced that Tibet would sooner ask for protection from Britain than from Russia.³ Besides, believing that it would take no less than ten years for Russia to make Tibet her protectorate, he believed that the British still had sufficient time to drive Russia out of Tibet. To achieve that aim, it was first necessary to establish direct relations with the Dalai Lama. 'A Russian protectorate over Tibet is to be stopped, and the only way to stop is by being in advance ourselves.' If this could not be effected through friendly correspondence, which Curzon had persistently attempted with no success (on 11 June 1901, he wrote to the Secretary of State for India Hamilton: 'It is really the most grotesque and indefensible thing that at a distance of little more than 200 miles from our frontier this community of unarmed monks should set us perpetually at defiance'⁴); the future use of force might become necessary. It must be said that even these attempts by Curzon to establish a correspondence with the Dalai Lama were regarded by the foreign office as being unwise, justly fearing that greater pressure on Tibet might drive the latter closer to Russia.

As regards the question of the sending a small expedition to Tibet, because of serious contradictions with both Germany and Russia, any measure of a military nature, especially at the time of the Anglo-Boer war, would create a complex military and political situation for the British Empire. Curzon was certain to realize that, and in the same letter to Hamilton wrote that for the British it would be a madness to cross the Himalaya and occupy Tibet. It was however important that nobody else should capture it, so it was necessary to convert it into a buffer between the Indian and the Russian empires.⁵

From the correspondence between Curzon and Hamilton on the question of relations with Tibet, it is evident that there were serious disagreements between the Anglo-Indian government and the British cabinet which manifested themselves whenever any matter of external policies concerning India arose. So it was in the case of Tibet. What Curzon could not secure by negotiations, he was prepared to secure by force, while the government in London was more cautious and dealt with matters concerning foreign policy keeping in view the interests of the British empire as a whole.⁶ As regards relations with

Russia, the Foreign Minister, Salisbury, wrote that Curzon wanted him to negotiate with Russia, pretending that they had '500,000 soldiers' to back them, which in fact was not the case.⁷

Meanwhile rumours about Russia's penetration into Lhasa were becoming more and more persistent. The British press was receiving numerous inquiries from readers regarding the situation on the north-eastern frontiers of India.⁸ The ruling circles in India loudly voiced the necessity of including this province in the sphere of British influence.⁹ Reports in the Russian Press about a new Dorjjeff visit to Russia in June 1901, this time with a whole group of Tibetans, greatly increased interest in the situation in Tibet.

Having learnt that on 23 June 1901 Nicholas II had received the extraordinary ambassadors of the Dalai Lama in Peterhof, the English ambassador in Petersburg tried to find out the details of the reception. He informed his government that, according to Dr Badmaev, the Tibetans had requested Russia to help them in the event of British aggression (new evidence of Badmaev's activities contrary to the instructions of the Russian foreign ministry). The Chinese chargé d'affaires in Petersburg believed that Dorjjeff had come to St Petersburg to request the Tsar not to prevent Russian subjects from going to Tibet (evidently, Russian diplomacy still sought to convince the Chinese officials of their desire to preserve the integrity of China). The international press also differently interpreted the reported Tibetan mission. Some of the Indian newspapers reported that missions such as that of 1900 were merely religious in nature.¹⁰ The press in Colombo, on the contrary, asserted that in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 'the explanation, that the aim of the envoy was purely religious ... was never believed; rather the conviction of its political nature was reinforced through descriptions in print of the difficulties encountered by the envoys at the hands of the British passing secretly through India.'¹¹

The British ambassador in St Petersburg, Scott, received an instruction from London that he meet the Foreign Minister of Russia, Lamsdorff. During their talk on 3 July 1901, Lamsdorff characterized the Russian press's conclusion that the Tibetan guests had come on some diplomatic mission, as 'ridiculous and utterly unfounded'.¹² According to him, Dorjjeff had come to St Petersburg 'probably to collect money for his order' from the numerous Buddhists of Russian origin. Lamsdorff stated that during Dorjjeff's first visit the Tsar had received him at Yalta in order to learn some interesting facts about

life in Tibet. The Russian Imperial Geographic Society also showed a keen interest in this visit which, however, was not official in nature.¹³

After the Russian press reported that Dorjjeff had paid visits to Lamsdorff and Witte, Scott again held a discussion with Lamsdorff and was reassured by him that the mission was not official and could not to be regarded as political or diplomatic, being similar to missions to other countries sent by the Roman Pope. The Dalai Lama's letter sent to him through Dorjjeff only wished him good health and wrote that he himself was well.¹⁴

However, the reports of Britain's ambassador in St Petersburg did not satisfy the foreign office. Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, emphasized his surprise that Russia had publicly welcomed the Tibetan mission, when the Dalai Lama had ignored the Viceroy of India and returned his letters unopened. On 2 September 1901, Scott again visited Lamsdorff and conveyed to him that the British government could not be indifferent towards any actions that might violate or change the existing status of Tibet. At that, the Russian minister once again reiterated his earlier statement that the mission had dealt 'with purely religious matters and had no political aims or diplomatic character'.¹⁵

While the British government was still uncertain about the nature of Dorjjeff's mission, the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, openly expressed doubts that 'the Tibetan mission to Russia represented only monasteries',¹⁶ and demanded that the foreign office conclude a treaty in Lhasa guaranteeing permanent relations between Britain and Tibet. For this Curzon was willing to take any measures, including even an armed invasion of Tibet. Hamilton wrote that, the way proposed by Curzon 'may boomerang. It may place Tibet in Russian hands'. Besides, according to the British cabinet, Britain had no material prerequisites to organize any expedition beyond the Indian borders.¹⁷ However, Curzon ignored these arguments and continued to assert that Dorjjeff was a Russian agent. (It is interesting that Curzon overestimated Dorjjeff's abilities and said that if the British intelligence service had such agents he could have established personal relations with the Dalai Lama without difficulty. Meanwhile, on 13 February 1902, Curzon reported to Hamilton that his letter had again been returned by the Dalai Lama.¹⁸

Thus Curzon and the British government, realizing the importance of the events in Tibet, still did not identically assess the seriousness of the events and the methods to be adopted towards Tibet, further

aggravating the differences on the Tibetan issue between Calcutta and London. As far back as August 1901, Hamilton wrote to Curzon that 'the Tibetans are but the smallest pawn on the political chessboard, but castles, knights and bishops may be all involved in trying to take that pawn'.¹⁹

This was testified to by the scope of the campaign started in the British press regarding the Russo-Tibetan rapprochement. It showed that the ruling circles in Britain had vested interests in it. (What can be said about the British press, when the Russian newspaper *Novoye Vremya* had published openly provocative materials on Dorjjeff's visit!). The reports in the British press coincided with the signing of the anti-Russian Anglo-Japanese treaty and of the Russo-Chinese agreement on the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Manchuria, i.e. with the weakening of the Russian position in the Far East.

The spread of rumours in the press and in some diplomatic circles about the Russo-Chinese agreements on Tibet regarding Russian agents in Lhasa, etc. gave the Curzon government a new pretext to intensify anti-Russian propaganda and to justify his 'offensive policy' on grounds of the Russian threat to India.

In May 1902, the Russian Consul-General in Bombay, V.O. Klemm reported to the Russian foreign ministry that the Anglo-Indian newspapers were almost daily printing 'cock and bull stories full of outrageous slanders about Russia'. All Indian libraries contained a collection of books 'which wrote with a suppressed fear and undistinguished spite of Russia's intentions vis-à-vis India the possible outcome of this allegedly inevitable struggle of the whale and the bear for appropriating that treasure'.²⁰

During a discussion with Klemm, a British officer acknowledged that 'false information spread about Russia, especially about the Russian civil and military authorities and about their treatment of people, was a part of a programme to train the Indian native troops'. According to Klemm, the editor of a native newspaper had told him that 'malicious attacks directed at the Russians are welcome to the government, and to please the British public and as a means of strengthening the sympathies of the native Indians for the British regime'. Klemm concluded that 'by this way the Indian people or at least the educated classes receive absolutely false ideas of Russia, in the first place, and secondly, are imbued with the fear and awareness that this ignorant, barbarous country, the embodiment of tyranny, lack of rights and bribe taking, etc., may one fine morning lay its heavy paw on India'.²¹

The British authorities attempted to ascertain Tibet's attitude. The Resident in Nepal, Colonel Ravenshaw, spoke to a merchant who had recently come from Tibet who said that Tibet at present seeks Russian help since China has lost her power there.²² A. Lamb writes that, according to a Tibetan monk, it is said in Lhasa that now Tibetans can be tranquil and not fear either the British or the Nepalese.²³ It was also said that in 1901, the Dalai Lama sought Russia's help and now Tibet had become her protectorate. China came to an understanding with Russia about the Chinese withdrawal from Tibet, so that, the Russians might probably enter Lhasa by the end of the following year (1903).²⁴

However, despite the stepped up anti-Russian propaganda, even Indian public opinion believed that the Russian threat to India was being greatly exaggerated. For example, the newspaper *Times of India* wrote on 4 September 1902 that Russia for many years would be busy with the assimilation and development of its acquired territory, and that therefore British Indians should not imagine that Russia would dream of invading India during the life of the present generation. A distinguished member of the Anglo-Indian government, a well-known expert on Asiatic problems, Henry Cotton, in an interview on 3 December 1902, stated that he did not believe that

Russia has any plan regarding Tibet. Tibet is located at a distance of 1500 miles from the nearest point in the Russian territory and has nothing in common with the Russian sphere of activities in the Chinese territory ... In the present case, again the old slogan 'Russia is interested in India' is repeated. I do not believe that this is really the case; but even if it were, I am sure that Russia could never do this.

Cotton believed that Russia at its present stage of technological development could never cross the Himalaya.²⁵ Indeed, as far back as 1898, a British military agent reported to the intelligence department that any relatively large body of Russian troops would perish of hunger and the relatively small detached force could be easily routed and pushed away from India by superior strength.²⁶

Although the British defence ministry was concerned by the development around Tibet, British army strategists at times displayed sobriety and realism when appraising the real situation in connection with the rumours about the 'Agreement' between Russia, China, and Tibet. Lieutenant-Colonel V.R. Robertson prepared a 'Memorandum on the alleged agreement between Russia and China concerning

Tibet',²⁷ in which the position at the north-east border was compared with that of the north-west. He wrote that from the purely strategic point of view, it is difficult to believe that some day the Russian protectorate over Tibet may convert the Himalayan principality of Nepal, 'sandwiched' between British India and Tibet, into a 'second Afganistan'. Irrespective of the strengthening of Russia's position in Sinkiang and Mongolia, 'the distance from Tibet is too far, the country too poor, to penetrate there from the north is too complicated, and the roads from Tibet to Nepal are difficult of access'. Hence, continued V.R. Robertson, Russia will never move as many soldiers across the Tibetan border as she may move across the border of Afganistan. It might therefore be considered that the threat to Tibet from the Russian side lies not in the intention to capture a strong strategic position, but in the desire to divert the attention of the British from the regions where they were really trying to concentrate their efforts, i.e. from Afganistan and Persia. Besides, wrote Robertson, after achieving a nominal protectorate over Tibet, Russia would do everything possible to complicate the political situation, create disturbances amongst the local tribes, and prevent the development of trade. It was therefore necessary, according to him, to take steps to prevent Russia from making Tibet its protectorate. Above all it is necessary to receive exhaustive information about what takes place in Tibet, and the best way to do that is to have a resident in Lhasa, irrespective of what China would say or do in response.

Thus it was clear that the British cabinet, the representatives of the defence ministry and the Indian press soberly evaluated the situation that was arising, realizing that the Anglo-Indian government need not fear the Russian threat to Tibet. At the same time, the idea of Russian penetration into Tibet justified the plans of the most bellicose representatives of the British colonial circles, who used it as a pretext for armed invasion into Tibet.

In 1902-3, the Anglo-Indian authorities, under the pretext of the intensification of activities against 'the aggressive plans of Russia' and the necessity to take timely measures against them, employed more active means of consolidating their position in Tibet, which was manifested, in the first place, in the attempt to ensure the implementation by Tibet of the conditions laid down by the Convention of 1890 and the Trade rules of 1893.

Curzon and the Anglo-Indian authorities did not have any comprehensive proof of the existence of a treaty between Russia and Tibet, but Curzon, H.C. Lansdowne, and G. Hamilton conjectured that there must have been some sort of negotiations or, if not, a secret treaty, between China and Russia concerning Tibet.²⁸ Curzon considered it his duty 'to foil this petty game, while there is still time'. On 28 May 1902, he wrote to Hamilton: 'As you probably know my open answer to any such action of Russia will be very simple. Without the slightest difficulty, I would put a British army into Lhasa'. It was thus clear that Curzon was only looking for a pretext to fulfil his plan to invade Tibet.

On 8 January 1903, the Viceroy of India sent to the Secretary of State for India, Hamilton, a letter in which he formulated the main principles of the Indian government policies vis-à-vis Tibet. He enumerated the principal developments in Anglo-Tibetan and Russo-Tibetan relations, reminding that 'the Russian border nowhere even touches that of Tibet, and the nearest point of Russian territory is considerably more than a 1000 miles short of the Tibetan capital, which is situated in the extreme south and in close proximity to the northern frontier of the Indian Empire'. No other states or powers had any connection with Tibet, and only 'China ... possesses a nominal suzerainty over the country; secondly Nepal, a state in close connection with India; and, thirdly the British government itself'. Russia has absolutely nothing to do with it. Curzon therefore insisted on resolute action to the extent of using military force in Tibet.²⁹ Actually, since the beginning of February 1903, British troops had begun to invade Tibetan territory. One of the members of the expedition, A. Waddell, attempting to justify the invasion, wrote that Britain was 'compelled' to prevent a very important geographical area situated so near India from finally falling into the Russian orbit.³⁰

On 2 February 1903, the Russian embassy in London sent a memorandum to the foreign office saying that the Russian government had learnt from a reliable source that the British military expedition had reached Komba-Ovaleko on its way to the northern part of the Chumbi valley. The Russian government drew the serious attention of the British government to that information because such actions might force the former to take suitable measures to safeguard its interests in that region.³¹

Thus the Russian government, on their part, attempted to use the threat of the British invasion of Tibet to pressurize the ruling

circles in Great Britain in order to gain concessions on other controversial matters.

On 4 February, the contents of the Russian memorandum was forwarded to the Indian government with a request that the issue be elucidated. On 6 February Curzon replied that the information of the Russian ambassador had no grounds that the matter concerned only the discussion of the border issues (between India and Tibet) in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and friendship.³²

On 11 February 1903, a discussion took place between Lansdowne and the Russian ambassador in Britain, A.K. Benckendorff, on the Russian memorandum of 2 February 1903. Lansdowne said that in his opinion the memorandum was written in a somewhat unusually threatening tone, that it dealt with a country in the direct vicinity of the Indian borders, and it was curious that Russia should so resolutely speak of the immediate defence of her interests in that region. Lansdowne suggested to the Russian government that when it wanted information on that matter it should directly approach him. He repeated that the information was baseless and pointed out that the Chumbi valley was situated close to the Indian border, and had always served as a trade route between the two countries. Benckendorff, on his part, remarked very cautiously that such rumours were possibly being spread to aggravate relations between Russia and Britain, and saw no reason why the two countries should quarrel over Tibet. Neither Russia nor, as she believed, Britain, had political interests in that country. Lansdowne responded that Britain had no intention of conquering Tibet or annexing Tibetan territory, but regarding the other issues provided no definite assurances. It was natural that the Indian government should want to develop trade relations with Tibet and would take necessary measures in that direction.³³

On 18 February, Lansdowne and Benckendorff met again. The English minister stated that the Indian government was extremely perturbed by the Russian memorandum. Indian interests in Tibet were of a special character, he reiterated. Lhasa was in close proximity to the northern borders of India, while Russia's Asiatic possessions were over a thousand kilometres away from Lhasa. Any manifestation of Russia's interests or activities in that region might therefore perturb the population or create an impression that British influence was being pushed into the background and that Russia was quickly moving into regions that had never been within her sphere of interests. Lansdowne also told Benckendorff that rumours had reached the

British government that Russia had concluded an agreement regarding the establishment of a Russian protectorate over Tibet and was despatching a Resident or a Consul to Lhasa. Benckendorff promised to clarify this matter with the Russian minister of foreign affairs, adding however that he doubted there were serious grounds to rely on such information. Concluding the discussion Lansdowne asserted that since Britain had greater interest in Tibet than Russia, so, in response to any action taken by Russia, she would be 'compelled' to take more active action. If Russia sent its mission to Tibet, then Britain would also fit out a mission, but one that was larger and more significant than Russia's. As far as Tibet was concerned, Lansdowne continued, the British would demand only the implementation of the conditions laid down in the 1890 Convention concerning the demarcation of Sikkim's border and trading privileges for the British. Having discovered the insignificance of Chinese influence over Tibet and considering Chinese suzerainty over the latter as mere 'constitutional fiction and political affectation', the Anglo-Indian government endeavoured to establish personal contacts with the Dalai Lama.³⁴

On 19 February 1903, the cabinet in London reviewed the Tibetan question and concluded that it could not sanction sending an armed mission into Tibet. The British Prime Minister Lord Balfour expressed the view that since Tibet was a part of the Chinese empire, a British mission to Lhasa might be regarded as an attack upon the integrity of China, and other powers might press the Chinese government to give them some compensation elsewhere.³⁵ Lansdowne informed the Viceroy of India on 20 February,³⁶ and Curzon expressed 'deep regret', at the decision of the British government, which according to him exposes the 'interests of India on Tibetan borders to undesirable risks'.³⁷ Curzon believed that Britain did not have such serious reasons for taking extreme action in any other part of Asia. If Britain delayed, declared Curzon, then in future 'some gross and irrelevant insult is offered to our honour or our flag'. He maintained that resolution to act would have served not only India's interests but also those of the British empire as a whole; that Britain's prestige should be unconditionally recognized in any point of the 'glaxis' that surrounded it.³⁸ The leader of the military mission to Tibet, F. Younghusband, wrote in his memoirs that only 'irresponsible persons, at a comfortable distance in England' could ignore the rumours about Russian intrigues in Lhasa, but the Indian government, vitally interested in those matters could not 'with a clear heart' repudiate those

rumours. Younghusband thought Russia's interest in Tibet was quite natural and expressed the opinion that Russia would not restrict herself to expansion in Manchuria, Sinkiang, and Mongolia, and that at this particular moment it was necessary to stop her, otherwise she would bring Tibet under her control, which would make her the first power in Asia. Younghusband wrote that 'a full-dress invasion of India through Tibet no responsible person ever dreamed possible', but he was seriously afraid of Russia strengthening her influence in Lhasa. 'In practical detail it would mean the increase of our army in the north-east frontier by several thousand men'.³⁹

The British government, which was serious enough about the rumours of Russian penetration into Lhasa, appraised the situation from a wider perspective than Lord Curzon, taking into account the interests of England in Europe and Asia as a whole.

Britain was preparing for an open encounter with its principal rival Germany. In 1903 the Anglo-French negotiations began regarding all colonial problems. During that period, Britain showed a tendency to come closer to Russia, which was actively supported by France. In early 1903, discussions between the Russian ambassador in London, Benckendorff, and Lansdowne became regular.

Considering all these circumstances, on 27 February 1903 Hamilton wrote to Curzon that a careful study of his proposals of 8 January had been made not only from the point of view of difficulties on the Indian border with Tibet, but 'from the wider point of view of the relations of Great Britain to other powers, both European and Asiatic'. Hamilton wrote that the British government was of the opinion that employment of force to establish British influence in Lhasa would be undesirable, particularly at a time when negotiations between the British foreign secretary and the Russian ambassador in London were underway. No doubt, both the British and the Indian governments considered it necessary to guarantee the interests of British India in Tibet, to neutralize the influence of any other foreign state in that region situated in proximity to the British possessions. Although the British government has 'no desire either to declare a Protectorate or permanently occupy any portion of the country', yet steps, such as an armed mission would undoubtedly entail the establishment of a firmer footing in Lhasa, but 'measures of this kind might, however, become inevitable if we were once to find ourselves committed to armed intervention in Tibet'. Therefore, the British government 'think it necessary before sanctioning a course which

might be regarded as an attack on the integrity of the Chinese Empire, to be sure that such action can be justified by the previous action of Tibet and Russia'. Of course, despatching an armed mission to Tibet could be assessed to be a legitimate reply to such actions of the Tibetan government as returning unopened three of Curzon's letters, and disregarding the convention with China of 1890, 'the validity of which was repudiated by the Tibetan officials'. However, in the emerging situation such measures would be premature. In connection with it, Hamilton wrote that the maximum benefit should be derived from the Russian memorandum of 2 February, to put pressure on the Russian government, to make a clear-cut announcement of their policies and to warn that Britain would counter any action on the Tibetan question taken by them. On receipt of explanations from the Russian government, it would be easier for the British government to decide on the question of further negotiations with China and other steps necessary to defend the interests of India from the threat of the growth of foreign influence in Tibet.⁴⁰

Curzon was not however convinced by these arguments, and while expecting a reply from the Russian ambassador, the Viceroy of India again wrote to Hamilton that the time was ripe and further delay could result in the appearance of a Russian agent in Lhasa. He reiterated his proposals of 8 January.⁴¹

On 20 March 1903, the Russian minister of external affairs, in a letter to his ambassador in London, Benckendorff, formulated the principles of Russian policies in relation to Tibet. He wrote, *inter alia*:

the Imperial Government considers that it is necessary to maintain a status-quo in Tibet and, if the British were somehow to violate that, Russia will not fail to protect her interests, of course, not by taking any direct measures in Tibet herself (as she is removed from us by Anglo-Indian possession), but most probably in other proper parts of the Asian continent.⁴²

On 24 March and 8th April 1903, Lansdowne met the Russian ambassador Benckendorff in London, who assured the British minister that the rumours about the secret treaties between Russia and Tibet and between Russia and China regarding Tibet were unfounded. Benckendorff state that Russia had no agents in Lhasa, nor did she intend to despatch any mission there. He added however that although the Russian government did not have any plans regarding Tibet, it could not remain indifferent to any attempt to violate the status quo

there. Russia would protect her interests in Asia, not only in Tibet, but also elsewhere. The Russian government considered Tibet to be a part of the Chinese empire and was interested in its integrity. He expressed the hope that Russia would not be forced to take such actions.⁴³

Lansdowne made it clear that Britain had no intention of annexing Tibetan territory but she would insist upon the implementation by Tibet of the provisions of treaties and trade agreements. Should Tibet violates its commitments, Britain would be forced to exercise its rights. In any case, Britain would not encroach upon the independence of Tibet.⁴⁴

The British government did not find it possible not to accept the Russian government's assertions and concluded that to counter Russian aspirations, 'it is not necessary to send an armed mission to Lhasa'. Reporting this to the Viceroy of India, Hamilton requested Curzon to inform him how, in his opinion, negotiations with China and Tibet should take place under the existing circumstances.⁴⁵ Curzon in a letter to Hamilton on 16 April 1903 expressed his agreement with that point of view and expressed the view that it was necessary to immediately start negotiations with China and Tibet on the implementation by the Tibetan side of the obligations stipulated in the treaties.

Thus it seemed that Britain and Russia made mutual commitments regarding Tibet. Nevertheless, the British continued their military preparations on the Tibetan border, moving in their forces, etc. Younghusband explained that the British were still apprehensive of Russian influence in Tibet, believing that even if the Russians did not intend to help the Tibetans, the latter 'might and did think they could count upon Russian support'. He went on to say that Tibetans expand 'ordinary amenities' from the Russian side 'into a promise of thick-and-thin support against the British'.⁴⁶ It was however clear that the Anglo-Indian government did not wish to miss such a convenient opportunity to capture Tibet as ultimately arose in 1903.

Activating their military preparations, the British authorities justified their actions on the basis of the reluctance of the Chinese and Tibetan authorities to start discussions on controversial matters, through Yu Tai, just appointed the Chinese Resident in Tibet, in a conversation with the then Chargé d'Affairs of Great Britain in Peking expressing the desire to do everything within his powers to reach an agreement with Claude White on the border question.⁴⁷ In a letter

to Curzon of 6 April 1903, Yu Tai wrote that as early as 1902 he had sent his representatives to Yatung, who had been there for three months and had repeatedly sought to negotiate with C. White. Yu Tai suggested that negotiations begin without further delay at any place of the Viceroy's choosing.⁴⁸ Curzon on his part expressed the view that Khamba-Dzong situated close to the disputed part of the border in Giagong would be the best place to hold such negotiations. Should the Chinese and Tibetan representatives refuse to go to Khamba-Dzong or if the Chinese representative came without the Tibetan representative, Curzon said, the British representative would go to Shigatse or Gyantse with an escort of 200 men to accelerate the opening of negotiations.⁴⁹ Thus Curzon continued to devise plans to invade Tibet with the use of force.

The British government did not object to Khamba-Dzong as the venue for the meeting between the representatives of the three sides. In a letter to Curzon, however, Hamilton reiterated that the existing situation could not serve as a justification for the invasion of Tibetan territory directed towards Lhasa even if the meeting did not take place. Hamilton wrote that the British mission should not advance beyond Khamba-Dzong without the prior permission of the British government.⁵⁰

Concern over the British mission in Tibet was expressed also by the Chinese ministry of external affairs referring to the Chinese Amban in Lhasa, who asked that the importance of peace negotiations be impressed upon the British representative and that British forces should refrain from entering Tibetan territory.⁵¹

In a letter to Hamilton of 7 May 1903, the Viceroy of India suggested Gyantse, an important trading centre en route to Lhasa and Shigatse, as the site for the trade market and the residence of the British agent. (Curzon again pointed out that in his opinion Lhasa was the best place, but as the British government was against it, he suggested Gyantse as an alternative.) While working out the trade rules, Curzon said that the British should make it clear to the Chinese and Tibetan authorities that the British representative should have every opportunity to establish direct links with the Tibetan government. In the event of resistance to this, shifting the threat of the British agent to Lhasa should be advanced. Curzon suggested the appointment of F. Younghusband as the chief representative at the negotiations, because he had recently been promoted to the rank of Colonel and had great experience in Asian affairs; Claude White, the resident in Sikkim, would assist him.⁵²

As a matter of principle, Hamilton was not against the transfer of the market to Gyantse.⁵³ However, before taking a final decision he wanted to know whether, if Tibet rejected Gyantse, there was any alternative to armed invasion of that country—the British government in this way continued to be very cautious and did everything possible to avoid an offensive on Tibet.

After consulting Younghusband and White, Curzon wrote to Hamilton on 21 May that the Tibetans and the Chinese were greatly perturbed by the long silence (of the British) and by the construction of the road in Sikkim, were very afraid of an armed invasion of Lhasa, and that to avoid this danger would be prepared to agree to any deal. As an alternative to an invasion of Tibet, Curzon suggested: (1) deportations of all Tibetans from British India and blockading all trade routes (although that might be futile or expensive) or (2) occupation of the Chumbi valley, which obviously would constitute an armed invasion. According to him, the main thing was that the Tibetans should know the seriousness of British intentions, because as soon as they realize it and see 'our military detachments behind', invasion may not be necessary.⁵⁴

The British government in London closely examined the messages of the Viceroy of India of 7 and 21 May 1903, and agreed on the need to conduct negotiations in Khamba-Dzong regarding the border. Lansdowne and Hamilton did not consider it advisable to put on the agenda the question of the residence of the British Agent (either in Lhasa or in Djagtse). Hamilton wrote to Curzon that complications that might arise through such a step might in the existing conditions outweigh the probable advantage of that sort of arrangement,⁵⁵ as the proposed measure, according to Lansdowne, might lead to a serious breach of status quo in Tibet to which, as the Russian ambassador had expressed it, the Russian government could not remain indifferent.⁵⁶ The British government did not wish the proposals made to Tibet be accompanied by a threat, especially, as Hamilton stated, Russia's assurances had changed earlier views regarding the extent of the political influence of that country in Tibet.⁵⁷ Thus, the British government in London continued to try to restrain the activity of the Anglo-Indian authorities and to proceed from the perspective of its own interests dictated by the necessity of a rapprochement with Russia.

On 3 June 1903, the Viceroy of India informed the Chinese Amban in Lhasa that Younghusband would lead the British mission and that Khamba-Dzong would be the place for negotiations. Curzon

sought the attendance of the Chinese and the Tibetan emissaries by 7 July 1903.⁵⁸ The Chinese authorities in Peking, on their part, informed the British Charge d'Affairs that the Dalai Lama had appointed a representative to conduct the negotiations,⁵⁹ but that these could take place only in Giagong or Yatung.⁶⁰ Meanwhile the British colonial authorities continued military preparations along the Tibetan border, chalked out extensive plans for the expedition, its composition, arrangements for the supply of provisions and munitions and drew-up the estimate of necessary expenditure, etc. Younghusband received detailed instructions on the issues he should negotiate with the Tibetan and Chinese emissaries.⁶¹

The situation in the border region was gradually worsening as the British, on the basis of reports of military preparations on the Tibetan side and the decision of the Tibetan Assembly to launch an armed struggle against the British,⁶² of the supply of arms to the Tibetan forces quartered in Lhasa, Pari, and Shigatse,⁶³ etc., were persistent in their demand that their terms be met, and threatened to increase their military escort's strength.⁶⁴ Younghusband himself continued to emphasize the Russian intrigues in Tibet and sent a memorandum to the Indian government regarding Russian penetration of Lhasa, stressing particularly that even if Russia did not intend to help Tibet then the latter, like the Chinese, believed that they could use Russia to pressurize the British for a resolution of the border question.⁶⁵ He added that the display of courteousness and friendliness by the Russian might lead the Tibetans to interpret that as a promise of help during the anti-British struggle.⁶⁶ Younghusband referred to the reports of British agents in Tibet about a substantial Russian detachment being located in the area to the north of Lhasa.⁶⁷ The British press also continued to spread rumours about Russian penetration into Tibet and of 143 Russian engineers who had arrived in army uniforms on the eastern border of Tibet and of a Cossack detachment approaching Tibet from the north, and so on.⁶⁸ The British authorities used these reports to intensify their preparations for an invasion of Tibet.

Younghusband continued to supply information about the Tibetan military preparations and their refusal to hold negotiations in Khamba-Dzong, stating to the Chinese representative at the negotiations that if he wanted to save the country from future trouble, he should convince the Amban in Lhasa that necessary measures should be taken while it was still not too late.⁶⁹ Reporting to London, the Viceroy of India added that Younghusband did not hope for a peaceful solution to the

issue and foresaw the possibility of occupying the Chumbi valley and simultaneously sending a mission to Gyantse. Curzon stated that the Tibetans were unaware of British strength and unconditionally counted on Russia's help. He said that the situation was becoming critical because of the approach of November, after which it would become extremely difficult to take any action and would delay the mission to Khamba-Dzong to spring. If that were the case, it could be possible that some other power might interfere.⁷⁰ Besides, the Tibetans had imprisoned two British nationals in Shigatse. In response the British demanded their release and a compensation of two million rupees, and in retaliation captured herds of Tibetans sheep in the Giagong area.⁷¹

Hamilton informed Curzon that the British representative in Peking had been told to report all these facts to the Chinese authorities, adding however that it was doubtful, whether, given the existing relations between China and Tibet, it would yield any result. If it did not, it might be necessary in the future to adopt forcible measures in Tibet. He thought also that the occupation of the Chumbi valley would be sufficient to bring home to the Tibetans the seriousness of Great Britain's intentions.⁷²

The Peking authorities, acting at the request of the Chinese Resident in Lhasa, approached the British diplomatic representative in Peking with the request that they await the arrival of the newly appointed Amban Yu T'ai in Lhasa and not to increase the strength of the British forces in Khamba-Dzong area by another 300 men (as had been planned) as that might result in serious difficulties of provisioning.⁷³ The British colonial administration however continued to point out to the Chinese government that the Tibetans were against holding peace negotiations and insisted that it send appropriate instructions to Lhasa and explain the seriousness of the situation to the Dalai Lama. Prince Ch'ing replied that the Chinese government was interested in the peaceful settlement of all questions with the Tibetan side (in a discussion with the British diplomats Prince Ch'ing repeatedly showed disrespect for the Tibetans, called them foolish, ignorant, etc.)⁷⁴ The British government informed China that their sole aim of establishing friendly relations with Tibet did not mean that they should disregard the British mission and continue to hold the British nationals in prison. Great Britain expected the Chinese government to immediately pressurize the Dalai Lama to send a plenipotentiary emissary to negotiate without delay and release the

two British nationals, otherwise Britain would be compelled to take necessary measures to ensure the security of the mission.⁷⁵

At the end of September 1903, to consolidate the positions in the border regions, Colonel J. MacDonald was placed in command of all the forces stationed there, and was also in charge of the construction of a road from Siliguri up to the border.⁷⁶

On 3 October 1903, Colonel F. Younghusband sent the Anglo-Indian government in Shimla a plan for the invasion of Tibet by the combined forces from Khamba-Dzong and the Chumbi valley under MacDonald's command, and the capture of Shigatse. Moreover, he also wrote that he had established friendly relations with the associates of the Panchen Lama in Shigatse, so the latter's support to Lhasa would be nominal. The Nepalese detachment would also take part in the invasion of Tibet.⁷⁷ In principle this plan was approved by the Anglo-Indian authorities,⁷⁸ and entry into the Chumbi valley was expected after 26 October.⁷⁹

Thus Tibet's fate was decided. The British colonial authorities, taking advantage of the weakness and unpreparedness of the country to resist such a powerful and highly experienced neighbour as the British masters of India, the inability of China, due to the complexity of her internal situation, to defend her vassal, and the further aggravation of the situation in the Far East, diverting Russia's attention from Tibet, sent their heavily armed forces into Tibet, while laying responsibility for the invasion squarely on Tibet.

BRITISH INVASION OF TIBET 1903-4

AND RUSSIA'S ATTITUDE

On 6 November 1903, the government of Great Britain ordered a full-scale invasion of Tibet.¹ In a telegram to the Anglo-Indian authorities, the British government emphasized that 'this step should not be allowed to lead to occupation or permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs in any form'. The sole purpose was to obtain satisfaction from the Tibetan side, and as soon as that aim was fulfilled, the troops would withdraw from Tibetan soil.²

Justifying the decision of the British government to send a 'special commission' with an armed escort to Tibet, on 7 November 1903 Lansdowne told Benckendorff that the 'outrageous' behaviour of the Tibetans who had expelled British nationals and had stolen their

transport animals, etc., had frustrated the negotiations with the British representatives and impelled the British government to send to Tibet a 'special commission' with the necessary armed escort; Lansdowne however stressed that this was not to capture or temporarily occupy Tibetan territory.³

Realizing the extremely difficult position of his government, the Russian ambassador in London, Benckendorff, did not immediately inform St Petersburg about the details of his discussion with Lansdowne, fearing that it would create an unfavourable impression. Lansdowne, not wanting an exaggerated rumour about the invasion to reach the ruling circles in Russia, once again requested Benckendorff to draw the attention of the Russian government to the fact that these measures were undertaken not to occupy or annex Tibet's territory, but only represented a response to the 'outrageous' behaviour of the Tibetans towards British nationals.⁴

On 17 November Lansdowne and Benckendorff had another discussion. The Russian ambassador spoke of the seriousness of the impact on the Russians of Younghusband's march into Tibet. Benckendorff reminded the British minister about the declaration on the Tibetan question made by the Russian government, and said that the British invasion in Tibet could seriously change the situation in Central Asia, especially at a time when the Russian government intended to enter into friendly negotiations with the British government on all controversial issues. In reply Lansdowne expressed 'surprise' at the 'excitement' shown by the Russian government and repeated all the issues he had enumerated earlier about the rights of Britain in Tibet, India's next door neighbour, and her relations with the Tibetan authorities, and remarked that such a reaction from Russia appeared strange to him as Russia is a power that according to him, had never in any part of the globe missed an opportunity to encroach upon the rights of its neighbours, for instance Manchuria, Turkestan, and Persia. On the insistence of Benckendorff in order to facilitate further negotiations, Lansdowne officially stated that Britain had been reluctant to take such a measure but had been compelled to do so by special circumstances, with the sole aim of receiving satisfaction from the Tibetan side for their harassment of British subjects.

The Chinese government was seriously concerned by British policies in Tibet. On 6 November 1903, on the day of the beginning of the invasion, the Chinese ambassador in London asked Lansdowne whether the report of the armed detachment despatched to the Tibetan

territory by the Indian government was true. Despite the fact that the order had already been issued, Lansdowne evasively stated that the decision on that question had not yet been finally taken, but the Indian government was so deeply insulted by the actions of the Chinese and Tibetan authorities that to him, Lansdowne, such an action appeared inevitable. Lansdowne said that the Chinese government had proved that it was unable to influence the Tibetan authorities and to prevent their 'outrageous behaviour' towards the British representatives.⁵

However, the Chinese ministry of external affairs still hoped that the government of Great Britain would not sanction the invasion of Tibet till the assumption by Yu T'ai of his office as the new Amban in Lhasa, which would make it possible to resolve the controversial question peacefully.⁶ A telegram on these lines was sent to London on 9 November, i.e. after the beginning of Younghusband's invasion of Tibet. Even on 14 November, the Chinese authorities still hoped for a repeal of the order to invade into Tibet. At the emperor's request the Tibetan authorities received an 'instruction' to adopt a more appropriate attitude toward the British representatives in order to avert further complication of the situation. Nevertheless, Lansdowne believed that in existing conditions the British government could not remain inactive and await the arrival of the Amban, and particularly so since there were few prospects of his orders being heeded by the Tibetan authorities.⁷ On 19 November 1903, the Chinese ambassador in London once again requested Lansdowne to hold back dispatch of the mission,⁸ but by then Younghusband and MacDonald's detachments had already moved into Tibet.⁹

It was no accident that the Chinese ruling circles were extremely perturbed by the British actions in Tibet. The Manchu dynasty themselves aspired to maintain a hold on that important strategic region, but this was not all. The Tibetan question was connected with Russian policies in relation to Manchuria, and, as P.M. Lessar wrote in one of his reports, China 'sees in the Russian interpretation of the Manchu question a beginning of a division of China, and in the British action a confirmation of this opinion, especially as opposition is not expected from anywhere'.¹⁰

The Shanghai *Diplomatic Gazette* wrote, in particular, that the conquest of Manchuria by Russia had caused much greater anxiety and discussion than the British offensive in Tibet, even though Tibet is a part of China, and the British are foreigners. The article added

that if, in the course of the negotiations, Britain argued that given China's incapacity to control Tibet, it would be more advantageous to let Tibet fall into British hands than Russia's, there would be no argument to counter this. If however Russia and Britain, along with other states (France and Germany) also began territorial expansion, then that would mean the end of China. If in that case China begins to actively protest against the British invasion in Tibet, then the British might demand that Russia evacuate Manchuria, and only thereafter a discussion of the Tibetan question. The fate of Manchuria depended on the outcome of the Russo-Japanese confrontation, so China lacked sufficiently strong arguments to convince the British not to invade Tibet and avert the use of her example by Russia and other states. In the opinion of the newspaper, there was a distinct threat of the beginning of the division of China. In the final analysis, the Tibetan question depended on the solution of the question of Manchuria and other parts of the Chinese empire.¹¹ Thus, though the Dalai Lama had observed that China 'is indifferent to the show of British strength in Tibet',¹² nevertheless this was the result of a complete inability of the Chinese authorities to actively intervene in the Tibetan events and to prevent the entry of British troops.

The Chinese ruling circles possibly had a vested interest in the worsening relations between Russia and Britain on account, *inter alia*, of Tibet. They hoped that the Anglo-Russian contradictions might compel the British authorities to oppose the offensive policies of Lord Curzon in relation to Tibet. This was remarked upon by the same *Diplomatic Gazette*.¹³ The Russian government, on its part, did not want its relations with Britain to deteriorate on account of Tibet, realizing that an attempt to receive any privileges in Tibet might entail demands being made of similar privileges being granted to Britain in Manchuria. This point of view was stated, in particular, in Lessar's, telegram to the foreign ministry.¹⁴

However, one of the most active champions of adventurous policies in the Far East was the Governor-General in the Far East Adjutant-General Y.I. Alekseev, who in an attempt to justify the actions in Manchuria, disagreed with the point of view that British actions in Tibet 'echoes our occupation of Manchuria'. Alekseev wrote to Lessar that 'long before the Manchurian question had cropped up, the British have been striving to include Tibet in their sphere of influence and it is a continuation of the offensive policies of the Indian government due to which Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Sikkim, and Central Asia were

subjugated by the British ... It is beyond doubt that China would have remained as passive as it is now to the capture of Tibet had we not occupied Manchuria'. 'To stop the conquest of Tibet, on whom all the Buddhists in Siberia and Mongolia spiritually depend', he continued, 'pressure must be put on the British in one of the most sensitive points in Central Asian possessions'.¹⁵

In response, Lessar wrote to Alekseev on 17/30 December, 1903:

During my long service in Central Asia, I learnt of the development of Russo-English rivalry there. It has lasted scores of years and, of course, I could not wish to express the opinion that British actions in Tibet echo our capture of Manchuria. But the successes of both rivals depend upon the political conditions. The area south of the Himalaya was in Britain's sphere of influence, and the rapidity of actions there depended solely on considerations, so to say, internal in nature. On the contrary, Tibet was being claimed both by Russia and Britain, and for effecting there the influence of one on the other, favourable concurrence of circumstances is necessary. Judging by Britain's actions, she evidently regards the present situation as such; our forces have been diverted to the Far East and ... joint actions with China are not possible for us. Thus, our seizure of Manchuria may have a decisive influence on the fate of Tibet and in a big or small degree affect the relative positions of both powers in the Persian Gulf and Seistan, etc.¹⁶

Despite the positive assurances of the British foreign secretary to the Russian ambassador in London, the Anglo-Indian colonial circles believed that consolidating their position in Tibet and creating a base connected to India with good communications might make it possible to establish strong ties with the Muslims of Kashgar and Buddhist Mongolia and Siberia, and via Kashgar to influence the Muslims of Russian Turkestan. The strengthening of British influence in eastern Tibet would make it possible to neutralize the French influence in Yunnan and Szechuan.¹⁷

It was therefore clear that the activities of Britain in Tibet and of Russia in Manchuria depended on the political and military situation: considering the critical position of Britain in South Africa, Russia pursued an active policy in the Far East; utilizing the opportunity offered by the Russo-Japanese war, Britain launched the expedition to Tibet. These were of course not the only reasons, and to view the relationship between the events that took place in Manchuria and Tibet we must not view them in that light. It would not be correct to

think that the actions of one power served as the cause of the actions of the other. Both Russia and Britain waited only for an opportunity to implement their plans of long standing. It was also clear that all these events were only a symptom of the weakness and eventual collapse of the Manchu dynasty in China.

Meanwhile, despite the protests of the Tibetan representatives and their declarations about their readiness to hold negotiations with Britain, the Younghusband mission continued to move inside Tibetan territory.¹⁸ Intending to divert the attention of China and to justify the invasion of the British armed detachments, Younghusband continued to report to Calcutta various rumours regarding Russian penetration of Tibet, about Russian armaments being brought into the country, about the expectations of Russian help, about Dorjief being in Lhasa in charge of the Tibetan arsenal, and the like.¹⁹ It was no coincidence that the Russian Consul-General in India, Klemm, wrote that the question about the reason for marching forward 'has only one answer in India: that they [the Indian government] are apprehensive of the spread of Russian influence, if not direct Russian domination in this country adjacent to India ...'. Klemm noted that, 'with the appearance of our individual travellers in Tibet, and especially since the visit of some Tibetans to Russia, the question of the future destiny of that country has been finally put on the agenda'.²⁰

On 3 December 1903, the Anglo-Indian authorities asked Younghusband about the conditions that he thought proper for negotiation of the proposed convention. In his reply, Younghusband analysed the existing situation and thinking it necessary for Britain to have Tibet's guarantee for the implementation of the conditions of the agreement, and also to restrict the further spread of Russian influence in Tibet, he expressed the view that sending a British agent to Lhasa (or at least to Shigatse) and the occupation of the Chumbi valley should be agreed upon. Younghusband submitted to the Anglo-Indian authorities a draft of the Convention and Trade Rules that provided for the residence of British officials in Shigatse, with extra-territorial rights and the right to establish direct contacts with senior Chinese and Tibetan officials in Lhasa. The Tibetan government was required not to hinder the movement of Tibetan merchants and officials in India and of their British counterparts in Tibet. The draft also provided for the occupation of the Chumbi valley by the British forces and the participation of the British in mining the mineral resources of Tibet. Thus the draft of the agreement submitted by

Younghusband reflected the attitude of the Anglo-Indian authorities, striving not only to ensure the implementation of the conditions of the 1890 Convention and Trade Rules of 1893 by Tibet, but also aiming at making the fullest use of a convenient moment to establish a dominant position in Tibet.

At the end of 1903 and beginning of 1904, the international scene was characterized by the strengthening of the foreign policy positions of Great Britain: signing the anti-Russian treaty with the Japanese and concluding peace with the Boers on 31 March 1902 gave full scope to the British authorities, who were preparing for an open battle with their principal foe, the Germans. In the face of such an adversary Britain sought an opportunity for reconciliation and co-operation with Russia and France. In 1903, as has already been mentioned, negotiations began between the British and the French governments on all controversial colonial problems. In November 1903, Britain's King Edward VII in a discussion with the Russian ambassador, Benckendorff, expressed his desire to establish 'better understanding' with the Russian government on the existing controversial issues: a discussion on the possibility of opening negotiations on Afghanistan whose place within Britain's sphere of influence Russia, according to Lansdowne, should admit; Tibet too should remain within the British sphere of influence and Russia should not send its representatives there. The situation in Manchuria and Persia should also be discussed.²¹ However, the Russian-Japanese war, which started during the night of 8/9 February 1904, interrupted the negotiations between Britain and Russia, and dramatically altered the political situation in Asia: after the defeat of the Russian forces on land and sea, the British authorities began to raise a number of controversial questions, particularly regarding Tibet, in the light of the security of the Indian frontiers, and their intervention there.

On 8 April 1904, the Anglo-French alliance was concluded. Signing the agreement with Britain, France, as Russia's ally, was also interested in Anglo-Russian rapprochement. The French diplomats in Petersburg and London, during discussions with Russian and British statesmen, dropped repeated hints about the readiness of both parties to negotiate. Moreover, the British king, Edward VII, held a discussion with the Russian envoy A.P. Izvolsky (the future foreign minister), in

the course of which he expressed a serious desire to establish friendly relations between Great Britain and Russia, pointing out that the war with Japan had not created a very favourable atmosphere for negotiations, but expressed the hope that all controversial issues dividing the two countries could be resolved. Evaluating the results of that discussion, the Russian ambassador in London, Benckendorff, remarked to Lansdowne that 'they were very favourable' and 'undoubtedly will improve the relations between the two countries'.

Though the course of the Russo-Japanese war appeared to distract Russian attention away from sorting out other controversial issues with Britain, yet the Tibetan issue still remained one of the major questions for Russian diplomacy and continued to be discussed in the course of the Anglo-Russian negotiations. Thus, Benckendorff asked Lansdowne about the British government's intention in connection with a report that the Tibetans had allegedly refused to dispatch an official representative to negotiate with them. Lansdowne replied that the government of Great Britain would wait for the information on that question from the government of British India and only then arrive at a final decision. The Russian ambassador did not conceal serious apprehensions the Russian government had regarding the Tibetan situation.²²

Even greater attention was paid to the Tibetan question after the signature of the 1904 Anglo-French agreement, when Russia had to support the articles of the agreement concerning the Egyptian debt (the so-called Khedival Decree).²³ The negotiations on that issue took place between Benckendorff and the French ambassador in London P.P. Cambon. The Russian ambassador emphasized that extending their support to the Khedival Decree was subject to British guarantees to maintain the status quo in Tibet. The Russian government was afraid that Russia 'will serve their [British] interests for nothing, if she gets nothing substantial for it', and therefore Benckendorff was advised to negotiate 'with a high degree of caution'.²⁴

Being interested in the publication of the Khedival Decree, French diplomacy sought to make its contribution to the solution of the Tibetan issue, and the French Ambassador in Petersburg, Bompar, in a discussion with the British ambassador C.A. Spring-Rice, expressed the view that the Russian government attached vital importance to the Tibetan issue, and if both sides really wanted to improve relations, the Tibetan question might serve as the initial point. Bompar added that Russia's concern vis-à-vis Tibet was quite natural, as Lhasa was

the religious centre of the Mongols, Buryats, and Kalmyks, and a foreign power annexing Tibet could influence the entire Buddhist population of Russia. Bompar opined that neither Britain nor Russia should occupy a predominant position in Lhasa. It was imperative to solve that 'unfavourable question' without delay as it was an obstacle to a better understanding between the two countries.²⁵

Thus, to receive Russia's consent to the Khedival Decree France called on British diplomacy to find a way to come to an understanding with Russia on the Tibetan question. On 16 April 1904, Lamsdorff informed Benckendorff that the British embassy in Petersburg had officially requested the Russian government to agree to publish the Khedival Decree. Before replying to such a request Lansdowne wanted to know at what stage the negotiations between Benckendorff and Lansdowne were regarding non-interference in the internal affairs of Tibet and maintaining the status quo. On 4 May 1904, a discussion took place between Lansdowne and Benckendorff at which both sides confirmed their natural desire to reach an agreement on all controversial issues. Lansdowne, in particular, noted that Benckendorff in the talks with him repeatedly broached the Tibetan question and in connection with it the British government might once again reaffirm its attitude expressed in the telegram of 6 November 1903, to the Anglo-Indian government sanctioning the entry of the mission into Shigatse, while maintaining that this step would not lead to the occupation of Tibet or interference in its internal affairs. Simultaneously, Lansdowne touched upon another question, which, as he said, the Russian government could solve without infringing on its interests, i.e. on the question of the Khedival Decree. During the talks Lansdowne plainly said that should Russia agree to the enforcement of the Khedival Decree, the British government would give firm assurances that in regard to Tibet it would adhere to the policy formulated in the telegram dated 6 November 1903. Once again, going through the text of the telegram, Benckendorff said that, as he saw it, there was everything in it that would satisfy the Russian government.²⁶

On 10 May 1904, Benckendorff passed on to Lansdowne the text of Lamsdorff's telegram, which expressed the Russian government's satisfaction with the British government's intention to establish relations between the two countries on the basis of mutual trust, and as soon as the Russian government had received an official memorandum from the government of Great Britain regarding its policy in Tibet, it, on its part, would declare that it had nothing against the enforcement of

the Khedival Decree, the draft of which was affixed to the Anglo-French Agreement of 8 April 1904.

On the same day Lansdowne gave Benckendorff the text of a memorandum containing the principal points of the telegram of 6 November 1903, indicating that the government of Great Britain would adhere to the principle prescribed in that telegram. It was however clear that its actions would depend to a degree on the behaviour of the Tibetans; therefore, the government could not guarantee that it would never deflect in future from the policy that it currently pursued. The Memorandum mentioned once again that so long as no other power interfered in Tibetan affairs, Britain too would make no attempt to annex it, treat it as a protectorate, or interfere in its internal affairs in any other way.

In the course of their discussions, Lansdowne informed Benckendorff that the 'aggressiveness and stubbornness' of the Tibetans had compelled the British government to sanction Younghusband's entry into Lhasa if no agreement was reached in Shigatse, but even this would in no way change the basic principles of its policy toward Tibet.²⁷

Russian diplomacy was anxious about the intention of the British to enter Lhasa, and especially about what they said regarding the 'behaviour of Tibetans'. Besides, the Russian government had some doubts over the second paragraph of Article One of the Anglo-French Declaration of 8 April 1904, which particularly mentioned that France would not hamper the activities of Britain in Egypt, insisting upon the fixation of a time limit for British occupation or some other restriction.²⁸ In the course of the talks between Benckendorff and Lansdowne it became clear that Britain would like a similar declaration on Egypt from the Russian government too.²⁹ Talks and correspondence on that question between Lansdowne, Benckendorff, and Spring-Rice continued for several days,³⁰ and eventually, during a meeting on 17 May 1904, Lansdowne stated to Benckendorff that the British government would be satisfied if Russia joined the Khedival Decree (without specifying 'some other way' that would hamper the activities on Britain in Egypt). On his part, Benckendorff was against the stipulation regarding the 'behaviour' of the Tibetans and the possibility of deviation from the policy that the British government was currently pursuing. In response, Lansdowne said that the stipulation was inevitable, but the text of the memorandum following it, in his opinion, was sufficiently convincing to make the Russian government

believe that Great Britain had no claims on Tibet,³¹ and Russia agreed to the enforcement of the Khedival Decree.

On the same day the first discussion was held between the just appointed ambassador of Great Britain, Hardinge, and Lamsdorff, in the course of which the British ambassador assured the Russian minister of Britain's strict neutrality in the war in the Far East and confirmed its desire to start negotiations on all outstanding controversial issues at the appropriate time with the aim of concluding a general agreement between the two countries. Lamsdorff declared his full agreement with Hardinge's sentiments. On the question of Tibet, Lamsdorff expressed the view that the text of the memorandum sent to him via ambassador Benckendorff was contradictory, particularly the stipulation about the future actions of the British in Tibet which would depend on the behaviour of the Tibetans themselves. According to Lamsdorff, that stipulation reduced to naught the significance of the Memorandum. Hardinge reminded him that the Memorandum was based on the telegram of 6 November 1904, and that despite the aforementioned stipulation, the Memorandum precisely and clearly spelt out the true intentions of the British government.³²

Eventually the Russian government received a letter from Lansdowne which once again reiterated that the sole aim of Younghusband's invasion was to receive satisfaction and that as soon it is received it would begin its withdrawal. The letter added that the government of Great Britain 'does not seek to set up a permanent mission in Tibet, but wanted only to acquire trade privileges in this country'. However, Lansdowne once again pointed out that 'the mode of action to a certain extent will depend upon the behaviour of the Tibetans'. Nevertheless, the government of Great Britain 'states most categorically that till no other power interferes in the Tibetan affair, it shall not even attempt to annex Tibet or establish her protectorate, or take under her control its internal administration'.³³ Despite the stipulations, Lamsdorff welcomed the letter as a guarantee of the maintenance of the status quo in Tibet by the government of Great Britain.³⁴

In this way Great Britain and Russia reassured each other on the problems that affected their mutual interests. The negotiations and the correspondence on those questions, once again demonstrated that the Tibetan question could not be isolated from the entire gamut of Anglo-Russian relations, and moreover even France at a certain time was also interested in the achievement of an agreement between Great Britain and Russia on Tibet. It was not a mere coincidence that the

French ambassador in Petersburg, Bompar, told Hardinge about his discussion on 30 May with Nicholas II in the course of which the Russian Tsar mentioned the London talks on the Tibetan question. Bompar particularly drew attention to the unusual circumstance that had led the Russian Tsar to discuss with an ambassador questions involving a third power.³⁵ This could testify to the importance that Russia gave to the achievement of an agreement with Great Britain on all questions of common interest, and also showed that the question of Tibet was one of these.

While negotiations on the Tibetan issue were underway in London and St Petersburg, Younghusband's mission continued to move deep into Tibet, facing resistance from its inhabitants. The Anglo-Indian authorities were determined to utilize every means to enter Lhasa, regardless of the arrival of plenipotentiary Tibetan and Chinese representatives for negotiations in Shigatse.³⁶ Moreover, in a letter to Shimla, Younghusband had frankly written that his aim was not only to reach Lhasa for negotiations, but also to abolish the power of the monks.³⁷ Younghusband had repeatedly spoken of the solely 'peaceful' character of his mission, of the wish not to speak of armed clashes between the Tibetans and the British, accusing the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan leaders of provoking anti-British sentiments.³⁸

On 1 June 1904, in letters to the Dalai Lama and to the Chinese Amban, Younghusband issued an ultimatum that if by 25 June, the Amban and the Tibetan representatives did not arrive in Shigatse, negotiations would only take place in Lhasa.³⁹ The following day Younghusband's letter to the Dalai Lama was returned unopened with the explanation that it was not 'customary' for Tibetans to receive letters from the British.⁴⁰

As regards the stand of the Chinese authorities, at the end of April 1904, the British envoy E. Satow reported from Peking that the Chinese government, fully informed about the goings-on in Tibet, was seeking to evade all responsibility for the occurrences there realizing that the Chinese Resident was unable to influence the Tibetan authorities to halt clashes with the British.⁴¹ (According to Satow, since 30 January 1904, the Chinese government had been cautiously avoiding any mention of Tibet).⁴² Nevertheless, authorities in London attached great importance to contacts with the Chinese government on account of Tibet, because if they failed to come to an agreement

with the Tibetans, then in the next stage they might utilize China, as the suzerain of Tibet.⁴³

The course of the Anglo-Russian negotiations on the Tibetan question and Lansdowne's commitments to the Russian government influenced the conduct of London to a degree and of the Anglo-Indian authorities, although it did not alter the central thrust and character of the actions undertaken in Tibet. It was thus that in early May 1904, the Anglo-Indian authorities in Shimla wrote to Younghusband of the 'extreme undesirability at the present circumstances' of any armed clashes with Tibetans if not necessitated by the security requirements of the mission.⁴⁴ On 14 June 1904, Younghusband was reminded that all proposals relating to Tibet should be submitted for the scrutiny of the British government and all his actions should be based upon the principles laid down in the Memorandum sent by Lansdowne to the Russian government. The documents received by Younghusband stated that a change in the circumstances in the future might lead to a change in policy, but at the moment the line of action of the British government was based on wider considerations than Indo-Tibetan relations as such, and the formulation of Tibetan policy was not in the competence of Younghusband alone, but also in that of the government of India.⁴⁵

Despite that, Curzon insisted on putting forward his point of view, and on 24 June 1904, in a letter addressed to the Secretary of State for Indian Affairs, H.J. Brodrick, stated that as the Tibetans had 'disregarded' the British ultimatum and had not yet come to Shigatse for negotiations, entry into Lhasa was inevitable. Curzon regarded Tibet's attempt to negotiate in Gyantse as 'delaying tactics' and saw entry into Lhasa as the only way of resolving the contradiction.⁴⁶ In Brodrick's reply to Curzon the following day it was said that the entry of the mission into Lhasa should be delayed if there was some hope for the arrival of the Tibetan and Chinese representatives in Gyantse. If they arrived, and there was no ground to doubt their sincerity, then no entry into Lhasa should take place.⁴⁷

Thus, the British authorities in London, taking into consideration the commitments made to Russia during the negotiations, continued unsuccessful attempts to restrain the Anglo-Indian government from continuing further expansion in Tibet. But, apparently, for both Curzon and Younghusband, the attack on Tibet became a prestige issue, of upholding the honour of British arms and power in the face of a weak adversary.

Therefore, the armed clashes between British forces and the Tibetan population continued, while in Gyantse Younghusband awaited the arrival of the Chinese and the Tibetan representatives. He received the news that the Tibetan representatives, two members of the Chief Council, Ta Lama and Yutok-Shape; the secretary of the Dalai Lama, and also the priors of the three largest monasteries of Tibet were on their way to Gyantse to conduct negotiations. The Dalai Lama said that he had authorized those persons to conduct negotiations with the British representatives, on his behalf.⁴⁸

Younghusband was not in any case interested in the achievement of an agreement with the Tibetans, so all further negotiations were conducted aggressively, threatening the Tibetan representatives that failure to fulfil his terms would mean the start of a campaign to Lhasa. Thus, already on 2 July, during the first round of talks with the Tibetans, he had declared that he was ready to enter Lhasa at any moment. However, he emphasized that he was willing to negotiate and conclude an agreement if the Tibetan representatives had any serious intentions and powers to conduct such negotiations. In response the Tibetans reminded Younghusband that the British troops had already forcibly entered their country, occupied a part of their territory, and had launched an armed struggle against the Tibetan population. Concerning the powers that they exercised they considered the letter of authority of the Dalai Lama to the Bhutanese Minister Tongsa Penlop, who had arrived on 1 July 1904, in the capacity of a mediator in the negotiations, to be sufficient evidence. Younghusband, however, enquired whether the Tibetan representatives could guarantee the implementation of the conditions to be laid down in the agreement. In response the Tibetans guaranteed the fulfilment of the agreement, provided it bore the seal of the Dalai Lama. In the course of further negotiations Younghusband laid, as further condition for subsequent meetings and discussions, the evacuation of the Tibetan forces from Gyantse. The Tibetans agreed to withdraw the troops if the British did the same. Younghusband did not want to even discuss that question but announced once more that if by 5 July the Tibetans did not withdraw, they would be made to do so by the use of force. This offensive policy continued in the dealings with Tibet, apparently utilizing the superiority of the British troops over the poorly trained, disunited Tibetan army with antiquated arms, and deliberately imposing on the Tibetan side conditions that could not be fulfilled. On 5 July Younghusband resumed active military operations. On 6

July the Tibetan troops were expelled from Gyantse, even though he continued to rattle on about his desire for peace negotiations.⁴⁹ The Anglo-Indian authorities in Shimla confirmed the 'inevitability' of an entry into Lhasa because the Tibetan representatives did not have 'clear-cut intention or powers' to conduct negotiations since no agreement would be valid without the Dalai Lama's signature.⁵⁰ On 12 July, Younghusband informed the Chinese resident in Tibet, Yu T'ai, that he was advancing towards Lhasa to conduct negotiations, but asked the Amban to prevent the Tibetans from resisting the British troops, otherwise they would be subjected to more drastic conditions.⁵¹

In July 1904, the Tibetan National Assembly dispatched a letter to the British representatives, to resolve the controversial issues. It said that the Dalai Lama knew that the accord had not been signed and that the British wanted to come to Lhasa to negotiate with him. He was acquainted with the text of the suggested convention. The letter went on to say that 'nobody has the right to enter the territory of this country'. If the British came to Lhasa and even met the Dalai Lama, it not only would not help to establish friendship, but would ignite unrest. The Tibetan Assembly requested the British representatives to start negotiations with the Tibetan officials sent for the purpose and not hasten to enter Lhasa.⁵²

Younghusband received that letter on 24 July and on the same day replied to the Dalai Lama, asserting that on no account did the British side seek to spark off unrest in Lhasa, it would not interfere in purely religious matters or station soldiers within the premises of the temples and provoke armed clashes. Younghusband went on to say that active resistance to British troops would mean more rigid conditions being imposed in the proposed convention. Younghusband thus sought to show the Tibetan high priest the 'sincerity' of the intentions of the government of India, Curzon, and other leaders who aspired only to establish peace and friendship between Great Britain and Tibet.⁵³ In the meantime, the British troops continued to advance towards Lhasa, plundering and stripping the Tibetan monasteries of treasures gathered by the Tibetan people over the centuries.

On 25 July 1904, Curzon wrote to Brodrick that according to him the Convention between Tibet and China should be signed by Younghusband and the Dalai Lama. In addition, a separate Agreement should be signed with the Chinese Amban with a reference to the Convention of 1890 and Trade Rules of 1893, recognizing the Anglo-Tibetan Agreement and making it obligatory for China to guarantee

the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in the Convention by the Tibetan side. Curzon requested the consent of London for signature of these conventions and noted that the other proposition, the signature of the tripartite Anglo-Tibetan-Chinese convention, might be complicated by China's stand. The first version of the Agreement would be signed by Younghusband and directly by the Tibetan representatives without any difficulties. Further negotiations to associate China with the Agreement could take place either in London or Peking. According to Curzon, China would agree to the first version, as its suzerainty would thus be acknowledged both by the British and the Tibetan sides.⁵⁴

On 26 July 1904, the Anglo-Indian government sent Younghusband two drafts of Agreements to be signed in Lhasa, the first of the tripartite accord and the second the direct accord between Great Britain and Tibet along with the text of the agreement regarding accession that was to be signed by the Chinese Amban. The government of India recommended that the second bipartite variant be adopted with China's accession to it.⁵⁵ The State Minister for Indian Affairs, H. Brodrick extended his support to the bipartite accord with China's accession and sent Curzon concrete comments on the text of the Convention.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, Younghusband's armed mission reached the Tibetan capital, Lhasa. On 1 August 1904, Younghusband reported to Shimla receipt of the Dalai Lama's first official letter requesting the British to refrain from entering Lhasa and a promise that one of his ministers would negotiate with them. Younghusband reasserted that entering Lhasa was essential but promised not to provoke armed clashes and to withdraw from Lhasa as soon as the required accord was signed.⁵⁷

On 6 August, Younghusband telegraphed Shimla that on 3 August he had entered Tibet's capital Lhasa without any resistance. The Dalai Lama was not in Lhasa, and the Chinese Amban had expressed the desire to help the mission, particularly in terms of providing them with provisions and other supplies.⁵⁸

As it became known, on 26 July 1904, the Dalai Lama, anticipating the British invasion of Lhasa and expecting no assistance from its suzerain China, and under the influence of Dorjjeff and the pro-Russian group, counting upon the support of the Russian Tsar, fled to Mongolia with Dorjjeff and several attendants and servants. The Chinese informed Younghusband that the Dalai Lama's campaign against Britain was allegedly the result of Dorjjeff's influence, and

that the latter had induced him to believe that help would come from Russia and that Russian troops would enter to assist it sooner than the British.

Thus, the Anglo-Indian colonial authorities, despite several attempts by London to restrain them, took advantage of the weakness of Tibet's suzerain, China, Russia's attention, diverted from Tibet because of the war in the Far East, the weak organization, disunity, and insufficient training of the Tibetan army, and the clear superiority of the British forces enabled the British to occupy Tibet and impose on the Tibetan authorities the conditions under the Convention that had been their ultimate aim.

On 3 August 1904, British troops entered the capital of Tibet, Lhasa, but the Dalai Lama was not in the capital. The invasion of the British troops, the absence of any hope of assistance from her suzerain, China, the influence of the pro-Russian group and expectation of support from the 'white Tsar' caused the Dalai Lama to flee from Tibet on 26 July 1904, together with Agvan Dorjieff, two retainers, a doctor, and eight servants, in the direction of Mongolia.

Throughout August and in the beginning of September 1904, negotiations to conclude the convention were in progress in Lhasa between the Tibetan authorities and the commander of the British armed mission. The British delegation was led by Colonel F. Younghusband, but the question was who could, in the Dalai Lama's absence, conduct negotiations on Tibet's behalf. The Chinese Resident Amban at all stages actively participated in the negotiations. Despite the fact that Curzon considered Chinese suzerainty over Tibet a 'constitutional fiction', Younghusband thought it necessary to rely in all questions concerning negotiations on the Amban who recommended the Tibetan officials to be chosen to participate in the negotiations. He mediated between the British and the Tibetans, and all documents were passed through him by both sides. In the presence of the Amban the final conditions of the Convention were dictated to the Tibetans who signed the agreement not without pressure from the Amban who acted at Younghusband's request. It testified to the fact that China, on her part, decided to consolidate her position in Tibet with the help of the British, taking advantage of the absence of the Dalai Lama and the leaders in the pro-Russian group.

When the negotiations were nearing completion, the question

arose as to who should sign the Convention on Tibet's behalf. After all, the Dalai Lama (even according to Curzon) was still both the 'de jure and de facto sovereign of the country'. The Chinese Amban and the Tibetan authorities therefore wrote to the Dalai Lama requesting him to return to Lhasa to sign the Convention. When it became clear that the Dalai Lama would not return, on the recommendation of the Chinese Resident and definitely not without Younghusband's participation, the Emperor in Peking issued the Proclamation that 'the rank of the Dalai Lama is temporarily confiscated, and in his place is appointed the Teshi Lama'. The ordinance also set out that:

for over 200 years Tibet has been feudatory of China, and the Dalai Lama has received much kindness from this Great Kingdom, but in return he did not remain to guard his kingdom ... Then, being defeated and great troubles having arisen, instead of protecting the country and his subjects, he ran away to a distant place in an unknown country. The Dalai Lama ... responsible only for the Yellow cap faith, and monks will only be slightly concerned with official matters, while the Amban will conduct all Tibetan affairs with Tibetan officials, important matters being referred to the Emperor.

The Dalai Lama will not be allowed 'on his own option to intervene in civil affairs'.^{59a} Thus, by formally dismissing the Dalai Lama, the Chinese authorities and the leaders of the pro-Chinese groups in the ruling circles of Tibet accomplished an important step in establishing their supremacy in Lhasa.

On 14 August 1904, the Regent, Ti-Rimpoche, arrived in Lhasa, carrying the state seal of the Dalai Lama, but without the authority to use it. After the Emperor's ordinance regarding the dismissal of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Assembly authorized the Regent to use the Dalai Lama's seal and to sign the agreement with the British. From that moment the Regent took part in the negotiations and, being interested in the peaceful settlement of the conflict, issued a proclamation to the people in Lhasa in which it was stated that in spite of Tibetan efforts to start negotiations with the British, their troops had entered Tibetan territory.

The Chinese ... wishing only the good of the country, have ordered us to make a settlement, and the Amban ordered us to withdraw all soldiers from the frontier and enter into relations with the British. ... Now it is the custom of all nations after war to make a Treaty, and although we were burning with anger, we considered the matter well in order to save the world from conflagration, and decided to act in accordance with our religious tenets ...

If war arises, men and animals will suffer, so we, consulted carefully, and withdraw our soldiers for the sake of peaceful negotiations; and now are making a Treaty, with the Amban acting between us and the British.

Given this, the Regent called upon the residents of Lhasa to maintain peace and to refrain from quarrels and fights, thereby hastening the signature of the Treaty.⁵⁹

On 7 September 1904, in the throne hall of Potala palace in Lhasa, the Anglo-Tibetan treaty was signed in a solemn atmosphere. Five copies of it, each with English, Chinese, and Tibetan translations, were signed (or rather seals were affixed to them) first by the representatives of the Tibetan National Assembly, by the representatives of the three largest monasteries of Tibet, Drepung, Sera, and Galdan, then by the Regent, and finally by Colonel Younghusband. In his concluding speech, Younghusband declared that Great Britain recognized the suzerainty of China over Tibet and had no intentions of interfering in its internal affairs.⁶⁰

The Anglo-Tibetan accord or the Lhasa Convention of 1904 made it obligatory for Tibet to respect the conditions envisaged in the Anglo-Tibetan treaty of 1890 and the 'Rules' of 1893 (recognition of the Sikkim-Tibetan border as defined in Article I of the Convention of 1890, opening of trade marts in Gyantse, Gartok, and Yatung, and creating conditions for free right of access of merchants to the trade marts through Tibetan territory, etc.) Article VI stipulated a sum equivalent to 75 lakhs of rupees to be paid by the Tibetan authorities as an indemnity for 75 years. Article VII gave the British forces the right to temporarily occupy Chumbi valley.⁶¹ Article IX was of special interest:

The government of Tibet engages that, without the previous consent of the British government: (a) No portion of Tibetan territory shall be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or otherwise given for occupation, to any other Foreign Power; (b) No such Power shall be permitted to intervene in Tibetan affairs; (c) No representatives or Agents of any Foreign Power shall be admitted to Tibet; (d) No concessions for railways, roads, telegraphs, mining or other rights, shall be granted to any Foreign Power, or the subject of any Foreign Power. In the event of consent to such concessions being granted, similar or equivalent concessions shall be granted to the British government; (e) No Tibetan revenues, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to any Foreign Power, or to the subject of any Foreign Power.

So, as stated in paragraph (c) Article IX, Tibet forfeited the right to admit any representative or agent of any foreign power into its territory

without the knowledge of the British government. At the same time, the Chinese Amban continued to stay in Lhasa exercising all previously established rights and privileges and, as has been noted, actively participated in all stages of the Anglo-Tibetan negotiations. From this it can be deduced that China was not included among the 'foreign powers', and therefore the British government recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. In that case, the question inevitably arises as to why, under the Lhasa Convention, there was no signature of the legitimate suzerain of Tibet, China. All this suggested that the question on Tibet's status had not till then been finally resolved and that the British authorities had still to reach an agreement with China on the Tibetan question.⁶²

It is necessary to mention that the authorities in London did not unreservedly accept the Convention signed by Younghusband. On the contrary, Lansdowne 'reprimanded' the Anglo-Indian government, pointing out that the directives of the 'central government' which is in a better position to judge the 'totality' of the political interests of the British empire, should have been adhered to.⁶³ H. Brodrick informed the government of India that the clause of indemnity and separate Article VII had been included in the text of the Lhasa Convention 'in defiance of expressed instructions', and that His Majesty's Government was not to accept the situation created by its representative's 'disobedience to orders'. Therefore, before the ratification of the Anglo-Tibetan Convention on 11 November 1904, a declaration was signed by the Viceroy of India, which reduced to one third the sum of the indemnity that the Tibetan side was required to pay (instead of 75 lakh of rupees, they were required to pay 25 lakhs), and also the period of occupation of Chumbi valley by the British forces was reduced and the troops were to be withdrawn after three annual payments of the contribution.⁶⁴

However, even the watered down version of the widely published text of the Anglo-Tibetan Agreement created an extremely unfavourable impression on the Russian government. They considered it to be 'a breach by the British of their obligation not to occupy Tibet and interfere with its internal administration'.⁶⁵ In a discussion with Lansdowne on this issue, a Russian diplomatic representative in London, S.D. Sazonov, was told that the Russian government had no cause for anxiety, for what the British had done did not amount to occupation, but a temporary seizure of a territory far from central Tibet. Sazonov retorted that this seizure might be perpetual. Lansdowne said that

because of the anarchy reigning in Tibet, Britain did not want to dispatch a second expedition. Sazonov was emphatic that Article IX of the Convention was an infringement upon the 'status quo', to which Lansdowne responded that the prohibition of relations between Tibet and other foreign powers applied also to Britain who, according to the Convention, received only trading privileges. Lansdowne requested Sazonov to inform the Russian government that Britain had 'no intention to look for occasions to evade her obligations', and that in its new treaty relations with Tibet, remained committed to the spirit of the assurances made to Russia.

Sazonov described his impression of his discussion with Lansdowne as 'equivocal'. On one hand, it really appeared that the British minister sincerely did not want to 'deviate from his words'. On the other, Sazonov 'did not fail to mark a lack of independent initiative and a certain influence of his comrades in the cabinet, and perhaps the Calcutta governmental spheres'.⁶⁶

As has already been mentioned, before the ratification of the agreement signed by Younghusband, the Cabinet in London made several amendments to the text: cut down the quantum of indemnity, reduced the period of British occupation of the Chumbi valley. That meant certain concessions by the British government to Russia, and testified that there existed at that time 'chronic disagreement' between London and Calcutta.⁶⁷

Nevertheless, it was clear that Russia was anxious regarding the position of Tibet created by the Lhasa Convention. The Russian envoy in Peking, Lessar, held a discussion with an official in the Chinese foreign ministry, Liang Fang, regarding the Convention, and was told that China's position was very complicated because she could not resist on her own, adding that there was little hope of protests from other powers and that China could not rely on Russia's support. Lessar responded by saying that this was an incorrect view and that Britain could not act in Tibet as she liked. Although Russia was now busy elsewhere, said Lessar, 'but if China is firm, then she will see that she is not alone'.⁶⁸

Despite this bold talk, Russia was unable to render help either to China or to Tibet because, as has already been said, she herself was facing extremely serious military, political, and diplomatic difficulties: in the course of the Russo-Japanese war, Russia was suffering one defeat after another, the revolutionary situation in the country was maturing, leading to the outbreak of the revolution in 1905.

Nevertheless, through diplomatic channels the Russian government reacted to the information regarding the changing situation in Tibet. Thus, on 9 April 1905 Benckendorff submitted to the British government a memorandum stating that according to the information available to the Russian government, the British had occupied several points in the Chumbi valley, had been building roads, installed telephone and telegraph lines, had trained the native soldiers, had settled Britishers in Tibet, etc. All these actions contradicted the statement made in September 1904 that the 'British do not seek any privileges and consider that Tibet should belong to the Tibetans'.⁶⁹ Responding to the Russian memorandum, the British government stated that the telegraph, telephone, and the railway lines were constructed only to connect the British forces in Chumbi valley with India, that no native soldiers had been trained, and buildings had been constructed only for British officials and the troops, and that all these activities were well within the purview of the 1904 treaty.⁷⁰

As anticipated, the absence of the signature of the Chinese Amban on the text of the Lhasa Convention of 1904 created obstacles for the implementation of its provisions and compelled the British authorities to start negotiations with China for the recognition of the Convention by the Chinese government. The negotiations were held in Calcutta, then in Peking, and continued for eighteen months. They were extremely intricate and intense, which was explained, in particular, by the change in Great Britain's foreign policy. At the end of 1905 the Liberals came to power and one of the first actions was the dismissal of Lord Curzon from the post of Viceroy of India as his activities had aroused condemnation in London. An important role was played by the fact that Britain and Russia opened direct negotiations on the division of spheres of influence in Asia, and both were ready to compromise on the Tibetan issue in order to gain advantage in other, more important, regions of the continent. As regards the Chinese representatives, they utilized that favourable situation to raise not only the question of the recognition by Great Britain of their suzerainty but also of their sovereign rights over Tibet.⁷¹

The Chinese representatives claimed that there were very strong grounds for such a recognition because the Chinese court had sanctioned the nomination of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, appointed important Tibetan officials, and that the Chinese Resident in Lhasa actually decided Tibetan affairs, supervised the Tibetan

troops, etc. He demanded also certain amendments to Article IX of the Convention calculated to make the Chinese government the sole mediator between the Anglo-Indian government and the Tibetan authorities. The British representatives, on the other hand, only wanted Chinese accession to the treaty already signed with Tibet.⁷²

Though some of the demands of the Chinese representatives were turned down, eventually the Anglo-Chinese Agreement, signed on 27 April 1906, restricted the rights that the British had enjoyed under the 1904 Convention. Thus, as was agreed in Article II, the government of Britain could not annex Tibetan territory and interfere in Tibet's internal administration; under Article III it forfeited the right to concessions mentioned in paragraph (d) of Article IX of the 1904 Convention, though it got the right to install a telegraph line connecting India with the British trade markets situated in Tibet.⁷³ The Chinese government took upon itself the responsibility of warding off interference by any other foreign power in Tibetan affairs (Article II).

The British press widely commented on the signature of the Peking Agreement, seeing it as a victory for Chinese diplomacy; as a radical change in British foreign policy on Tibet; as recognition of Tibet as a Chinese protectorate and a return to the position as it had existed prior to Younghusband's mission.⁷⁴

According to the *Daily News*, that Convention holds China responsible for the 'good conduct of Tibet' and thus compels the Chinese government to take measures to make the control over Tibet no less practical than the responsibility put on it by the Anglo-Chinese Convention.⁷⁵

The British Foreign Secretary Edward Gray informed the Russian ambassador in London, Benckendorff, several days before the signature of the Convention, about the negotiations in Peking regarding the acceptance by China of the 1904 Convention and change in British policy envisaged in Articles II and III.⁷⁶ The full text of the Anglo-Chinese Convention signed on 27 April 1906 was handed over by E. Gray to the new British ambassador in Petersburg, A. Nicolson, for presentation to the Russian government on 2 July 1906.⁷⁷

The modified Articles of the 1904 Convention, already during its ratification (the cut in the quantum of contribution, conditions for the withdrawal of British forces from the Chumbi valley, etc.) and also the conclusion of the 1906 Convention on terms more advantageous

for China were explained by advancing a number of reasons. Lord Curzon and Younghusband simply missed the opportunity to derive political mileage from the 'Russian threat' on which they had banked when engineering the Tibetan campaign. Despite the pressure from London they had entered Tibet, evidently to uphold their prestige in the eyes of a clearly weak and unorganized adversary. In consequence the British authorities were obliged to agree to a compromise on the Tibetan question, which was *'ballon d'essai'* in the beginning of the Anglo-Russian negotiations on all controversial problems. Besides, during this period, internal changes took place in China that affected its external policies and its relations with the outlying areas of the Manchurian empire. The Chinese imperial government, through internal reforms and also the use of military strength, sought to consolidate its position, which also helped China in her negotiations with Britain over the 1906 Convention.

The events of 1900–6 revolving around Tibet, showed that the history of that region situated in Central Asia, which over the course of many centuries had remaining isolated, cannot be viewed in isolation from problems of wider significance: those of the relations of world powers in the European and Asiatic geo-political space. Activization of Russia's policy in the Far East and the establishment of its direct contacts with Tibet became possible because of Britain's engagement in the Anglo-Boer war of 1900–1 and the people's uprising in China. In 1903, after Britain signed the anti-Russian Anglo-Japanese Agreement and a peace agreement with the Boers, and the Russo-Japanese war was looming, the alignment of forces around Tibet sharply changed in Britain's favour, enabling it to invade Tibet in 1903–4 and occupy Lhasa. It appeared that the British would be able to establish their protectorate over Tibet, and neither Russia nor China were strong enough to oppose them. However, new factors began to influence Tibet's fate: Britain entered the decisive stage of the struggle with her principal adversary, Germany. This necessitated her alliance with France and Russia. On 8 April 1904 the Anglo-French alliance, the 'Entente Cordiale', was signed, and already in mid-1903 the Anglo-Russian negotiations concerning the division of spheres of influence in Persia, Afganistan, and Tibet had opened in London. Russia herself, burdened with the ordeals of war with Japan and the first revolution of 1905, did not involve herself in Tibetan affairs.

Thus by 1906 neither Russia nor England were in a position to pursue an active policy in Tibet, and this was confirmed by the signature of the Anglo-Russian Convention. The course of subsequent events showed that the third interested power, China, broadly exploited the relative weakness of the principal European powers, and this resulted in the recognition by Great Britain of China as the suzerain of Tibet, and won the commitments of foreign states not to interfere in its internal affairs and to maintain relations with Tibet only through the Chinese government. We will however discuss this later.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Dalai Lama's Sojourn in Mongolia Gauged through Russian Diplomatic Activity

The British forces entering Lhasa under the command of Colonel F. Younghusband, discovered that the Dalai Lama, along with some attendants and Agvan Dorjiew, had fled the capital to Mongolia.

On 21 October 1904, Dorjiew telegraphed Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lamsdorff, through the Russian Consul-General in Urga, informing him of the event.¹ On receipt of the news, Lamsdorff requested the envoy in Peking, Lessar, an expert on Chinese, Tibetan, and Mongolian affairs, to express his opinion of what would be the Russian government's attitude to the arrival of the chief Buddhist priest to Urga.²

On 24 October/6 November 1904, Lessar replied by telegram and provided detailed information to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs about the intricate situation and expressed his view on how the Russian diplomacy should deal with the situation, taking into account Russia's position in the Far East in the context of the Russo-Japanese war.

Lessar was aware that the policy of the Tsarist government towards the Dalai Lama and his sojourn in Mongolia depended on the course of hostilities in the Russo-Japanese war. In the 'present phase', i.e. when Russia was suffering defeat, it was 'undoubtedly necessary to maintain tranquillity in Mongolia and therefore to abstain from

any action that could spark off unrest'.³ Lessar thought that it would not be wise to arouse the suspicious of the Chinese authorities:

Because for the Dalai Lama himself the discovery by the Chinese authorities of our aspirations to use his services may be disastrous, as the history of Tibet has already shown in recent times.⁴ If China sees that the Dalai Lama has gained the support of the Imperial government, he may also suffer the fate of his predecessors.⁵

Lessar believed that the activities of the Russian consulate should at first be restricted to the study of the situation, devoting token attention to the Dalai Lama as befitting the chief Buddhist priest and also discussions with Dorjjeff about his needs and desires, and persuading him to 'refrain' from any action that could harm friendly relations with the Chinese authorities.

Lessar wrote also that

If owing to our imprudence or due to his obstinacy and obduracy the Dalai Lama earns the displeasure of China and danger could be anticipated for him, he may be saved by extending hospitality to him in Russia herself. If it is certain that the Dalai Lama will be recognized as the spiritual leader of all Mongolians, the Buddhists of China, Tibet, and India, the formation of a common centre of the powerful religion within our borders will be very desirable despite the huge expenditure needed, especially in the beginning.⁶

However, Lessar said that at the present moment, due to the intricate situation, an invitation to the Dalai Lama might have the opposite result, i.e. rivalry between the new Buddhist monasteries in Russia with those in Urga, and serve as a cause of a split which might excite the population of Mongolia against the Russian Buddhists, which should at present be avoided. It would therefore be desirable to do nothing to persuade the Dalai Lama to come to Russia until the results of his coming to Urga become clear or if there is any threat to the Dalai Lama.⁷ In the second stage, 'when the superiority of our forces over the Japanese becomes evident, we, on the contrary, will need to create in Mongolia our party, and then the Dalai Lama could certainly be useful'.⁸

Thus, Lessar thought that in the existing situation, the Russian government should bide its time, paying due respect to the Dalai Lama as the head of the Buddhist religion. A change in attitude towards him might follow a change on the Russo-Japanese front.

The former Consul-General of Urga, Shishmarev was of a similar view. He submitted a special note to the Russian Foreign Ministry saying that any relation with the Dalai Lama at that juncture:

may serve as a hindrance to the forthcoming discussions with China and Mongolia and mar the relations with the government of the Chinese emperor who already unfavourably regards the Dalai Lama's going to Urga and suspects him, due to certain influence in Peking, of the intention to get Russian protection and even to come over to the Russian side.⁹

Due to that critical situation, Russian diplomacy feared the possibility of the situation worsening in the Far East, and therefore wanted to avoid any movement vis-à-vis the Dalai Lama. At the same time, they also wanted to retain the option of utilizing the future services of the high priest.

Finally, on 14 November 1904, the Dalai Lama accompanied by Agvan Dorjieff, five high ranking lamas, eight lamas to hold the divine services, a personal physician, the keeper of the Dalai Lama's seal, an interpreter, and thirty bodyguards entered Urga in a solemn procession.¹⁰

The very fact of the arrival of the religious leader of the Lamaists at the Mongolian capital, part of the domain of Ch'ing China, situated near the Russian borders, could not but attract the attention of the Peking authorities and Russian diplomacy, particularly in the context of the very disturbed situation in the Far East brought on by the Russo-Japanese war.

What was the attitude of the Chinese and Mongolian authorities towards the Dalai Lama's arrival in Urga? The Chinese both in Peking and in Urga were extremely displeased with the appearance of the Dalai Lama in Mongolia, situated close to the Russian border. They feared that as the Dalai Lama 'stays near the [Russian] border and actually under ... the [Russian] influence which may make him dangerous'.¹¹

Lessar reported that an official from the Chinese Ministry of External Affairs, Lian Fang had come to him for advice regarding the attitude to be adopted to the impending arrival of the Dalai Lama in Urga. Lessar told him: the Dalai Lama is not a ruler of a state, but the head of a religion. 'Hence the decision of his fate is a matter of concern for both China and Russia, and for both of them the maintenance of peace in all parts of China is of equal importance. Therefore, at this difficult moment, it is most expedient to ensure to the Dalai Lama at

Urga a high position in accordance with his high status, without investing it with any political significance'.¹²

The Chinese authorities realized that the Dalai Lama's sojourn in Urga would strengthen the Russo-Tibetan bonds, would intensify the inflow of Lamaist pilgrims from Siberia, and weaken the control of the Chinese imperial government over Tibet and the Dalai Lama. They also realized that due to the difficult situation in the Far East, it was doubtful that at the moment Russia would lead an active campaign in the Dalai Lama's defence. The Chinese resident in Mongolia, Yang Chi, at his government's directive, while visiting the Dalai Lama insisted that he move to Sining in China.¹³ China's demand that the Dalai Lama be sent out of Mongolia coincided with the interests of the Mongolian religious leader Khutukhta who received the news of the impending arrival of the high priest in Urga with displeasure because it meant a lowering of his own prestige: thousands of pilgrims went to worship the Dalai Lama resulting in the curtailment of the Khutukhta's income.¹⁴ The Mongolian and the Chinese authorities in Urga did not show due respect to the Dalai Lama as the head of the Buddhists. Moreover the Urga Khulukhta was even instructed by Peking 'not to pay homage to the Dalai Lama'.¹⁵ The demand of the Mongolian and Chinese authorities that the Dalai Lama move to Sining received a distinctly negative response from the Dalai Lama, since Sining was far from the religious centres of the Lamaists and had no communications with Russia. Should China insist on the move using military strength, the Dalai Lama would have to rely on Russia for help.¹⁶

What was the Russian government's attitude to the question of the Dalai Lama's transfer to Sining? The Russian envoy in Peking, Lessar, on learning about the demands of the Chinese authorities, expressed his displeasure to the Peking government, saying that the visit of the Dalai Lama was of a religious nature, whereas Sining was not a religious centre. Therefore, forcible eviction to Sining could lead to a serious unrest among the Lamaists which might impel Russia to take remedial measures.¹⁷

Lessar thought that the Dalai Lama should avoid going to Sining under any pretext, whether of fatigue, sickness, difficult journey, etc., so as to remain in Urga at least until the situation in Manchuria changed. The Dalai Lama would be ruined if he undertook anything at that time. He should realize that Russia was pre-occupied with Manchuria and it was untimely to start any new action elsewhere:

it was necessary to wait in Urga and not to worsen relations with China.¹⁸

In a special message sent by Lessar to the Russian consul in Urga, he informed him that the British government had guaranteed Russia its readiness to sign a new Anglo-Chinese treaty that recognized the suzerainty of China over Tibet (negotiations ended with the signature of the Anglo-Chinese accord in 1906). Bearing this in mind, Lessar wrote that the Dalai Lama ought not to hurry. It could be conjectured that if the Panchen Lama installed in his place did not cope with his responsibilities and if the Dalai Lama managed to maintain relations with China, than probably in the near future the Chinese government itself might ask the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet and fulfil his responsibilities. By that time Russia would be able to assist in restoring him, at least partially, to his former position in Tibet.¹⁹

Therefore, from the point of view of Russian diplomacy, it was necessary to pursue the wait and see policy in the interests of both Russia and the Dalai Lama and to use all means to persuade the Chinese government to permit the Dalai Lama to stay on in Urga. On the advice of the Russian diplomats, which coincided with his own wishes, the Dalai Lama asked the Chinese authorities to allow him to stay in Urga during the winter because of the severe cold and the difficulties of travelling under such conditions. In response Peking sent a telegram stating:

In view of the applications by the Dalai Lama about the impossibility to travel due to the inclement weather, he ... has been allowed to pass the winter in Urga, but with the advent of spring he should leave for Sining without the slightest delay accompanied by ... [Amban]Yang Chi.²⁰

The content of this telegram was made known to the Dalai Lama by the Sining Amban in a special Instruction²¹ which was in turn communicated to the Russian consul Lyuba through Dorjjeff. The Dalai Lama asked that Lyuba be informed that he was extremely worried by the insistence of the Chinese authorities that he leave for Sining in spring,²² while he himself would prefer to go to Tibet, if the Chinese government wanted him to leave Urga.²³ The Dalai Lama once again reminded the Russian consul that he had come there with the 'sole purpose to get advice and help from Russia ... and will do nothing without the Russian government's advice'.

The persistent rumours spread in Mongolia that the Dalai Lama was going to Russia, were supported by the arrival in Urga, to meet

the Dalai Lama, of Bandido Khambo Lama Iroltuev, head of the Trans-Baikal and Siberian Lamaists.

The Dalai Lama himself expressed a wish to meet Iroltuev²⁴ en route to Urga from Tibet. Iroltuev thereupon requested the governor-general of the Far East, Alekseev, to allow him to pay a visit to the high priest in Urga. The permission was granted on condition that 'to preserve the exclusive character of his visit to pay respect to the high position of the Dalai Lama by the Buddhist priesthood and to exclude any pretext to attach political significance to this visit'.²⁵

The active stand of the priests from the Trans-Baikal area expecting the Dalai Lama's arrival at Urga aroused deep concern amongst Russian diplomats who were afraid that the Buryat Lamas would be guided by religious considerations alone without taking into account the diplomatic and military position of Russia in the Far East which required the maintenance of friendly relations with China. Lessar in a special telegram reported to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that

there is no doubt that Iroltuev, Dorjjeff and others will activate the Mongolians on the occasion of the Dalai Lama's arrival at Urga. All these persons, not informed about the actual situation, hope that if they can involve Russia in these affairs, they will be able to implement their large but poorly considered plans, not to speak about the usual Eastern greed, which make many of them want to extract subsidy from Russia. As a result, it is inevitable that the unrest started will be highly undesirable to us at present and probably disastrous for the Dalai Lama.²⁶

Lessar added that the question regarding the Dalai Lama should be decided 'from the Russian point of view and in conformity with the Russian objectives in the Far East'.²⁷

This shows that Lessar considered it necessary for the interests of Russian diplomacy in the Far East to restrict to some degree the activities of Dorjjeff, Iroltuev, and other Lamaists who otherwise might unnecessarily harm the interests of both Russia and the Dalai Lama.

The rumours about the intentions of the Trans-Baikal priests became so widespread that after the arrival of Iroltuev antipathy to the Russian Buryati subjects grew. The Russian consul in Urga therefore warned Iroltuev and the heads of monasteries who had arrived with him against 'any step which could be interpreted by the Mongolians as in a sense being undesirable to us'.²⁸ As mentioned earlier, the Russian authorities did not fully trust the Trans-Baikal Lamas, fear-

ing that they would only consider their religious interests, ignoring the diplomatic and military position of Russia in the Far East that required then to maintain tranquil and friendly relations with China. To put a rein on Iroltuev's activity, R. Bimbaev, interpreter of the Kyakhta commissioner, was allowed to go unofficially to Urga, to worship the Dalai Lama, with the directive that he 'keep a close surveillance on Iroltuev so that his visit and that of Lamas accompanying him are limited to paying respect to the Dalai Lama just as the spiritual head'.²⁹ Besides that, the military governor of the Trans-Baikal area instructed the Kyakhta commissioner to telegraph about any suspicious activities of the Khambo-Lama.³⁰ The heads of the peasants were ordered to allow only private individual Buryati with clean records, regarding whose loyalty to Russian interests there was no doubt, to go to Urga to worship the Dalai Lama.³¹

On 18 November 1904, Iroltuev was received by the Dalai Lama in Urga who, according to him, is 'steadily pursuing his previous aim and hopes for the warm participation and help of Russia in restoring lasting peace in Tibet'. During his visit to the Russian consulate in Urga, Iroltuev expressed 'a very unambiguous desire of the Buryats to install the Dalai Lama in Selenginsk for the purpose of establishing a new Buddhist centre with the Dalai Lama as its head, which will attract pilgrims from Mongolia, where our Buddhists now spend lots of money'.³² Lyuba made it clear to Iroltuev that at that moment there were no ground to fear 'aggressive intentions of China regarding the Dalai Lama and suggested that he restrain the Buryats from taking any steps undesirable to us'.³³ Nevertheless, the question of the Dalai Lama's possible visit to Russia was put on the agenda.

THE QUESTION OF THE DALAI LAMA'S PASSAGE TO RUSSIA

Towards the beginning of 1905, the principal purpose of the Dalai Lama's stay in Urga was to return to Tibet with Russian assistance in conditions of fully regulated Anglo-Chinese and Anglo-Tibetan relations. In January 1905 the representatives of the monasteries and priests who had come to Urga from Tibet also insisted on the return of the Dalai Lama to Lhasa. If Russia failed to help Tibet in the near future, they would seek the assistance of France or Germany.¹ The Dalai Lama stated that before receiving a special order from Peking he could not go to Tibet, but relied solely on Russian help.²

The stand adopted by Russian diplomacy on the Tibetan question by the beginning of 1905 was as follows: the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet, though the most correct course, was rather dangerous.³ The special meeting of prominent Tibetan statesmen in Urga was of the same opinion, but Dorjieff did not participate in it.⁴ The best way would be to let the Dalai Lama stay in Urga for a long time, at least until Russia's position in the Russo-Japanese war became clear. In Urga the Dalai Lama was comparatively safe, and since this was in proximity to the Russian border and there was a Russian consul in Mongolia, this would enable Russia to keep a constant watch over the situation in Tibet and pass on advice to the Dalai Lama.

However, at the beginning of 1905, the Chinese authorities once again proclaimed that by March–April 1905 the Dalai Lama would have to leave Urga for Sining.⁵ The Dalai Lama strove to delay his departure and awaited a response from Russia.⁶ Russian diplomacy believed that in the existing situation the Dalai Lama's departure to Sining would be tantamount to a firm rejection of their good offices.⁷ The Dalai Lama could go to Lhasa from Sining without Russia's support, only on the basis of an agreement between Britain and China. Russia, in that case, could regain her influence on Tibet only in a more or less distant future.⁸

Therefore, in an extreme case, Lessar opined, he would 'prefer Selenginsk to Sining'⁹ but such a move might also entail many difficulties and inconveniences, and should be resorted to only in the event of a direct threat to the Dalai Lama's life¹⁰ even though the establishment of a Buddhist religious centre in Russia could serve as a potent means of exerting pressure on China.¹¹

Lessar thought it necessary to inform the Dalai Lama of the following: 'our government cannot render assistance to the journey, but if the Dalai Lama manages to enlist the help of loyal Buryats, masters of many ruses, and reach the border, than he will receive asylum'.¹² In the meantime, Lessar and the Tibetan representatives in Peking attempted to obtain Chinese permission for the Dalai Lama to stay on in Urga, but the Chinese authorities practically ignored the Tibetan request. Lessar kept receiving false information from the Chinese government that 'the Dalai Lama himself wishes to return to Tibet through China and that no one is compelling him to leave Urga',¹³ while at the same time, Yang Chi was adamant and the Khutukhta made the Dalai Lama's stay in Urga intolerable.

6 March 1905 was the deadline set by the Chinese government

for the Dalai Lama to leave Urga. On 4 March a new ordinance was received from the Peking authorities regarding the immediate departure of the high priest.¹⁴ Yang Chi pressurized the Dalai Lama to leave while the latter continued to await Russian advice. He sent a new report to the emperor in Peking, enabling him to once again delay his departure from Urga pending receipt of a reply.

It was clear that the Peking government would do everything to compel the Dalai Lama to leave Urga. According to the Russian Foreign Minister Lamsdorff and the Governor-General of the Far East Alekseev, 'we can only help the Dalai Lama to migrate to Russia secretly'.¹⁵ In Alekseev's view, 'the implementation of this difficult and delicate task should only be suitably entrusted, through the consul, to the head of the Russian Buddhist Khambo-Lama Iroltuev residing in Urga, who could enlist the assistance of Buryats loyal to him, and safely take the Dalai Lama to Russia, where he may stay till his further fate is decided'.¹⁶ As mentioned earlier, all this could be instrumental in setting up a religious centre in Russia that could serve as a useful means of pressurizing the Mongolians and the Chinese. The Trans-Baikal military governor chalked out a plan of necessary measures in the event of the Dalai Lama entering Russia, and summoned Iroltuev to Chita to make the necessary preparations for lodging, repairs, etc. This was all to be paid for by all the Buddhist communities in the Trans-Baikal area; in the event of the Dalai Lama having to stay for a long time, a special subsidy would be necessary from the government. The protection of the Dalai Lama was entrusted to the clergy; a detachment of Cossack Lamaists would be sent to accompany the Dalai Lama across the border. The Governor planned to present a gift to the Dalai Lama on his arrival and requested 500 roubles from Alekseev for the purpose.¹⁷

However, the news of Iroltuev's departure to Chita to make preparations for the move of the Dalai Lama there had already reached Urga and soon travelled to the Chinese Amban Pu Shou. Therefore, the Dalai Lama urged the Russian consul to pacify the Chinese, but continued to think about going to Russia. He requested that it be communicated to Lessar that he would place himself under the protection of His Majesty the Russian Tsar with complete confidence but wanted to know 'whether Russia can openly protect Tibet from England and the Chinese'.¹⁸ Lessar replied that at that juncture the Russian government was not in a position to provide positive assurances.¹⁹ The Chinese Amban directly asked the Dalai Lama about

his proposed trip to Russia which he denied; in response the Amban said that the Dalai Lama could negotiate with any state, but he (the Amban) would not be answerable for the consequences of this.²⁰

The Buryats of the Trans-Baikal area headed by Iroltuev submitted an application to the Chita authorities to request the Chinese government to extend the Dalai Lama's stay in Urga to give the Buryats an opportunity to worship their religious head.²¹ In addition, Iroltuev sent a telegram on behalf of 160 Buryats with a request that the Dalai Lama be permitted to stay on in Urga.²² The Peking government however again reiterated that it was not encroaching upon his freedom, though it was well-known that Yang Chi and Pu Shou, as has already been mentioned, had been insisting on his immediate departure (it was quite possible that the Dalai Lama could still stay at Urga, provided he gave generous gifts to the Ambans).²³

The Russian foreign ministry, in the face of China's insistence that the Dalai Lama be evicted from Urga as soon as possible, instructed its diplomatic representatives G.A. Kozakov, acting as envoy in Peking in the place of Lessar, who had died, to obtain a clarification from the Chinese government about providing to the Dalai Lama with security on his journey and normal conditions in Tibet.²⁴ Kozakov reported that the Chinese authorities met him 'with reserve' and expressed surprise that Russia should evince so much interest in the Dalai Lama's journey. The Chinese authorities would allow the Dalai Lama to travel to Tibet and consider him as the spiritual leader of Buddhists but resented that he should have sought the aid of foreign powers. Kozakov replied that the Russian government was anxious about its Buddhist subjects and could not be indifferent to any attempts to 'hamper' the Dalai Lama.²⁵

In view of the complicated diplomatic situation in the Far East and internal difficulties, the Russian government could not risk severing relations with China and create new complications with Britain. In the circumstances the Dalai Lama, realizing that his going to Russia was not feasible and return to Lhasa, even with a Russian convoy, unsafe, looked for at least purely superficial reconciliation with the Chinese government. He intended to accept the invitation of the Eastern near-Manchurian princes to visit their domains and then, with their help and that of the new envoy in Peking D.D. Pokotilov, to return to Lhasa.²⁶

Russian diplomacy, with the future possibility of utilizing the influence and authority of the Dalai Lama to their ends, strove to

maintain friendly relations with him. Therefore, when on 14 May 1905, Pokotilov left Petersburg for Peking via Urga,²⁷ Nicholas II sent with him gifts for the Dalai Lama: a ring with the portrait of Nicholas II studded with a diamond monogram and a chain with sapphires and a diamond crown.²⁸

On 28 May Pokotilov arrived in Kyakhta where he was awaited by Dorjjeff. 'According to Dorjjeff', wrote Pokotilov to the Foreign Ministry:

the main and almost exclusive aim of the arrival of the Dalai Lama to Urga was that he seeks patronage of Russia during the adverse situation in Tibet. He [Dorjjeff] is the chief adviser on these affairs, so he is interested that the Dalai Lama's visit to Mongolia should not be in vain and that he does not return to Tibet empty handed. He adds that the Dalai Lama is fully aware of Russia's present difficulties, but nevertheless hopes that His Majesty the Emperor will not abandon Tibet and him personally but will bestow on them his kind patronage.²⁹

Pokotilov said that the Dalai Lama could 'fully rely on his Majesty the Emperor's considerate attention to him and Tibet'. To guarantee this he was assigned to meet the Dalai Lama personally.

Pokotilov pointed out that the Russian government 'has not for a moment diverted its attention from Tibetan affairs, using every available opportunity to guard that country against foreign encroachment'. Pokotilov went on to say that during the summer of 1904 the Russian foreign ministry had

obtained a commitment from Great Britain's foreign office that while no other power is interesting in Tibetan affairs, Britain, on her part, would not also make any attempt to annex this country, to establish a protectorate over it or influence her internal administration. As Russia had shown consideration for Tibet at the time, when her attention was naturally distracted by other things, the Dalai Lama can rely even more on our active support and patronage when finally our hands are untied and normalcy is restored.³⁰

On 30 May 1905, Pokotilov arrived at Urga, and a solemn meeting was arranged for him. Immediately upon his arrival at the Russian consulate, the Dalai Lama's messengers came to welcome him. On 31 May, Pokotilov called on the Chinese Ambans and the Mongolian authorities, and at 5 p.m. he was granted an audience by the Dalai Lama.

Talks followed after the gifts had been presented. Apart from the Dalai Lama and Pokotilov, the Russian consul and two of the Dalai Lama's retainers as interpreters were present. The talks centred around the same questions that had been discussed by Pokotilov with Dorjjeff. Pokotilov requested the Dalai Lama to approach the Russian consul on all questions, as he had been maintaining regular contact with St Petersburg and Peking. To avoid Chinese suspicions the Dalai Lama and Pokotilov decided that the latter would not pay another visit to the former and that necessary exchanges between them would be conveyed through reliable persons.³¹

In a letter to the Tsar given to Pokotilov, the Dalai Lama wrote that he would do everything possible for the 'welfare of the religion and the people', and that his 'thoughts are bright and directed at attaining their prosperity'. 'Therefore I am striving to find means to ensure peace for your state internally and externally and express my deeply thought wish of happy and long life to the Great Emperor and fulfilment of his aspirations in all spheres of state administration'.³² The meeting between the Dalai Lama and Pokotilov and the substance of the talks between the Russian envoy with him and Dorjjeff, once again showed that Russia did not go beyond making verbal promises to help because of her own difficulties both in her external policies and internal situation.

The Russian Geographical Society attempted to establish relations with the Dalai Lama. On 15 April 1905, a famous explorer and traveller, P.K. Kozlov, went to Urga from St Petersburg to 'greet the Dalai Lama and offer him gifts on behalf of the Russian Imperial Geographical Society'.³³ After meeting the Dalai Lama, Dorjjeff, and other Tibetans, Kozlov came to the conclusion that

it is necessary for Russia for the time being only to win the sympathies of the ruler of that country guaranteeing the Russians a passive advantage, to woo the numerous Buryat Buddhists and Mongolians bordering on them, being very cautious but vigilant by watching the British policy from the side of the Indian border. The future will reveal the further steps of our neighbours: the Japanese, Chinese, and British. It is necessary to keep a strict watch of the East and, as far as possible, to be ready to parry the insidious schemes of our neighbours, especially the Japanese, who are trying to become friendly with the ruler of Tibet.³⁴

'Hence it is clear', wrote P. Kozlov, that 'Russia should maintain good relations with the Dalai Lama and meet half way his close adviser

and counsellor on Tibetan affairs Agvan Dorjjeff to whom the Dalai Lama officially requested that full trust and proper attention be bestowed'.³⁵ It is significant that P. Kozlov saw only the 'passive' advantage of Russia's association with the Dalai Lama. The latter presented eighteen valuable articles of the Buddhist cult to the Geographical Society, both material and scientific, and promised to give free access to Tibet to all Russians who wanted to go there for scientific or commercial purposes.³⁶

The friendly relations between the Dalai Lama and the Geographical Society were important because they were established at a time when any contacts at the diplomatic level had become increasingly dangerous due to the apprehensions of Great Britain and China regarding the strengthening of the Russo-Tibetan bonds. No formal protests on their part would however be launched if such contacts were at the scientific level, and therefore the Russian Foreign Ministry encouraged the development of these, realizing that in future they might become the only source of information about the situation in Tibet.

Meanwhile, taking note of Russia's advice that relations with China should not be worsened and receiving through Yang Chi a new instruction to leave Urga, the Dalai Lama decided to travel in the direction of Tibet. Taking into account the situation in Tibet, however, he accepted the invitation of the princes of west Mongolia and planned to spend some time with them to await the 'turn of events'.³⁷

The Dalai Lama himself explained his unwillingness to return to Tibet not on grounds of apprehension for his personal security (in that event he could obtain asylum in Russia), but by the certitude that he would meet Britons there with whom he cannot live in one country³⁸ and apprehension of 'what people say about him and Russia, when they see the predominance of British influence'.³⁹ The Dalai Lama's return to Tibet occupied by the British could mean acknowledgement by him of British power over his country.

Besides, the Dalai Lama learned of the start of negotiations between Britain and China on the Tibetan question which provided conclusive evidence that he would not receive any help from China against Great Britain. Secondly, he received news of the cessation of the Russo-Japanese hostilities and through the Russian consular official Kuzminsky, sent a message to the Russian government stating his 'sincere happiness', and saying that the

termination of the war made him sure of a quick restoration of the former might of Russia in the Far East, allowing him also to hope that soon a time will come for the Russian government to fulfil the promise of friendly interference in the Tibetan affairs, so that in case, if it is impossible to evict the British from Tibet, all the interested powers will enjoy equal rights like Britain in our country.⁴⁰

Thus, the Dalai Lama's hope for Russian help was renewed, but this did not materialize due to the upsurge of the first Russian revolution in the second half of 1905 which diverted the attention of the Russian government from Tibet's affairs.

For all that, the Dalai Lama, under China's pressure, was compelled to leave Urga. On the eve of his departure he had a two hour discussion with M.N. Kuzminsky. In the course of the discussion he emphasized that his future plans depended upon the situation in Tibet. He requested the Russian press to publicize the fact that the Mongolian Khutukhta had incited the Chinese Ambans Yang Chi and Pu Shou against him and persuaded them to expell him from Urga, which prompted the Chinese emperor to refuse to grant him an audience. The Dalai Lama said that he committed the Tibetans headed by Agvan Chungtsian remaining in Urga to the protection of Russia. It was through Agvan Chungtsian that he wanted to keep in touch with the Russian consulate.⁴¹ The Dalai Lama's agent, T.G. Badmazhapov, was in Peking to conduct negotiations regarding the future of Tibet. He was ordered to maintain continuing contact with the Russian envoy in Peking, Pokotilov. Dylykov remained in Urga. The Dalai Lama sent Dorjjeff to Petersburg with the instruction, saying, *inter alia*:

For the past twenty years the British India government has been repeatedly disturbing the tranquillity in the frontier regions of Tibet. Last year they went one step further by sending to Tibet an armed detachment who plundered and massacred the peace-loving inhabitants and entered Lhasa. Being afraid of Britain, the friendly government of the Chinese emperor did not render to us assistance. To appeal to other powers we could not at the time because of the great distances. Therefore, to have convenient communication with the Bogdochan⁴² we went to Khalkhask Kuren [Urga], from where we communicated the true position to His Majesty through a specially sent Amban and two our trusted officials in Peking. However, after six or seven months no direct reply has come on our representations. As a result we have decided to turn to the Russian Tsar, knowing his great care for the welfare of all people and ask him to sort out the controversy between the governments of Great Britain and Tibet, to recognize the

existence of Tibet's independence, and help alleviate the situation so that no other power is able to annex Tibetan territory or interfere in the internal affairs of this country. We wish also that the British subjects do not have any advantages over the subjects of other powers dealing with Tibet and that in general to ensure that the Tibetan government in its external relations may freely enjoy the same rights and customs which are in force in the mutual relations between great powers.⁴³

Thus, the Dalai Lama aspired to create an independent Tibet that he believed could be guaranteed by Russia acting as a mediator in a resolution of the controversy between Britain and Tibet.

On 2 September 1905 the Dalai Lama left Urga and on 7 September arrived at Khandatsinvan Kuren (Vankuren), situated 200 *verst* (213.36 km) from Kyakhta, which facilitated his contacts with Russia.⁴⁴ The Russian Consul-General in Urga, Lyuba, had analyzed the results of the Dalai Lama's stay in Urga in one of his reports to the Foreign Ministry. The high priest's arrival at Urga resulted in a great influx of Buddhist pilgrims, not only from Mongolia and China but even from the Trans-Baikal region, Astrakhan, and the Kalmyk steppes, who came to worship their spiritual leader. It was not possible for the Dalai Lama to personally receive each of them, so he met only the most important and influential pilgrims.

But he paid particular attention to our non-Russians. This has not escaped the notice of the crowd of pilgrims who were agitated and that gave the pretext to lamas to comment that the Dalai Lama was mercenary, because he actually received rich gifts from our Buryats' ... by displaying courteous sympathy to the Russian subjects, the Dalai Lama wanted to stress his preference for Russia and to make known the hostile attitude to him of the Khutukhta explained by the decrease of its incomes.

Undoubtedly, the sojourn of the Dalai Lama in Urga had sharply reduced the political significance of the Khutukhta who therefore appealed to the Chinese Amban Yang Chi to expel the Dalai Lama from Mongolia.

After several talks with the Dalai Lama, Lyuba came to the conclusion that he had come to Mongolia

with a clear purpose of ascertaining the position of Tibet after the British expedition and to obtain Russia's protection in order to defend the rights of his country, trampled upon by the British. The Dalai Lama came to Urga with the firm belief that he would receive Russian help, and the thought

that owing to the unhappy situation she will not be able to rebuff the claims of the British is greatly depressing him.

Lyuba stated that the Dalai Lama was well acquainted with the 'insidiousness' of Great Britain which was gradually increasing the sphere of her influence in Tibet and did not believe that the British would fulfil their commitments given to Russia. Chinese power in Tibet was only minimal, and China was not in a position to oppose British policies in Tibet, and therefore the Dalai Lama depended solely on Russia's help and valued the efforts she had made during times so difficult to her. However, he definitely believed that Great Britain would not voluntarily give up claims on Lhasa. The Dalai Lama expressed his readiness to turn for help to Japan as a Buddhist state, and to mediate in its signing a peace with Russia, as he considered that this, in turn, would help to resolve the Tibetan question.⁴⁵ As the Dalai Lama's feelings for Russia were unchangeable he was pained by the fact that his desire to approach Japan in the interests of peace could engender doubts regarding his sincerity in relation to Russia.⁴⁶ The Dalai Lama sympathized with Russian scholars Kozlov and Shcherbatsky and reaffirmed his readiness to permit the expedition organized by the Russian Geographical Society to enter Tibet.⁴⁷

Undoubtedly the Dalai Lama's sojourn in Urga 'thoroughly changed both the spiritual life and the socio-political outlook of the Mongolians and the non-Russians'. His sympathetic attitude towards Russia found an echo among the Mongolian people, princes, and Lamas who hated their enslavers, the Chinese, and ardently desired 'their Supreme Pastor to get back his country, taken from him by the British with China's criminal connivance'.⁴⁸ The reform to settle Mongolian territory with Chinese inhabitants⁴⁹ further heightened the Mongolian peoples' desire to free themselves from the Manchurian yoke with Russian help and fuelled the growth of a sense of national identity and urge for independence, if not complete then at least under the protection of a more powerful and 'just' state. The Dalai Lama was prepared to support such a plan if it met with Russia's approval.⁵⁰

On 7 September 1905, the Dalai Lama arrived at Khandatsinvan Kuren where he planned a long stay. However, on 23 September, a courier arrived with a new directive from the Chinese emperor

requiring him to leave for Tibet at the earliest.⁵¹ The Dalai Lama requested that the official from the Russian consulate, Kuzminsky arrive there as soon as possible with a Russian convoy. In addition, at his call, a student, Boraydin, who had been sent by the Imperial Academy of Sciences to study in Tibet, left for Khandatsinvan to translate state documents relating to the question on the juridical dependence of Tibet on China.⁵²

On 26 September 1905, the Dalai Lama wrote to the Russian envoy in Peking, Pokotilov, mentioning that 'the Amban of Urga, Pu Shou' had come personally to meet him with a document called the Imperial Decree, stating that the British had left Tibet and that once again peace and tranquillity having been restored, he should proceed to Lhasa. However, according to eyewitnesses, the British had occupied numerous temples, had quartered their troops there, and even started the construction of a railway line and installation of a telegraph line which was by no means in consonance with the Imperial Decree. The Dalai Lama had not received any reply to his petitions to the Emperor. According to him, the Urga Khutukhta being displeased with his stay in Urga had formed an alliance with Yang Chi. The latter repeatedly asked the Dalai Lama to return to his country allegedly in compliance with the Emperor's decree, whereas it was learnt from reliable sources that no such decree existed.⁵³

In response Pokotilov assured the Dalai Lama of his readiness to fulfil all assignments given to him by the Dalai Lama during their personal meeting.⁵⁴ On 31 October 1905, Pokotilov sent a cable to the Russian foreign ministry from Peking about his talks with the official Badmazhapov sent to Peking in accordance with the Dalai Lama's request. The talks clarified the relations established between the Buddhist high priest and the representatives of the Chinese administration.⁵⁵ Pokotilov was also assigned a Mongolian official, Chjalafyng, whom the Dalai Lama wanted as his official representative to the Chinese authorities. Pokotilov liked Chjalafyng and preferred the view that being attached to the Dalai Lama, he could also be 'a useful agent' for Russia. In a discussion Chjalafyng said that he would require 6000 roubles as bribes to secure his appointment and sought Pokotilov's help in securing this sum as a loan. Pokotilov replied that he must ascertain whether Chjalafyng was sufficiently solvent and after he had ascertained that this was so, expressed the view that he could arrange for a loan from the Russo-Chinese Bank. The former wrote that this should be done in such a way that the Dalai Lama

regarded it as a 'favour' accorded to him by Russia.⁵⁶ He concluded by saying that 'to avoid the resumption of oppressions of which the Dalai Lama complains at present, he should not aggravate his relations with the Khutukhta and the Urga Amban Yang Chi who only aspired to make less the number of his followers'. Pokotilov considered it necessary that the attention of the Dalai Lama be drawn to this aspect through the Russian consulate in Urga.⁵⁷

Thus, Russian diplomacy was unable to provide active assistance to Tibet but not wishing the Dalai Lama to discover this, sought to create an impression that it was helping him by sending an agent to him and, moreover, supplying this agent with money to bribe senior Chinese officials. As we see, the Russo-Chinese Bank provided indispensable assistance to these actions.

In the beginning of October 1905, Dylykov suddenly reported to the foreign ministry that the Dalai Lama had been threatened that he would be forced to go to Tibet.⁵⁸ Kuzminsky however doubted the veracity of the reports, and presumed that the plan was to make the Dalai Lama move as far as possible from the Russian border⁵⁹ because it was not easy to evict him forcefully as a minimum of 100 soldiers would be required to accomplish such a task, and Khandatsinvan did not have these at the time.⁶⁰

On 22 October 1905, Dylykov, in a letter to Dorjieff, again reminded him of the insulting attitude that the Chinese authorities were adopting vis-à-vis the Dalai Lama, and the possibility also of their using force to hasten his journey to Tibet. According to the Emperor's decree, Dylykov wrote, two 'trustworthy' officials were appointed under whose surveillance the Dalai Lama was to be required to leave. It was ordered that there should be no 'wilful delay of the journey. The proper authorities were told unhesitatingly and without discussion to execute that order bearing in mind the proximity of the border'. In consequence the Dalai Lama requested Dorjieff, who had been sent to St Petersburg, first to appeal to the Russian government, that in the event of Tibet's relations with China being severed, to act as the formal mediator during further negotiations between the governments of Tibet and China. Secondly, to find out whether Russia reaffirmed her commitment to provide refuge to the Dalai Lama in Russia, and whether Russia included Tibet in the 'group of friendly countries'. Finally, he hoped that the Russian government would not deny protection to some princes of Mongolia who had assisted the Dalai Lama.⁶¹

The fact that the Dalai Lama entrusted Dorjieff with such an important assignment shows that he continued to nurture hope of Russian assistance in concrete form, not only diplomatic. The Dalai Lama still contemplated fleeing to Russia, despite the fact that this question had been already discussed, and he himself had realized that it was impossible. In all probability, however, the Dalai Lama had again raised that issue as a ruse, on the one hand, to demonstrate his readiness to listen to Russia's advice and directives, and on the other, knowing all the time that Russia was not in a position to receive him at the time, to make her think of some alternative steps to protect Tibet. This assignment also showed that Dorjieff remained the closest lieutenant and trusted servant of the Dalai Lama.

In the meantime, in Peking, the Russian envoy, Pokotilov, in a discussion with Lian Fang regarding the Dalai Lama, personally requested that the latter be permitted to remain in Khandatsinvan for the duration of the winter months. Lian Fan promised to settle the matter, 'in a way suitable for the Dalai Lama'. While in Peking, Pokotilov was gradually getting acquainted with the existing ways and came to the conclusion that the

misunderstandings between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese authorities are due to the unwillingness of the Dalai Lama ... to 'satisfy' the proper Chinese officials by more or less huge gifts. Having collected during the stay in Mongolia from one and a half to two and a half million roubles of donations, the Dalai Lama gave nothing to either the central Chinese government or even the Urga authorities while his rival in Urga, the Khutukhta, acts differently and therefore, naturally gains general favour.

As Pokotilov reported to the foreign ministry, he had learnt that the 'victimization' of the Tibetan leader has been initiated principally by the Mongolian Khutukhta with his ally, the Urga Amban Yang Chi, who sought the Dalai Lama's eviction because his arrival had caused the former to suffer losses. Pokotilov was ready 'to protect as far as possible the Dalai Lama's interests in Peking', but thought 'that he might be advised to maintain good relations with the representatives of the local administration, who are always free to interpret the instructions received from Peking in their own way'.⁶²

Pokotilov informed the Dalai Lama, through Urga, of the steps taken to guard him against being 'victimized' by Yang Chi, and expressed the conviction that the latter had acted on his own initiative and not in accordance with the orders of the Peking authorities.

Pokotilov advised the consul in Urga to try to convince Yang Chi that by his 'tactless' attitude toward the Dalai Lama he might drive him to the 'extreme', which was scarcely in conformity with China's plans. On the other hand, Pokotilov again advised the Dalai Lama not to go too far in aggravating relations with Yang Chi. At the same time, he considered it necessary to once more remind the latter that if he failed to establish normal relations with Yang Chi, he could count on the most 'hospitable reception of the Russian government, if he believed going to Russia the only possible solution of the situation'.⁶³

At Pokotilov's instruction, Kuzminsky had a discussion with Yang Chi on 30 October and drew the attention of the Manchurian Amban to the predicament of the Dalai Lama who could be driven to extremity by the drastic steps employed by the Amban. In response to this, Yang Chi, notwithstanding his usual reticence, did not find it necessary to mask, at least cautiously, 'the true actions, plans and apprehensions' of the Chinese government in dealing with the Dalai Lama. Kuzminsky raised the question of the supposed departure of the Dalai Lama from Khandatsinvan, and the misunderstandings that had arisen between him and the secretaries sent by the Amban.⁶⁴ Yang Chi clarified that the Dalai Lama had insisted on the removal of these secretaries from Khandatsinvan, but as they had been sent at the order of the Chinese emperor, that request could not be granted, and it was the Dalai Lama who was guilty of misconstruction, for he, as a 'loyal subject', must obey orders from Peking. Kuzminsky expressed the view that because of his desperate situation the Dalai Lama might take recourse to 'extreme measures'. Yang Chi agreed, but said that while the Dalai Lama was in the region administered by the emperor he was obliged to obey his command. He, however, promised to send a detailed account of the circumstances to the emperor, 'which make it impossible for the high priest to return to Tibet, and to solicit an extension of his stay in Mongolia'.

However, when Kuzminsky sought clarifications as to why the Chinese government was so strongly bent upon removing the Dalai Lama from Mongolia (as, according to Kuzminsky, the Chinese government's plans could hardly be to send the Dalai Lama back to Tibet, which would strengthen the British hold over the country), the Amban said that, in his opinion, 'one of the principal reasons was Peking's apprehension that the proximity of the Buryats might create serious misunderstanding between them and the Tibetans'.

Summing up this exchange with Yang Chi, Kuzminsky, in a report to the foreign ministry, wrote that 'the Chinese government, with its natural tendency to suppress the national self-consciousness of the Mongolian people and, as far as possible, to "sinificate" the country, cannot but be concerned about the sojourn of the Tibetan high priest in Mongolia'. As anticipated, the Chinese authorities were not content with the Dalai Lama's departure only from Urga; true, this relieved the Chinese administration from the control of Russian authorities and to a certain degree isolated the high priest from Russian influence. The close proximity of the Russian border from the temporary residence of the Dalai Lama caused the Chinese authorities apprehension: being certain of help from the Russian government he 'might finally break relations with the Chinese government which, as it is, are strained', as that 'government could not protect his country from being captured by Britain'. Therefore the Chinese administration takes resolute measures for a speedy removal of the Dalai Lama from Mongolia. 'Evidently, the Chinese', Kuzminsky wrote to the foreign ministry, 'had to reconcile for the time being, with the British dominating in Tibet, and now, in the Lama question, they are focusing on an effort to paralyse by all means all separatist movements of the Mongolians and their inevitable gravitation towards Russia, in case the spiritual leader of the Lamaists enters Russia'.⁶⁵ 'Therefore', he continued,

it can be expected that the Chinese authorities will not hesitate to take any step, including the use of force and even assassination, being afraid of an imaginary danger which the British and the Japanese, no doubt interested in the future of Tibet and Mongolia, will not fail to depict in the most sombre colours.⁶⁶

Concluding the report, Kuzminsky wrote, that according to the prevalent opinion in Urga, the present moment was the most propitious to execute the Dalai Lama's plan to go to Russia, since the aggressive activities of the Chinese administration entitled him to break off with China. At the same time, he said:

This situation should not cause a deterioration in Russo-Chinese relations, as the principles of international law envisaged the grant of asylum even to political offenders not subject to extradition, and will not affect the relations between countries and does not constitute a reason for the government granting asylum of being accused of displaying an unfriendly attitude.⁶⁷

Thus, the issue relating to the Dalai Lama's trip to Russia was put on the agenda for the third time. It is necessary to mention, however, that despite Russian diplomats 'genuine concern for the Dalai Lama, the desire of certain religious and military circles' to see him in Russia was not prompted either by real prospects of or an actual threat to his life. The Russian government, of course, saw that China would hardly resort to violent measures in relation to the Dalai Lama. On 2 November 1905, Pokotilov wrote to Kuzminsky that the Dalai Lama had been permitted to stay in Khalkha (West Mongolia) during the winter and requested him to inform the Dalai Lama of that, noting that 'he owes the settlement of the misunderstandings between him and the Chinese authorities exclusively to us'.⁶⁸

It should be stated that the Dalai Lama's assumption that after the signature of the peace treaty with Japan, Russia would devote greater attention to Tibet, materialized to a certain degree. After his arrival in Peking, Pokotilov took steps that were advantageous to the Russian government and at the same time were not inimical to the wishes of the Dalai Lama; i.e. conducting negotiations with the Chinese officials, etc.⁶⁹ The Dalai Lama expressed his gratitude to the Russian government through Pokotilov for rendering service: permission to pass the winter at Khalkha, that dispelled the danger of severing relations with the Chinese administration.⁷⁰

In December 1905, Pokotilov requested the Russian Consul in Urga, Lyuba, to inform the Dalai Lama that his return to Lhasa would make it significantly easier for Russia to accomplish her tasks in Tibet.⁷¹ The Dalai Lama however replied that in the beginning of December Dorjief's messenger had informed him that the Russian government had still been seriously interested in the Tibetan question and advised him to remain in Mongolia 'till this question is favourably decided'.⁷² This created a contradictory situation. To avoid further misunderstandings, Pokotilov (who continued to solicit the Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa), asked Lamsdorff 'to furnish him with additional instructions in this regard'.⁷³

It is hardly likely that this contradiction could be explained by Dorjief's incorrect understanding of the explanations of the foreign ministry. It could however be a confirmation of the clergy's desire to secure the active assistance of Russia which was possible during the Dalai Lama's sojourn in Mongolia, close to the Russian borders, while the Russian government was insistent that the Dalai Lama proceed to Lhasa since at that time Russia was not in a position to pursue an

active policy in Mongolia, in particular, and in the Far East in general. This did not however mean that Russia had abandoned plans to strengthen its influence in Urga.

Thus, till the spring of 1906 the Dalai Lama was permitted to remain in west Mongolia but his future movements remained on the agenda. He himself was extremely worried about his security during his trip and asked Dorjjeff to convey his fears to Lamsdorff, who instructed the Russian envoy in Peking, Pokotilov, to talk to the Chinese government about guaranteeing the Dalai Lama's security during his trip. Pokotilov was told that 'the Chinese government wishing to expedite the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet acknowledges their duty to provide an armed detachment' for the protection of the Dalai Lama, and he should not be 'anxious about and nurture doubts about his fate'. This assurance of the Chinese government was conveyed by Lamsdorff to the Dalai Lama on 7 February 1906, which 'according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, placed on it a moral obligation to keep that promise and fully safeguard' him on his journey to Tibet.⁷⁴

While the Russian government was convinced of the necessity for the Dalai Lama's quick return to Lhasa, yet some groups in the Russian ruling circles connected with the military authorities still considered it 'necessary to profit by the high priest's sojourn in Mongolia, to fulfil the broadest political tasks in regard to this country'.⁷⁵ Hence, the Russian military representatives in Mongolia, Lieutenant-Colonel A.D. Khitrovo and an official Kostritsky, felt it was imperative to keep the Dalai Lama in Mongolia as long as possible till the Tibetan question was resolved and hence, recommended that the Prince of Khandatsinvan, whose hospitality the Dalai Lama enjoyed, be sent to Peking to participate in the congress of Mongolian princes where the question about moving the Dalai Lama to west Mongolia would be reviewed. According to a report from Pokotilov to the foreign ministry, it was proposed that the 'Princes send a petition to the Chinese government about the expulsion of the British from Tibet and to obtain from them a positive commitment that they would not invade this country'.⁷⁶

On 3 December the Prince of Khandatsinvan went to Peking⁷⁷ where he met Pokotilov who told him that the Russian Tsar

would like to help the Dalai Lama, but at present due to the unrest in the country [the 1905–7 revolutionary events in Russia] assistance to the Dalai

Lama may be extended only after re-establishing order. It is desirable that the Dalai Lama immediately returns to Tibet since there is no threat from Britain to his return and in an extreme case I may help him in this regard.⁷⁸

When the Russian envoy refused to assist in the prolongation of the Dalai Lama's stay in Mongolia, the Mongolian princes began negotiations with the Chinese officials, giving rise to great expenditure that was to be borne by the Russo-Chinese Bank.⁷⁹ Giving an account of his trip to Peking, the Prince of Khandatsinvan wrote to the Dalai Lama:

We took the risk of acting in this way because Russia refused to render assistance in the near future; Yang Chi's attempts to evict you from Mongolia may taint your prestige in future; the inimical attitude of the powerful state [i.e. Great Britain] makes your return to Tibet unsafe and, finally, if the main task is not fulfilled, at least the minor questions will be settled which will give us a chance to prepare the ground for the future'.⁸⁰

What was the Chinese government's stand on the Dalai Lama's future fate? Pokotilov reported to the foreign ministry that during a discussion in mid-April 1906, Lian Fang had said that, 'on principle, the Chinese government has by no means changed its attitude to the desirability of the Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa'. Nevertheless, they thought it necessary 'to ascertain the sentiments in Tibet to avoid taking any unnecessary responsibility, in case any misfortune befalls the high priest'. Bearing that in mind, the Chinese government had appointed a new resident to Lhasa who had already arrived at Kandin. According to Pokotilov, Lian Fang stressed the

extreme risk for China to take any thoughtless step in this respect, and the necessity of being very cautious in staving off any disturbances in Tibet, quite possible in connection with the Dalai Lama's return there. The first consequence of this sort of disturbances may be fresh intervention by the British.⁸¹

From what Lian Fang had said, Pokotilov concluded that the Chinese government had decided not to yield to British pressure on the Tibetan question (at the end of December 1905 Pokotilov told Lian Fang that during negotiations with Britain, China should be firm and 'on no account agree to any concessions on China's right of suzerainty or allow any exclusive advantages to the British in the political or economic spheres'.)⁸² However, the presence of the Dalai Lama in Lhasa was essential to successfully counter British influence.⁸³

Therefore, although the Chinese government wanted the Dalai Lama to leave Mongolia (to be further from Russia) and return to Lhasa, yet it did not hurry the high priest before the conclusion of negotiations with the British about signing the Convention and the payment of the entire indemnity sum to England, fearing fresh unrest in Tibet. Russia also insisted on the Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa, promising help and assistance. This is explained by the fact that during that period, she was not able to pursue an active policy in Mongolia, in particular, and in the Far East in general, which did not however mean that Russia had abandoned her plans to strengthen Russian influence in Urga.

The Russian government which, as mentioned earlier, had held negotiations and regular consultations with Great Britain on the Tibetan question, was interested in learning about the Dalai Lama's thoughts and intentions, and, on its part, to 'explain' to him Russia's standpoint and plans regarding Tibet, particularly as rumours had reached the Russian diplomatic representatives in Peking about 'the high priest's hesitations as he had allegedly lost confidence in our assistance and decided to return to Lhasa intending to completely surrender to the will of the British'.⁸⁴ It was also learnt that the Dalai Lama had sought the advice of the Russian foreign ministry, stating his desire to go to Peking to personally meet and negotiate with the Chinese emperor on the Tibetan question.⁸⁵ The Russian government however responded to that idea negatively, and its refusal was communicated to the Dalai Lama by Dorjjeff in a telegram from St Petersburg on 20 January 1906. 'The Dalai Lama and his retinue were depressed by that information and even suspected that the [Russian] government is looking for a pretext to get rid of the Dalai Lama'.⁸⁶ Pokotilov therefore requested the Consul in Urga to find out the stand of the Dalai Lama. Dylykov, a Russian consulate official in Urga, was deputed to his headquarters. He set out his impressions in a letter dated 8 February 1906 to Badmazhapov in Peking. What did Dylykov report?

First, that the Dalai Lama had received a letter from the Panchen Lama that Great Britain had made him a gift of 50,000 *lans* and proposed that he occupy the Tibetan throne in place of the Dalai Lama. The Panchen Lama had accepted the gift, but rejected the proposal, since he considered that 'such action would invite discord in the country'. The British had told him that they were very well aware of 'Russia's weakness and inability to help the Dalai Lama, yet

he will place himself in their hands all the same'. Hence the Panchen Lama suggested that the Dalai Lama should not hasten his return to Tibet and wait for a 'more favourable moment'. Dylykov believed that the Dalai Lama could not expect any other sort of advice from his rival, but the high priest took it 'all in good faith', which 'gave more perplexity in the spheres around the Dalai Lama'. He requested Dorjiëff 'to learn the true intentions of our government and if it comes out that Russia's advice to go to Lhasa is their last word, then he will be forced to return to Tibet to reconcile to his fate and so fully accept the British influence'.

Secondly, as a member of one of the religious circles that considered it necessary to delay the Dalai Lama's departure from Mongolia, Dylykov proposed 'to prompt him to summon an Ecumenical Convocation of Buddhists to resolve different religious issues'. The convocation could take place in East Mongolia or Peking.

How did Pokotilov react to Dylykov's proposal? 'All our compatriots who contacted the Dalai Lama insisted that he should be at a close proximity to us or even be invited to Russia', declared Pokotilov. 'I am accustomed to regard this with some distrust'. They always 'have shown a certain interest: either to make themselves famous or simply to gain some profit at the expense of so rare a guest ...'. As regards the idea of summoning a Convocation, 'it is, no doubt, important to the Dalai Lama and his advisors to take at least artificially such an act, in connection with which our government will have to act jointly with the Buddhist high priest and thus publicly demonstrate a certain community of mutual interests'. Pokotilov places this scheme devised by Dylykov on the same plane with 'the insistent wish of the high priest to decide the question of sending with him a Russian convoy, of appointing an official Russian agent in Lhasa, and conveying our government's guarantees for his personal safety'. In connection with it, proceeding from certain hints made to him by Badmazhapov in Peking, Pokotilov suggests 'the measure that would satisfy the high priest, being at the same time quite harmless, that is to officially thank the high priest on behalf of His Majesty for the beneficial influence of the high priest on the Buddhist pilgrims, thronging in from the Trans-Baikal area'. Finally, as regards the Dalai Lama's intention of surrendering to the British in Lhasa, Pokotilov considered it to be 'politically untenable' because 'it is fully possible for the Dalai Lama, with our active support, to be successful in his struggle for Tibet's independence'.⁸⁷

Besides the officials of the Russian consulate in Urga and the religious leaders of Siberia, negotiations with the Dalai Lama were held by a member of Russia's military intelligence who relied on the Dalai Lama 'to propagare in favour of secession of Mongolia from the Chinese domain, and the establishment of a favourably disposed towards us independent Mongolo-Tibetan State'.⁸⁸

At the end of 1905 Lieutenant-Colonel Khitrovo, assistant of the head of the Mongolian expedition, and the official Kostritsky, arrived at Van-Kuren as members of the guards of one of the Mongolian deputations. It should be said that the foreign ministry had expressly forbidden Khitrovo to undertake that trip, taking into consideration the desire of the military to annex Mongolia, contrary to the general orientation of the Far Eastern policy of the Russian Tsarists after Russia's defeat in the war with Japan.

This notwithstanding, Kostritsky came to Van-Kuren incognito and was ordered not to meet the Dalai Lama at his own initiative, yet the latter learnt of his arrival and invited him. During their long meeting Kostritsky received detailed information from the Dalai Lama, who asked him to inform Khitrovo about his sojourn in Mongolia, about the difficulties he was experiencing, his intentions and the moves he was pursuing.⁸⁹ Lieutenant-Colonel Khitrovo sent a special report to the foreign ministry 'About the Dalai Lama and his activities'⁹⁰ with a detailed account of Kostritsky's meeting with the Dalai Lama, and the information he had obtained in Van-Kuren. The Dalai Lama told Kostritsky that he, with the help of 'documentary' and historical evidence, had shown the Russian consulate his rights to temporal power over Tibet; that Manchu dynasty was soon going to be overthrown and the rights of the Chinese Ming dynasty restored; that Mongolia and Tibet had never been under the Chinese Suzerainty; that Mongolia itself had ruled China in the past. With the fall of the Manchu dynasty, Tibet and Mongolia would again gain independence. Kostritsky further wrote that

the Dalai Lama holding the same views as the Mongolian Princes and the influential Khutuktas-Gegens, had finally decided to irrevocably secede from China to form an independent allied state, accomplishing this operation with Russia's patronage and support, avoiding bloodshed. If Russia refuses to help, the Dalai Lama, not changing the decision to secede from China will do so under the protection of some other great power, and in an extreme case even Britain, offering her services to the Dalai Lama.

The character and course of this discussion showed that the apprehensions of the Russian foreign ministry were not unfounded: the question of the secession of Mongolia and Tibet from China undoubtedly did not conform to the plans of Russian diplomacy, and would lead to serious negotiations with Britain. As regards the idea to secede, it demonstrated the increasing discontent with the Manchu authorities that existed in the outlying areas of the Chinese empire. The Dalai Lama realized that an independent Mongolo-Tibetan state could not exist without the patronage of some great power. By declaring his readiness to make his old enemy, Britain, his patron, the Dalai Lama apparently wanted to exert pressure on Russia to more actively intervene in Tibetan affairs. It is necessary to say that this was not the first time that the Dalai Lama attempted to pressurize Russia by stating intentions of seeking British assistance.

During his meeting with the representatives of the different Russian circles—diplomats, military and religious leaders—the Dalai Lama could not but notice the absence of a common view on the policy to be pursued in the Far East, Mongolia, and Tibet. He very clearly saw and felt that serious differences existed among the different Russian departments. Khitrovo quoted Kostritsky, saying

the Dalai Lama with great caution and tact, expressed regret about the absence of solidarity in the activities of the Russian administrative organs, the consulate, the embassy, military authorities and the ministries in St Petersburg; which put him in a frightfully difficult and uncertain position, not knowing to whom to turn for counsel or whom to inform of his confidential considerations regarding achieving his chief aim stated above.

According to the Dalai Lama, some groups in Tibet, because of the 'evasive stand of Russia', thought that it was necessary to choose another power friendly with Russia. However, the Dalai Lama himself 'has been stubbornly thinking of depending on Russia alone for the time being, knowing that the latter is being torn apart by internal strife and disturbances which, in his opinion, will subside by the beginning of spring'.

Khitrovo reported that in the opinion of the Dalai Lama, Russia's help and support should be manifested by

Russia recognizing the just nature of the lawful demands of Mongolia and Tibet, would consider the Dalai Lama's stand on this question and introduce them for discussion and decision of all other great powers which,

as the Dalai Lama is convinced, would agree with the lawfulness of their demand.

In conclusion, Khitrovo noted that he could not decide whether the Dalai Lama might be useful to Russia, and repeated, however, that he knew for certain that during the Russo-Japanese war all Mongolians, under the Dalai Lama's influence, had 'ignored the orders of the Chinese government not to sell livestock and horses to the Russians'.⁹¹

Therefore, we see that the Russian military intelligence strove to link the Tibetan and Mongolian questions and to use the Dalai Lama to accomplish their plans vis-à-vis Mongolia. Regarding the idea of an appeal to the great powers, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lamsdorff, in his Memorandum of 10 February, once again confirmed that their proposal was 'impractical ... does not deserve attention and should be rejected'.⁹²

The attitude of Russian diplomacy to that proposal was fully understandable, if it is taken into account that Russia could either turn to Britain, with whom negotiations had already been initiated on the Tibetan question, or to Britain and Russia's ally France, which had practically nothing to do with Tibet, or to Germany, whose relations with Britain and Russia were becoming more and more strained.

AGVAN DORJIEFF'S NEGOTIATIONS IN ST PETERSBURG

Meanwhile, Dorjjeff was in Petersburg, and on 22 February 1906, he was received in the Tsarskoye Selo by Tsar Nicholas II. At the meeting Dorjjeff conveyed to the Russian Tsar that the Dalai Lama had asked him to 'express his unfailing devotion and gratitude for his permanent kind attention to the affairs of the Dalai Lama and Tibet'. He hopes, Dorjjeff continued, that Nicholas II would continue to hold the interests of Tibet 'close to his heart' as Tibet was connected by religious ties with numerous subjects of the Russian empire. Intending, on the Russian government's advice, to go to Tibet soon, the Dalai Lama assigned the task to Dorjjeff to assure the Russian Tsar that he had been taking and would take further measures to ensure that Russian explorers and travellers would receive a most hospitable reception in Tibet. In conclusion, Dorjjeff said that the Dalai Lama was well aware of the fact that only Russia's concern about many other affairs prevented it for the time being 'to desire to participate in Tibetan affairs to the proper degree'.⁹³

In reply Nicholas II said:

Convey to His Holiness my sincere thanks for the feelings he has for me. I have always held dear the interests of millions of my subjects: the flock of His Holiness along with Tibet. I want it to be believed that I and Russia have been always eager to help Tibet as much as our means permit and I hope that after some time we shall render to His Holiness even stronger and more desirable help to Tibet.

He requested His Holiness to believe and always count on his assistance and wished him the best of health 'in good ruling of his country and for the welfare of Russia'. The Russian Tsar recommended that the Dalai Lama make use in all affairs of the services of Russia's envoy in Peking, Pokotilov, who 'enjoys the great trust' of the Tsar.

The text of this speech of Nicholas II clearly shows that at that time he again limited himself to verbal promises of help to Tibet, without having in mind any concrete steps to implement them. The following day, Dorjjeff despatched a letter to Lamsdorff, thanking him for the 'great interest' of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 'Tibetan affairs, as well as for assisting ... in obtaining the highest level audience'.⁹⁴

After the Dalai Lama received Dorjjeff's report on the results of his visit to Nicholas II, the Dalai Lama sent the following telegram to the Russian Tsar:

My boundless and infinite gratitude to Your Majesty for your high merciful attention to me, especially, valuable at Tibet's difficult present time and for granting audience to my representative, Dorjjeff. As a token of my greatest joy I present to Your Majesty the image of the Buddha and blessed *khadak*.⁹⁵

Thus, Dorjjeff's negotiations in St Petersburg, on which the Dalai Lama had placed so much hope, brought virtually no results. Besides somewhat abstract promises, Dorjjeff had achieved nothing. All relations with the Dalai Lama and Tibet were entrusted to the Russian envoy in Peking, Pokotilov. To Dorjjeff's proposal that a Russian expedition be sent to Tibet, Nicholas II gave no reply. In the Memorandum of 10 February 1906 the Foreign Minister termed it 'impracticable'.⁹⁶

It is interesting that on 14 March 1906, the Chief of the Asian Department of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, N.G. Gartvig, hastened to inform the British ambassador in St Petersburg, Spring-Rice about Dorjjeff's arrival in Petersburg, about his audience with

Tsar Nicholas II, and the substance of the discussion. Doing so, Gartvig said that he wanted to inform the British ambassador about the events as accurately as possible, since he was apprehensive that the Russian press (considering the experience of 1900–1) would give the meeting a political colour. Spring-Rice thanked Gartvig for the information and said that in the course of the Anglo-Chinese negotiations on the Tibetan issue, the British government would keep to the 'spirit and letter' of the oral agreement arrived between Great Britain and Russia on the Tibetan issue arrived at as a consequence of the negotiations between the British foreign office and the Russian ambassador in London, Benckendorff.⁹⁷

By informing the British government about the Russo-Tibetan negotiations, Russian diplomacy demonstrated that it was ready to stop pursuing individual policies in Tibet and would coordinate further actions in Tibet with the government of Great Britain. This once again demonstrated the great importance Russian diplomacy attached to negotiations with Great Britain.

At the Dalai Lama's request, Dorjjeff negotiated with A.P. Izvolsky about the construction of a Buddhist temple in St Petersburg.⁹⁸ In June 1908, the Russian Prime Minister, P. Stolypin, received a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Izvolsky, mentioning, *inter alia*, that a trusted agent of the Dalai Lama, with whom the Russian Foreign Minister 'maintains confidential relations', 'has requested that the Lamaists be granted permission to build their temple in St Petersburg'. The Dalai Lama himself envisaged the temple as a centre where many young people from 'Buddhist countries' may come to acquire knowledge necessary to strengthen the friendly relations between Russia, Tibet, and Mongolia.

This problem was discussed in the course of the talks between Dorjjeff and Nicholas II who showed interest in the idea. Dorjjeff reported that the temple would be built at the expense of the Buddhists in Russia so that the people and the government would not have to spend a single kopek. Dorjjeff spent his own money to buy land in the region of Chernaya Rechka (Black River), where A.S. Pushkin had fought his celebrated duel. The first instalment of 50,000 roubles in gold for the construction was paid by him in the name of the Dalai Lama, 30,000 roubles in his own name, 10,000 roubles were contributed by the Buddhists of the Trans-Baikal area, 6,000 roubles

by the Kalmyks, and several thousand roubles by the Mongolian Buddhists.

For the construction, a special committee was set up and approved by the government, comprising Dorjieff himself as the representative of the Dalai Lama, academicians V.V. Radlov, S.F. Oldenburg, P.I. Shcherbatsky, P. Badmaev, Prince A. Ukhtomsky, scientist and explorer P. Kozlov, architect G. Baranovsky, and painter Nicholas Roerich.

Despite the opposition from the Russian Orthodox Church, of the Black-Hundred upper circles, fanned by the synod, the construction was begun in 1909 and completed in 1914. A grand opening ceremony took place on 10 August 1915 although the first service was conducted on 21 February 1913, during the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Romanov dynasty. Near the temple a guest-house for the Buddhist visitors and a hospital were built. During the First World War this temple served as a halting place for Buryats and Kalmyks returning from the front to their places of domicile.

The Buddhist temple, a unique architectural feat, fulfilled its historical and religious mission in the course of several decades and in the first years after the October revolution. However, in the thirties, particularly after 1935, the temple, its lamas, and Agvan Dorjieff himself shared Russia's tragic fate. The lamas were arrested. On 13 November 1937, the 84 year old Agvan Dorjieff was also arrested and 'died from heart paralysis on 29 January 1938' in the prison hospital in Ulan-Ude.

During the period of the Great Patriotic War, the premises of the Buddhist temple were used as a radio station and its building at Kolpino was demolished. After the war the temple housed a sports centre, a laboratory of the Zoological Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1991, the temple was again reopened and began to be actively visited by members of the Buddhist community in St Petersburg and by foreign guests from Mongolia, China, India, and Japan.

PERSPECTIVES OF THE DALAI LAMA'S RETURN TO TIBET AND THE RUSSIAN POSITION

Meanwhile, on 5 July 1906, the Dalai Lama left Tszain-Khur monastery and on 8 July reached the principality of Sain-Noyon. He still banked on Russia's active help and requested permission 'to have a Russian convoy to accompany him to the borders of Tibet'. He

believed that the relations of Tibet with China and Britain would be fully regulated 'by the new treaty' and on reaching Lhasa, intended 'to send an embassy to Russia'. The Dalai Lama asked the Russian Consul in Urga to clarify 'whether it will be possible to install a telegraph line linking Tibet and Russia through India or China to maintain the shortest communication link with Russia'.

The Chinese government, in turn, wanted to rid Mongolia of the Dalai Lama as soon as possible and send him to Tibet. They therefore worked out an itinerary, providing 'a comfortable and speedy journey across Mongolia'.¹ However, Russian diplomacy, having learnt of the British government's attitude in the course of the negotiation regarding the question of relations with the Dalai Lama and his future, changed their view on that question, fearing that the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet might aggravate the relations with Great Britain and break off the negotiations. So, at the request of the Russian envoy in Peking, Pokotilov, an official of the Consulate in Urga, Kuzminsky on 7 July 1906 went to the domain of Prince Sain-Noyon to talk to the Dalai Lama,² and on 14 July 1906 was received by him. 'Reporting that the Imperial government had received information from reliable sources that the British disapproved of his return to Lhasa and that there was a possibility of an outbreak of unrest in the country which the British will undoubtedly not fail to utilize to revive their intervention in Tibet', Kuzminsky notified the Dalai Lama, on behalf of the envoy, that 'the trend of affairs makes it necessary for him to delay his journey to Lhasa'. The Dalai Lama, according to Kuzminsky, was very perturbed by that information. In reply he said that 'though he had made all preparations to undertake the journey' yet Kuzminsky's warning and the envoy's advice induced him to reconsider the question of the advisability of his return to Lhasa, notwithstanding the fact that 'his people and his entire congregation in Tibet had for a long period remained without their temporal and spiritual head, which created confusion in the religious and the administrative affairs of the country'.

The Dalai Lama told Kuzminsky about his talks and negotiations with the Princes Bo Disu and Da Show sent by the Peking government as early as 3 May 1906, with instructions to accompany the Dalai Lama and pay 'attention' to him on behalf of the Chinese government.³ The Dalai Lama endeavoured to elicit a clarification from the princes on the content of the Anglo-Chinese Treaty 'as the secrecy ... binds the will and the decision of the high priest to return to

Lhasa'. The Dalai Lama suspected that the 'full text of the Treaty so stubbornly concealed from him by the Chinese government, contains articles limiting the suzerainty of China over Tibet in favour of Great Britain ... and also not furnishing full information about how his personal immunity will be guaranteed by Britain and China, in the event of his returning to Lhasa and how his age-long rights on Tibet are to be protected.' According to the Dalai Lama, 'In the country occupied by the British they are ignoring his person, not only as the supreme ruler of Tibet but also as a simple feudal lord.'

Notwithstanding the Dalai Lama's repeated attempts to elicit from Princes Bo Disu and Da Show all the details concerning the Anglo-Chinese Agreement, they reported only that:

At the present moment Tibet is not dependent on the British, hence they should not interfere in its internal affairs. If they or any other state interfere, the Middle Empire will not tolerate such interference. Such an order had been firmly established once and for ever.

According to them, the Dalai Lama was unnecessarily delaying his journey back to Lhasa.⁴

Moreover, the Chinese government did not give a written confirmation

of the assurances, repeatedly given to the high priest in the talks with him, to restore the Dalai Lama as the Supreme Ruler of Tibet, about withdrawing the British from the country, about the consent of Great Britain to open two places in Tibet for international trade and about Britain's encroachment upon the suzerainty of China over Tibet.

Therefore, due to the absence of exact information about the accord, which seriously affected the Dalai Lama's personal interests and Tibet's fate, he had already begun to hesitate on the decision to leave for Lhasa immediately, taken on the advice of the Russian government. Nevertheless, on being directly questioned by Bo Disu whether the Dalai Lama intended to fulfil the wishes of the Chinese emperor and return to Tibet, the Dalai Lama replied that he was prepared to return at once, but would only request the emperor to satisfy his 'natural desire to know the true text of the Treaty'. Bo Disu promised to send this to him from Peking, and stated that any suspicion regarding this was 'inappropriate'.

The Dalai Lama told Kuzminsky about his 'doubts' and explained his desperate situation, as he had promised the Bogdykhan (the

Chinese emperor) that he would not stay in Mongolia longer and at the same time following the advice of the envoy, had to delay his return. In a discussion with Kuzminsky, the Dalai Lama continued to express his warm sympathy for Russia and his firm belief in Russia's assistance. He said:

The words of His Majesty, the Emperor, said to my representative Agvan Dorjief that I ought to have full trust in the Russia envoy in Peking, have been deeply imprinted in my mind and serve as the only guidance for the policy and affairs of Tibet. Implicitly following the advice and instructions of the Imperial government and expressing heartfelt thanks to His Majesty for taking an interest in my fate and active support, of which I had repeated evidence, I am far from the intention to hold Russia responsible for the future happenings and the final outcome of the affair.

The Dalai Lama attached great importance to the telegram sent by Nicholas II on 23 March 1906 and requested the Russian government to send the text of it to Tibet by the usual means, i.e. through the Chinese government who would officially forward it to the Dalai Lama. The high priest regarded the telegram to be 'the main guarantee of his inviolability during his trip to Tibet and inside Tibet', and decided not to proceed with it before a copy of the telegram reached him from Peking.

The Dalai Lama again raised with Kuzminsky the question of 'a quick sending of the Buryati agents and stationing them together with the Cossack convoy in various points in Tibet and Mongolia'. The Dalai Lama himself wanted to retain the Russian convoy 'so that it can accompany him as far as possible and then go to the agents' places of residence'. He requested that Bo Disu and Da Show be replaced by the official Chalafyng who was a known supporter of Russia. Besides, the Dalai Lama was also interested in the plans to send expeditions of Russian scholars to Tibet (Kaznakov, etc.), and asked 'to be given detailed information about their departure time in order to render to them his active support'.

On 15 July 1906, Kuzminsky returned to Urga. He was able to persuade the Dalai Lama to temporarily delay his final departure for Lhasa, yet the high priest continued to send 'requests for the convoys, agents, etc.' On 20 July 1906, Pokotilov reported to the foreign ministry about Kuzminsky's return to Urga, expressing the view that given the possibility of the handover of the written text of the telegram, as requested by the Dalai Lama, or to send a Russian

official, it would be correct to inform him through V.F. Lyuba that if he 'desires to get further instructions from us, he should send a reliable person to Urga', through whom Lyuba would repeat all warnings about the Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa and advise him to settle temporarily in Kokonor or Tsaidam. Regarding the queries about the agents and the convoy, Lyuba would answer negatively but 'cautiously'.⁶ This telegram was fully approved by the foreign ministry.⁷

On 13 August 1906, as advised by the Russian diplomatic representatives, the Dalai Lama left Sain-Noyon for Gumbum, which was an important focal point on the main Asiatic highway, connecting the roads from Kashgar, Urga, Peking, and Lhasa. The monastery city of Gumbum had for centuries been 'the advanced post of Lamaism in north-west China and centre of political intrigues'.⁸ The Dalai Lama intended to stay at Gumbum 'at least for several years, hoping for a better future and assistance from Russia'. He asked that the Russian emperor be informed about his departure from Mongolia and to tell him that 'he is as always devoted to Russia and will not request anybody else for advice or help'. He had realized the need to refuse to have the Russian convoy when leaving Mongolia, but 'urgently requested the dispatch of an experienced man to accompany him to Gumbum, if possible, Dylykov, along with three or four Cossacks', to maintain links with Russia. He also requested that T.G. Badmazhapov, R. Bimbaev, T.D. Dabdanov, and Galsanov, who were in the Tibetan service, be placed at his disposal.⁹ All this was reported to the foreign ministry by Pokotilov who added that he would advise Lyuba to reply 'evasively, referring to the difficulties of finding a suitable person'.¹⁰

The Dalai Lama sent gifts for Nicholas II. Pokotilov asked the foreign ministry whether he should forward them 'in the light of our changed relations with the Dalai Lama'.¹¹

On receiving the report from Urga about the contemplated trip of Dylykov to the Dalai Lama 'as an ordinary literate Buryat', of which Pokotilov had already informed the foreign ministry, the Russian envoy in Peking categorically refused to sanction it.¹² On 28 September 1906, the Russian Foreign Minister, Izvolsky wrote to Pokotilov in Peking that

as the negotiations between Russia and Britain on the Tibetan question had reached a stage when direct official relations with the Dalai Lama or even

any intercourse through persons in the Russian state service, so to say, under the Russian flag, are obviously incongruous, particularly with the high priest's arrival to Gumbum, after which his contacts with Lhasa may be activated.

The departure of the Dalai Lama to Gumbum was the 'only advisable' step, given the desire of the Chinese government to be "quick" in subjecting the Dalai Lama to its influence and expediting his return to Lhasa'. According to Izvolsky, all these factors should have

undoubtedly led to a statement addressed by the Imperial Government to the persons who serve officially or officiously as mediators between the Russian representatives and the Tibetan high priest, that we shall no longer acknowledge them or use their services in the above mentioned way.

This, however, did not preclude the Russian Buddhists from retaining their contacts with the Dalai Lama and depriving him of his right 'to make to us in an accidental way some or other indispensable report ... Complete abstention from maintaining relations with the Dalai Lama', wrote Izvolsky, 'especially as he had still not returned to Lhasa and is staying at a place from where his direct influence on events in Mongolia seems not to be ruled out'. In such a situation Russian diplomacy should have utilized its relations with the Dalai Lama 'in the sphere of Mongolian affairs'.¹³ Fulfilling the directives of the Foreign Minister, Pokotilov declared the necessity of severing relations between Badmazhapov and the Dalai Lama. Therefore, on 6 October 1906, the latter went to his homeland in the Trans-Baikal area and his position as an agent in Peking was 'finally annulled'.¹⁴

We see that Russian diplomacy relinquished regular contacts with the Dalai Lama for the sake of concluding an agreement with Britain on other Asiatic problems, and planned to gain advantage in Mongolia where the Dalai Lama's authority was strongly entrenched notwithstanding his having lost temporal power in Tibet.¹⁵ Thus, in a letter dated 12 October 1906, the Russian Foreign Minister, Izvolsky, wrote to Benckendorff that the tasks of Russian diplomacy in the future were to separate Tibetan affairs from those of Mongolia; and in the latter sphere to seek, if not directly, but at least not to refuse the services that the Dalai Lama may render to us by his charm among the Mongolians and Buryats. Izvolsky believed that China's and Japan's active policies in the Chinese regions adjoining Russia compelled Russian diplomacy to pay serious attention to relations with Mongolia. The Chinese authorities wanted the Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa

to counterbalance the British in Tibet. The Russian government could not actively interfere and only 'strives to remain strictly aloof' of that. On the other hand, while the Dalai Lama resides in Gumbum, 'his activities will be markedly directed towards Mongolia, from where he is receiving his entire material assistance'. As he will be living outside Tibet, 'the Dalai Lama will not use any prerogatives of power in purely Tibetan affairs, which are the subject of negotiations between Russia and Britain which are close to termination'.¹⁶

Thus, Russian diplomacy was interested in the Dalai Lama's stay in Gumbum, as it, being located outside Tibet, was situated sufficiently close to Mongolia to enable Russia to utilize the high priest's influence there, and there was at the same time no fear of his complicating matters with Great Britain.

In early October 1906 the Dalai Lama, escorted by a Chinese detachment, finally arrived at Gumbum, where he was hospitably received by the population; the more so as this time (in contrast to his arrival to Urga) the Chinese had pasted special welcoming placards.¹⁷

The Dalai Lama, however, did not wish to stay long in Gumbum and let it be known through Dorjjeff, who was still in St Petersburg, that he wanted to move over to Tsaidam, 'if such a change is approved by the Russian government', since a 'long stay in Gumbum would not seem desirable'.¹⁸ Before replying to the Dalai Lama's request, Russian diplomacy sought to ascertain whether Tsaidam was within the borders of Tibet and where the Chinese border extended.¹⁹ In Peking, Pokotilov discovered that Tsaidam was not a part of Tibet but the realm of a special Chinese ruler, but there Chinese power was significantly weak.²⁰ Therefore, the note of 9 December 1906 stated that

the Dalai Lama's natural wish to be in Tsaidam is explained by his aspiration to be free to some extent ... from the surveillance of the Chinese administration. From our point of view the move of the high priest to the above mentioned locality in the Kokonor region, may be considered only desirable, as staying outside Tibet and not affecting Britain's interests, the Dalai Lama will be able to consolidate his influence in South Mongolia'.²¹

Developments in Tibet however changed the Dalai Lama's original plans and intentions. Since the beginning of 1904, the Manchurian authorities had pursued a policy of expansion, plunder, and mass repression in Tibet, especially in its east. The Dalai Lama was therefore hesitant in deciding whether to remain in Gumbum or to immediately move on

to Lhasa via Tsaidam, or following Dorjjeff's advice, go to Peking for personal discussions with the Chinese emperor.²² Eventually he decided to spend some more time in Gumbum till he received more detailed information regarding the situation prevailing in Tibet.²³

Russian diplomacy therefore considered it possible 'to allow some of the Dalai Lama's favourite agents to revive direct contact with him, provided they exercised extreme caution and acted as private individuals, because, as has been stated above, a complete break in the relations of Russia with Tibet 'could negatively affect the Mongolians' attitude towards us'.²⁴ For that purpose Dylykov, on 3 December 1906 arrived at Urga with the task of meeting the Dalai Lama 'with extreme caution as a private pilgrim, concealing his real motive'.²⁵ For some reason, however, he refused to go there, and on 11–24 December 1906, Pokotilov reported to the Foreign Minister that Dylykov was going to the Trans-Baikal area.²⁶ Earlier, on 4 December 1906, Pokotilov had informed the Ministry that he had instructed Rabdanov to come to Peking.²⁷ Thus, the activities of the consulate in Da-Tszin-lu also came to an end.²⁸

So, by the end of 1906, an important phase in Russo-Tibetan relations, initiated in 1898, may be considered to have ended. The Russian agents in the service of the Dalai Lama discontinued their activities. Dorjjeff stayed back in Russia (at any rate, on 3 July 1907 he was in Irkutsk, from where he intended to go to Verkhneudinsk).

Russo-Tibetan relations developed in conformity with the objectives and tasks set for itself by Russian diplomacy at each particular period. In the final account, tsarist diplomacy actually gave up active participation in Tibetan affairs in order to reach an accord with Britain on other issues of international relations in Asia that were of greater significance for Russia. This was particularly clearly manifested in the course of Anglo-Russian negotiations which became more active in the first months of 1906.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Tibetan Question in the Anglo-Russian Convention, 1907

In the beginning of 1906, the ruling circles in Great Britain and Russia started direct negotiations to conclude a final agreement regarding controversial Asiatic problems. A change in political tack entailed the appointment to the higher diplomatic posts of persons who were interested in practising new policies, and the dismissal of those who opposed it. As has been mentioned, in 1905 Lord Curzon, as a vehement opponent of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement, was unseated from his post of the Viceroy of India, and A. Nicolson, a staunch supporter and champion of a political alliance with Russia was appointed the British ambassador in St Petersburg. Izvolsky, also seeking to normalize Anglo-Russian relations, became the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

From the very beginning of 1906, the Russian government sought to resolve matters relating to Tibet in the course of the Anglo-Russian negotiations. Russian diplomacy also sought to convince the Dalai Lama of British and Russian intentions to arrive at an amicable agreement about the future of Tibet, keeping Tibet's interests foremost. On 7 February 1906, Lamsdorff wrote to the Dalai Lama reiterating the obligations of 20 May 1904, committed to by Britain and Russia, and added that 'the assurances of the government of Great Britain have quite a positive and definite character, serving to a certain extent as a guarantee of the preservation of Tibet's political independence'.¹ Russian diplomacy sought to build all its further relations with the Dalai Lama with the concurrence of the British Cabinet in London.

Between 21 March–3 April 1906, the Russian Ambassador to London, Benckendorff, who regularly consulted the British government on the Tibetan issue, wrote that in his view, ‘at the present moment ... it is imperative for us to maintain the status quo on the Tibetan issue and have the prudence to avoid doing anything that may again aggravate it’. In this case Benckendorff had in mind a letter of the Consul-General in Urga, Lyuba, of 23 February/8 March 1906, stating that the Dalai Lama wanted to know ‘whether it will be possible, without complicating matters with Britain, to send to Lhasa, as had been previously promised to Dorjjeff, a Russian diplomatic official with a detachment of guards to be attached to the high priest’. Benckendorff was not in favour of sending a Russian official since Great Britain had made a number of concessions vis-à-vis Russia on condition that Russian diplomacy would not interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet. Therefore, sending a Russian official to Lhasa, Benckendorff wrote, ‘will bring to nought our deal with Britain’. Moreover, the Russian detachment turning up in Tibet could be regarded by the British Cabinet and public as an attempt to damage British prestige in Tibet and lead to ‘great excitement which may create very serious complications for us’. It could not be ruled out, Benckendorff asserted, that the appearance of a Russian military force in Tibet would create ‘unrest’ in the country and the small Russian detachment ‘may find itself in danger, with the direct intervention by Britain, culminating in a serious conflict as a next step’. He added that the outbreak of a conflict would make it difficult for the Russian government to prove the legitimacy of its action as Britain always had two principal arguments: ‘Tibet is situated close to India and the British Buddhist subjects greatly outnumber ours’. ‘For this reason it is unnecessary for me to even say how much this will be able to change the general political situation, especially at this moment when, however important the question relating to Tibet may be, the settlement of other more vital issues requires from us the greatest effort’. The Russian ambassador concluded that ‘nobody in London can even conceive the possibility of sending back the Dalai Lama to Tibet under the protection of our armed forces; this very fact will bring about a revolution in local public opinion and would be interpreted as a sudden and sharp change in our policy’.²

From this letter it is evident that Russian diplomacy was very well aware of the intimate correlation between the resolution of Anglo-Russian contradictions in Central Asia, the Middle East, and the

Tibetan issue, and was ready to make concessions in Tibet to avoid aggravation of relations with Britain and to induce her to grant concessions on issues of greater importance to Russia. Therefore, from a broader point of view, i.e. the negotiations with Britain, sending a Russian convoy to guard the Dalai Lama was impossible, though the Russian government continued to demonstrate its 'concern' about his future.

At the same time, the Russian envoy in Peking, Pokotilov, in a letter to the Foreign Ministry dated 24 April/7 May 1906, expressed the fear that the 'refusal to dispatch Dylykov to Tibet (whom the Dalai Lama, as has already been mentioned, had requested), directly following the prohibition of sending our convoy to cross the Tibet border, would be interpreted by the Dalai Lama as a complete break-off of our relations with him, forcing him to return to Tibet at the mercy of the British'. Pokotilov surmises that 'giving an absolutely personal reason for Dylykov's trip to Lhasa, we could supply him privately with the means necessary for his stay in Lhasa'.³

On 27 April 1906, the Foreign Minister wrote to Benckendorff in London that 'a closer acquaintance with the opinion of the London Cabinet' caused the Foreign Ministry to issue orders 'not to allow the Russian subjects [Buryats] accompanying him [the Dalai Lama], to cross the Tibetan border'.^{3a}

A secret telegram from the new Foreign Minister, A.P. Izvolsky, informed the Russian envoy in Peking on 2 June 1906 that the issue about the return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet was closely connected with the Anglo-Russian negotiations on the Tibetan question and other Asiatic problems, in which both countries were interested.

The government of Great Britain has a totally negative attitude towards the return of the Dalai Lama who is openly hostile, and foresees that new misunderstandings are likely to arise if he returns to Lhasa and also the possibility of a new military expedition to Tibet.⁴ Therefore it is necessary to weigh thoroughly whether there are sufficient reasons for our desire to return the Dalai Lama to Lhasa.⁵

Thus, the desire of the Russian ruling circles to come to an agreement with Great Britain on major problems caused Russian diplomacy to revise its attitude to such an apparently specific question as the return of the Dalai Lama to Lhasa. Having learnt about the negative attitude of the British government to his return, Russian diplomacy altered its point of view on the issue.

On 5/18 June 1906, Pokotilov sent a secret telegram to the foreign ministry in which, analysing the significance of the Russo-Tibetan relations in the negotiations with Britain, he wrote:

all our agreements with Great Britain on the Tibetan issue at the present moment should, no doubt, be seen only as our concession to Britain. Turning to the examination of the essence of the question, we have to admit that from the practical and political points of view, the entire interest in the Tibetan affair shown by us in them in general and in the fate of the Dalai Lama in particular, may be justified only by the consideration that the stand taken by us in that affair has created a possibility, in a favourable time, to get proper compensation for further non-interference in Tibetan affairs, which as such could hardly be of serious significance to us. Thus, the only thing that matters is to what extent we are satisfied with the compensation that Great Britain would agree to give us in exchange for our compliance in Tibetan affairs. [The Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa] could be of serious significance in the sense of establishing in his person on Tibet an active counterbalance to British influence, as the high priest's Anglophobe disposition allows us to hope that he will become a reliable tool in our hands.⁶

Therefore, if this time is considered as an appropriate moment to conclude a general agreement with Britain, then, I think that we should not be detained by this question. On the contrary, we could even promise Britain to press the Dalai Lama to delay his return to Tibet. I think that our presentation to the high priest of this idea would, undoubtedly, greatly impress him, and lead him to think before deciding to return to Lhasa under such circumstances.

The Dalai Lama's intention to return to Tibet depended on the guarantees provided under the 1906 Anglo-Chinese convention and on assistance from Russia in his struggle against British influence. Pokotilov said that the Chinese government continued to want to quickly remove the high priest from the Russian borders and have him back at Lhasa where, according to them, 'the high priest would be their ally against the aggressive plans of the British. However, the Chinese would hardly resort to using force in their relations with the Dalai Lama and he might, should he so desire, remain in Mongolia indefinitely.'⁷

Thus Pokotilov, opposing serious concessions to Britain on Asiatic affairs, attached the greatest significance to the probability of Russia receiving concessions from her. He also mentioned the possibility of utilizing the Anglophobe sentiments of the Dalai Lama which were most feared by supporters of the rapprochement with Britain.

On 7 June 1906, after the setback in the talks on Persian affairs, Anglo-Russian official negotiations began between Izvolsky and the British Ambassador, Sir A. Nicolson on the Tibetan question.⁸ In the course of negotiations, the British ambassador, acting on the instructions of the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, considered the changed situation in the Far East, i.e. the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese war which restricted Russia's ability to pursue an active policy with regard to China.⁹

As far back as 30 May 1906, Nicolson presented to the Russian foreign ministry a draft of a five point Agreement between Russia and Britain on the Tibetan question. According to the draft Agreement, the two sides undertook to recognize the suzerainty of China over Tibet, not to break its territorial integrity, and not to interfere in its internal administration. Owing to the geographical position of Tibet, under article two of the draft Agreement, Russia should recognize the interests of Great Britain by agreeing that no other power should interfere in the external relations of Tibet. The two powers agreed not to send their representatives to Lhasa and to refrain from acquiring concessions for the construction of railway lines, installation of telegraph lines, working mines, etc. The Russian and the British governments pledged not to utilize the income generated from the concessions for their own benefit or for the benefit of their subjects.¹⁰

The draft Agreement regarding Tibet, presented by the British side, was sent to the Russian ambassador in London, who conveyed his views on the matter to Izvolsky. According to Benckendorff, Nicolson's proposals 'deserve the most serious attention; they undoubtedly place the Tibetan question in a broad and conciliatory manner and are in full conformity with our interests, which are in the main concerned with the preservation of the insulation of Tibet and the prevention of Britain absorbing it'. Therefore, Benckendorff considered the proposed draft desirable and advantageous. The recognition of the special interests of Britain in Tibet due to her geographical position, offered Russia the prospects of receiving a quid pro quo in other parts of Asia. In this case, the prolonged British efforts to insulate Tibet were manifested in the condition not to allow Tibet to have relations with other powers (actually, Russia). Benckendorff considered it necessary to recognize Russia's argument that it was necessary for her to maintain relations with the Dalai Lama in view of Russia's numerous Buddhist subjects applied

to Britain to an even greater extent, as she had more Buddhists than they had. It was therefore clear that Russia's relations with Tibet had a political tinge. The Dalai Lama was seeking support to his 'resistance to the aggressive policy of Britain in Tibet'. In Benckendorff's view, all this was a consequence of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia, but if the outcome of the negotiations and the signature of the agreement ended that rivalry, Russia would not seek to consolidate its links with Tibet.

In this connection, Benckendorff believed that both Russian and British Buddhists should get permission to maintain direct contacts with the Dalai Lama and other Buddhist religious leaders, and besides did not regard it as a fundamental issue. According to him, for the sake of reaching a general agreement, it was not even necessary to wrangle with Britain on that particular issue.

Because of the British government's negative attitude to the Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa, Benckendorff thought that he should not be compelled to do so since, being still hostile to Britain and relying on Russia's assistance, the high priest might act rashly, creating disturbances, that would serve as a pretext for Britain to launch a new expedition, which, in turn, might break the course of the Anglo-Russian negotiations. Benckendorff proposed that it should be recommended to the Dalai Lama that he settle somewhere in Mongolia.

In conclusion, the Russian ambassador in London wrote that:

the Tibetan question is a 'touchstone', which can lay bare the sincerity of Britain's and our intentions, We should view in a broad perspective the important question of our rapprochement with Britain, leaving no room for petty political issues and removing all secondary elements, which can only make Britain mistrust us and completely undermine the agreement with her. I am deeply convinced ... that this attitude alone may give hope for the successful solution of such a gigantic political task as the agreement with Britain on the basis of our mutual interests.¹¹

Thus, according to Benckendorff, Russia should grant concessions to Britain on the Tibetan question which was not of vital interest to her. The question of the Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa was regarded as an issue wholly dependent on the course of the Anglo-Russian negotiations.

On 12 June 1906, after reviewing the issue of the Dalai Lama's return, the foreign minister presented a memorandum on the question: 'As the future fate of the Dalai Lama is of great concern to us, we should first of all bear in mind that in case he returns to Lhasa, it may mean his end, therefore, naturally the question arises whether

we should wish his return and, moreover, promote it.' The foreign minister felt that in the event of something untoward happening to the Dalai Lama, 'this will be greatly disadvantageous for the prestige of Russia, since the Dalai Lama continues to make use of our moral support and maintain constant contacts with us'. Besides, it was necessary to take into account the British government's hostility to the Dalai Lama and the possibility that in the event of the Dalai Lama settling in Lhasa, 'there is a possibility of a new military expedition being sent by the British to Tibet. Such a turn of events would frustrate all our efforts to reach an agreement with the British. To prevent such an outcome, it would be wise to let the Dalai Lama know about Britain's attitude towards him and what was in store for Tibet in the event of his returning to Lhasa. If then he ventured to return, Russia would certainly be absolved of all responsibilities for his fate, and moreover, from the point of view of the Dalai Lama's expectations concerning Russia's assistance, we may regard ourselves free of rapprochements because of obligations by which we tied up with the British long before their hostility towards the present head of the Buddhists became clear'. Therefore, after additional discussions with the British government 'we could declare that we are not insisting upon his return; that in the present case they should reckon not on us but on the Chinese, and that we even could, without of course being sure of success, make an attempt to influence the high priest in a desirable way'. Such a way out of the situation would warrant 'the possibility of a firm agreement with Britain on the Tibetan issue'.¹²

Nevertheless, Russian diplomacy was still worried about the future of the Dalai Lama. Pokotilov said that 'his staying in Mongolia as long as possible' would be in Russia's interests and 'we would have a good chance to use his presence to increase our influence on the Mongolian princes'. So long as the Dalai Lama remained outside Tibet, 'Britain hardly has a lawful basis to demand our severance of relations with him'. Pokotilov was apprehensive that a drastic change in Russia's attitude towards the Dalai Lama might be construed as 'a clear acknowledgement of our weakness in dealing with the British which will certainly produce the most unfavourable impression of us both in China and especially in Mongolia, where at present we have to value our prestige particularly highly'.¹³

The Russian ambassador in London, Benckendorff, was worried about the possible British reaction to any attempt by Russia to assist

the Dalai Lama. On 28 June 1906, he wrote to Izvolsky that it was desirable to exchange views about the fate of the Dalai Lama, since even his settlement in areas of China bordering on Tibet (for instance Kokonor) would enable him to interfere in Tibetan affairs, engage in intrigue, etc.

Benckendorff thought that Russia might assert the importance of maintaining the status quo in Mongolia as an equivalent to the recognition of 'the special interests of Britain' in Tibet, as the Mongolian issue was closely linked with that of Tibet, and also concerned a part of the Chinese empire, and Britain was well aware of Russia's special interests in that region of China'.¹⁴ Thus, having ascertained in the course of the negotiations with Britain that there was a possibility of coming to an understanding on the Tibetan issue, Russian diplomacy, starting then, strove to secure its position in Mongolia. Apparently, this was the result of the commencement at that time of Russo-Japanese negotiations, regarding also the recognition of Outer Mongolia as a sphere of Russian influence. Russia however did not seek to create a united Mongolo-Tibetan state, but formally only strove to secure its position in Mongolia as a quid pro quo for her recognition of British interests in Tibet; and therefore here the question of Mongolia would not adversely affect the ongoing Anglo-Russian negotiations.

In this situation, the Russian Foreign Minister, Izvolsky, considered it necessary to consult the Russian military authorities. On 24 August 1906, he wrote to the acting Chief of the General Staff F.F. Palitsyn, *inter alia*:

Not having direct interests in Tibet, we, at the same time, absolutely lack any means of directly influencing this country, since the relations that we have maintained with the Dalai Lama, despite his exclusive spiritual authority, once more reveal the unstable and illusory nature of the political influence depending on an individual. Regarding the stable position that Britain has steadily worked towards on the basis of international Acts since 1890 and finally achieved, we can only refer to the needs of our Buddhists and the scientific requirements of Russian researchers on Tibet. Therefore it would be advantageous to Russian diplomacy to come to an agreement with Britain on non-intervention on the condition of the guarantee of the equality of sides.

Russia's concession to Great Britain means 'only that we are prepared to accept the same obligations that the British undertook in the case of China (in the 1906 Treaty)'. The British cabinet, Izvolsky proceeded to say,

being of course quite conscious of the advantages of its position, demonstrated a full preparedness to give up its exclusive claims, and this fact itself cannot but be considered sufficiently satisfactory to us. If the Tibetan issue is regarded ... as a touchstone for the differentiation of the sincerity of the mutual intentions of Russia and Britain to attain the general agreement, then our answer to that ... should be based on the same broad view on the issue, displayed by the British, and in any case exclude petty cavils to unessential details that would result in making Britain distrustful and act as an impediment to the solution of the affair on the agenda which is of paramount public importance.¹⁵

In his reply 'Regarding the Anglo-Russian Agreement', of 6 September 1906, F.F. Palitsyn said:

Of the tremendous number of significant and intricate questions to be discussed, that of Tibet is the less important to us, as it is little connected with our essential interests. The Tibetan issue appears to be almost the only one on which we may be, so to say, free of British pressure, used in the mutual exchange of interests and concessions, with an advantage to us which it is necessary to utilize.

We do not have any direct border and military interests in Tibet. Historically, however, we have developed several moral interests in Tibet, as the entire Lamaist population in Central Asia, including those living within our borders and also in Mongolia, look upon Russia as a protector of the Tibetan high priest against Britain. This moral interest in Tibet may be illusory, but it exists and should be taken into consideration. Its fairness is evidenced by the fact that in 1904 Britain had launched a military expedition to undermine it, and now finds it desirable to receive legitimation from us of what, in fact, she has already directly established by the treaties with Tibet and China, and at the same time to cause us to give up direct contacts with the Dalai Lama.

Palitsyn believed that they could give up contacts, but it was necessary to bear in mind that

such a change of our policy vis-à-vis the Lamaists world will no doubt come to it as a shock and produce a deep impression, the implications of which should be taken into consideration. If such a concession to Britain is necessary, it should be made only in exchange for something really profitable to us.

Analyzing the contents of the British proposals on the Tibetan question, Palitsyn concluded that

this agreement will mean giving up our moral interests in Tibet in return for such promises that Britain has already made to China. Therefore, the agreement on the Tibetan issue should be part of a general agreement with

Britain on Asiatic problems. Let this preliminary agreement on Tibet prove to Britain that our wish for an agreement, not only on this issue but on all other issues, is so sincere that we are prepared to make serious political sacrifices for its sake.¹⁶

Thus, in the ruling circles in Russia by 1907, the opinion prevailed that Russia did not have direct strategic interests in Tibet; that Russo-Tibetan relations should only be of a religious nature. The close political relations established at the very beginning of the twentieth century were rather of the nature of a political game and were connected with the offensive course in the Far East policies of Russian Tsarism. However, in view of Russia's changing international position, her defeat in the Russo-Japanese war, and the aggravation of the Russo-German antagonism, the most influential section of Russian diplomacy, headed by Foreign Minister Izvolsky, was prepared to give up interference in Tibetan affairs in order to reach an agreement with Britain on Asiatic problems more crucial to Russia. At the same time, Russian diplomacy and the army authorities were interested in the possibility of using the Dalai Lama's influence in the Buddhist world of Mongolia and the Trans-Baikal area. While the supporters of concessions to Britain on Tibet sought only to have London recognize the existence of Russian interests in Mongolia, and counted on the usefulness of the Dalai Lama's prestige in Mongolia, there was also a different point of view. Some diplomats and the army circles in Russia believed that before compromising with Britain on the Tibetan question, it was necessary to take into account all the consequences of such a step from the point of view of Russian interests in Mongolia and the Trans-Baikal region. They could not reconcile with the fact that Tibet was slipping away from active Russian control and that in future it would not be possible to utilize it as 'small change' to obtain concessions in other Asian regions.

Finally, on 31 August 1907, the Anglo-Russian agreement on the division of spheres of influence in Persia, Afganistan, and Tibet was signed in St Petersburg. In the preamble of the Tibetan part of the Agreement it was stated that 'the governments of Great Britain and Russia recognizing the suzerain rights of China over Tibet, and considering the fact that Great Britain, by reason of her geographical position, has a special interest in the maintenance of the status quo in the external relations of Tibet'. Both sides agreed 'to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and to abstain from all interference in

the internal administration' and, 'in conformity with the admitted principle of suzerainty of China over Tibet, ... engage not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the Chinese government'. The text of the convention also stated that British commercial agents had the right to establish direct relations with the Tibetan authorities, on the basis of the 1904 and 1906 Conventions. The Russian and British Buddhist subjects have the right to establish direct relations with the Dalai Lama and other religious leaders in Tibet, of course 'on strictly religious matters'. The two governments 'respectively engaged not to send Representatives to Lhasa', 'neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for themselves or their subjects, any concessions for railways, roads, telegraph, and mines, or other rights in Tibet'. Finally, the two governments agreed that 'no part of the revenues of Tibet, whether in kind or in cash, shall be pledged or assigned to Great Britain or Russia or to any of their subjects'.¹⁷

In the 'Annexe to the Arrangement between Great Britain and Russia concerning Tibet', it was stated that 'the occupation of the Chumbi valley by British forces shall cease after the payment of three annual instalments of the indemnity of 25,00,000 rupees, provided, that the trade marts mentioned in Article II of that (1904) Convention have been effectively opened for three years'.¹⁸

After signing the Convention, Russia and Great Britain exchanged Notes in which their governments agreed not to allow any sort of scientific expeditions to go to Tibet for three years without preliminary agreement.¹⁹

The 1907 Agreement was one of the results of the aggravation of Russo-German and Anglo-German contradictions. It completed the formation of an Anglo-Franco-Russian entente against the collusion between Germany and the Austro-Hungarian empire, which played a decisive role in the alignment of forces in the world on the eve of the First World War. As regards the Tibetan part of the Agreement of 1907, Russia's and Great Britain's mutual recognition of the suzerainty of China over Tibet, the obligation of non-interference in its affairs, and of communication with it only through the Chinese authorities, opened up limitless possibility for the Chinese authorities to fully dominate Tibet.

In 1907, the already retired S. Yu. Witte in his *Memoirs* wrote that the Anglo-Russian convention 'signified our drastic change from the policies of rapprochement, or to put it differently, of a flirt with Germany to the rapprochement and flirt with Britain. In essence, he

wrote, being more inclined towards Britain was of no significance in itself, but was important because Britain is an ally of France, and we, too, are allies of France, and therefore, the rapprochement with Britain on the basis of a Convention being signed on issues most urgent to us in our relations with her may have the substance if not the form, of a Tripartite Alliance. It was not idly that diplomacy termed that agreement, in contrast to the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, and Italy), a Tripartite Agreement. On the whole Witte thought the agreement 'to be disadvantageous because it gave more advantages to Britain than to us'.²⁰ As regards its particular Tibetan part, Witte was of the view that the 'restriction of Britain vis-à-vis Tibet is hardly necessary, since we can have no influence in Tibet if a balanced judgement is passed. To have some expectations regarding Tibet—says a former ideologist and a champion of the policy of expansion in the Far East—one has to possess a too bellicose cruelty'.²¹

The signing of the Convention faced sharp criticism during the debates in the British parliament in February 1908. Lord Curzon was the first to speak and said that the Convention was the most important of all the instruments signed by Britain during the past half a century, and although its basic idea was correct, its implementation was utterly erroneous. He termed the Persian section of the Agreement 'capitulation'²² and that on Tibet a 'full capitulation, and the commitment to consult Russia on the evacuation of the Chumbi valley almost humiliating'. Quite naturally, the Tibetan section of the Agreement was subjected to the harshest criticism by those British statesmen who, in one way or another, had been associated with the policy of the former government and the British expedition to Tibet in 1904. However, the Liberal government was reasonably indifferent to this criticism since, on the whole, they disapproved their predecessors' Tibetan policy. On 2 January 1908, the Secretary of State for India, J. Morley, suggested the withdrawal of British forces from the Chumbi valley immediately after the payment of the third instalment of the compensation, without waiting for the implementation of the rights of British commercial agents envisaged in the 1904 Convention and confirmed by the 1907 Convention. The Foreign Secretary Lord Gray, approved the proposal. On 27 January 1908, the third and last instalment of the compensation was paid and immediately after this the British forces were ordered to withdraw from the Chumbi valley.²³ Finally, on 20 April 1908, the representative of the Chinese government, Chang Yin Tang, the British representative,

E.C. Wilton, and Tibetan delegate, Wang Chuk Gyalpo, signed in Calcutta the 'Tibet Trade Regulations',²⁴ in which a number of the articles from the 1893 Rules were retained. British subjects received the right to lease land for the construction of houses and warehouses in specially reserved places, the administration of which was left in the hands of Chinese and the Tibetan officials. The administration of the trade marts remained the function of Tibetan officials acting under the supervision and direction of Chinese officials. Controversial issues were to be considered by the Indian government and the Tibetan high authorities at Lhasa and, in the event of their failing to resolve the problems at that level, they were to be referred for settlement to the governments of Great Britain and China. The 'Trade Regulations' fixed, in a clear-cut way, the trading routes and borders of the trade marts beyond the territories to which British subjects were not allowed to go without permission. The 'Regulations' also stated that the British trade agents in Tibet could retain their armed escorts till such time as China herself guaranteed their personal security and that of their belongings. Providing British tradesmen with certain rights and privileges, the Convention once again recognized China's suzerainty over Tibet.

The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and the 'Regulations' of 1908, gave China a predominant influence over Tibet. The Russian diplomatic representative Chirkin reported from Bombay that

regarding Tibet, it is rightly considered here that the Agreement [of 1907] brought to nought the results of Colonel Younghusband's expedition and practically consolidated China's power in the country actually independent and conquered by British weapons, creating, which is worst of all, a very dangerous and kindred neighbour for semi-independent Sikkim, Nepal and Bhutan ... where the revived China will not miss an opportunity to wage the 'propaganda of freedom'!²⁵

The British representative in Sikkim, Charles Bell, wrote that the agreement which laid 'the basis for cooperation between Britain and Russia' liberated 'each of them from the mutual threat, guaranteed India freedom from an attack, signified much for victory in the world war. However, the commitment to negotiate with Tibet only through the mediation of China 'made Tibet even more dependent' on the latter and intensified not so much the immediate threat of war, as the danger of hostile influence penetrating the north-east frontier of India. Bell thought that in the final account, the Russian threat was not so strong,

that Britain withdraw from Tibet with the aim of obtaining the Russian imprimatur to the text of the Agreement, paving the way for the penetration of China.²⁶

China fully exercised the rights and privileges she received in Tibet. On Dorjjeff's request, made in a Memorandum to the Foreign Ministry of Russia, of 27 September 1907, the Dalai Lama was informed of the contents of the Anglo-Russian Convention.²⁷

CHAPTER SIX

The Policy of Manchu China in Tibet 1903–13, the Tibetan Response, and the Reaction of Russia and Great Britain

THE SITUATION IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL TIBET TOWARDS
THE END OF THE FIRST DECADE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

With the onset of the twentieth century, the signing of the international agreements, i.e. the 1906 Anglo-Chinese Convention, the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, and the 1908 Trade Regulations in Tibet, actually reaffirmed China's suzerain rights in Tibet and opened immense possibilities for their exercise. At the beginning of the twentieth century Manchu China had not even been able to establish nominal control over the distant region adjoining the Indian border. Towards the mid-first decade, however, the situation in the country had changed so much that China's suzerainty over Tibet was no longer 'constitutional fiction'.

The acute crisis of the Manchu dynasty, i.e. the Boxer rebellion and the intervention of foreign states, prompted the more far-sighted politicians to realize the necessity for implementation of reforms that would consolidate state power and prevent new revolutionary movements. Since 1901, China had introduced reforms in the state apparatus and the army, abolished slavery, etc. The growth of self-confidence among the Chinese was greatly influenced by the victory of an Asian country, Japan, over Russia, while the impact of the revolutionary events in Russia, that forced the ruling circles,

not only in China, but those of several other Asian countries, to follow the path of more active state reforms, should not be underestimated. Thus, in 1905, the Chinese authorities sent a special mission abroad to study the political systems of the Western countries. In 1906, a decree was promulgated to begin work on drafting constitutional laws for the country, and in 1907, the Supreme Chamber for Administrative and Constitutional Control was set up, comprising representatives of high ranking Chinese nobility and officialdom. All these measures were instrumental in the consolidation of state power. The Russian diplomatic representative I.Y. Korostovets wrote from Peking about the necessity 'to acknowledge that there is no more a stagnating and compliant China'.¹

These measures created prerequisites for the activation of the policies of the Centre in the outlying provinces of the Manchu empire. In Tibet, the execution of these policies was facilitated when the Manchu authorities received diplomatic confirmation of their suzerain rights. As early as 1903–4, military, administrative, and economic measures were instituted to consolidate the Manchu positions along the Tibeto-Szechuan border and to gradually annex the most strategically important regions of Tibet.

In 1903, Hsi Liang, a high-ranking Manchu official, was appointed the Governor-General of Szechuan, and sought to establish direct control over the tribes living in the border areas by usurping the power of the local tribal leaders and conferring it on specially assigned officials. This led to a revolt of the lamas of the monastery of T'ai-ning,² and towards the end of 1903 and the beginning of 1904, after the execution of three prominent lamas, a broad anti-Manchu movement developed in Li-t'ang.³ The assistant of the Imperial Resident Feng Ch'uan was transferred to Chamdo to suppress this movement and had triumphantly put down the uprising in 1904.⁴

Feng Ch'uan, like Hsi Liang, continued to follow the strategy of restricting the power of the local tribal leaders and transferring the frontier territories under the more effective control of Peking, invading the interior region of Tibet proper to do so. He also established his temporary residence in Ba-t'ang in eastern Tibet, much to the displeasure of the local inhabitants.⁵

Under his leadership, eastern Tibet witnessed a series of measures for economic development: drainage works, protection of and more active mining of natural resources, to begin with, gold. For that purpose special funds were allocated and military forces used. The

Manchu resident chalked out plans to create new settlements in eastern Tibet, intending to settle migrant Chinese from other regions on the best land. Thus, vast regions to the north-east of Li-t'ang came under the direct control of the Manchu Resident.⁶

The brutal suppression of the Tibetan inhabitants, establishment of administrative control over eastern Tibet, the plunder of its monasteries, assassination of lamas, eviction of local people from the most fertile land, and forcible conscription in the army led to the anti-Manchu uprising in Ba-t'ang in February–March 1905, in which over 9000 lamas participated.⁷ Feng Ch'uan was killed, his body stuffed and hung in a pagoda.⁸ Soon the uprising spread to other regions along the Szechuan-Yun-nan-Tibetan border.⁹ Hsi Liang requested the Imperial court in Peking to send military assistance to put down the revolt.¹⁰ The Central authorities dispatched to Tibet a punitive expedition of 7500 soldiers headed by Chao Erfeng.¹¹

In June 1905, the Manchus captured Ba-t'ang.¹² The monastery was ravaged, plundered and razed to the ground.¹³ All officials, temporal and religious, were beheaded. Chao returned to Ba-t'ang once more at the close of 1905 and murdered those who had survived the summer massacre.¹⁴

In the autumn of 1905 the lamas in Li-t'ang broke out in revolt. The insurrection lasted for a span of five months, from December 1905 to May 1906, the lamas offering heroic resistance to the punitive forces.¹⁵ However, the fate that had befallen the inhabitants of Ba-t'ang befell them: arrests, executions, plunder, and demolition of the buildings of monasteries.¹⁶ Three other monasteries near Li-t'ang suffered the same fate. They were looted of their most valuable possessions which were carried off to China, the treasuries of the monasteries was confiscated, the inhabitants robbed and annihilated, and those who miraculously survived, died of hunger.¹⁷

The highest military award was conferred on Chao Erfeng for 'successfully' quelling the anti-Manchu uprisings, and on 22 August 1906 he was appointed the High Commissioner of the Frontier Provinces¹⁸ and was empowered to deal with all questions relating to the settlement and defence problems of the border regions.¹⁹ His awful nickname, 'Butcher Chao', persisted throughout his life due to his brutality not only towards his enemies, but even towards his own soldiers.²⁰ It was no accident that the Dalai Lama later commented that in 1904 the Lhasa Resident together with the military authorities of Szechuan 'systematically plundered, assassinated monks and

laymen, tore down monasteries, and committed other outrages in eastern Tibet'.²¹

In November 1906, having successfully accomplished the military operations in Ba-t'ang, Chao Erfeng returned to Ch'ang-tu and as the High Commissioner of the Frontier Provinces took up residence in Ba-t'ang.²² Towards the end of 1906, 43-point Rules were drawn up for the future administration of Ba-t'ang. All the inhabitants, both the indigenous people and the Chinese, were proclaimed the subjects of the central Peking authorities, the entire region was placed under the administrative control of the Manchus, and the lamas, whose number in the monasteries was restricted, were prohibited from interfering in administrative matters, new rules were framed for the collection of taxes, some customs were banned, etc.²³ In Li-t'ang and Ba-t'ang, five additional battalions were deployed.²⁴ As the Commissioner of the Frontier Provinces, Chao Erfeng implemented measures to improve the economic and political conditions of the provinces. In September–October 1906, administrative reforms were put into effect in Li-t'ang. In February–March 1907, reforms were introduced in school education (government schools for teaching 5–6 year-old youngsters were set up), in the field of agriculture, health services, the system of water supply was improved, bridges were constructed, and mining was expanded. The central authorities in Peking allotted a million *taels* for these reforms.²⁵

Chao Erfeng simultaneously pursued a policy of gradual annexation of parts of eastern Tibet, thus extending the possessions of the central authorities at the expense of age-old Tibetan landownership. New administrative units were established, subordinated directly to the authorities of the frontier provinces, and troops were deployed.²⁶ Chao Erfeng appealed to the Chinese population to settle in east Tibet, in the territories of Ba-t'ang, Li-t'ang, etc., promising incentives such as paying for their conveyance, giving them the best lands for cultivation, supplying them with seeds and agricultural implements, and guaranteeing them the patronage of the Manchu officials and troops.^{26a}

The missionary D. Edgar, who travelled in east Tibet, provided the British consulate in Cheng-tu with the text of that appeal. According to him that plan had little prospect of success since conciliation in that region was nominal and it was unlikely that Chinese peasants would want to leave the fertile lands and congenial atmosphere of Szechuan for mountainous east Tibet with its severe winters. He thought that even if some migrants did settle in new

places they would soon assimilate with the local tribes, and the Manchu authorities would fail to create a firm support base for themselves in these regions.

Evidently, the experienced British missionary's deduction was correct. Reports continued to come from eastern Tibet regarding anti-Manchu activities that were being repressed by the troops of Chao Erfeng. Though in the course of containment of the revolt the punitive forces suffered heavy losses,²⁷ on the whole they managed to venture deeper into Tibetan territory.²⁸ Towards the close of 1907 and the beginning of 1908, a Chinese detachment marched into Kham province, and the local administration was replaced by the military.²⁹

Thus, all the activities of the Manchu authorities along the Szechuan-Yun-nan-Tibetan border, in the first decade of the twentieth century were aimed at annexing east Tibet to facilitate their penetration of Tibet proper.

Taking advantage of the signature of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, the Peking authorities took steps to turn Tibet into a province of China. Chang Yintan, who had taken part in the Anglo-Chinese talks in 1905–6, was appointed the Manchu Resident in Lhasa. His nine month tenure was considered a 'bright spot' in Manchu-Tibetan relations (in comparison with the activities of his predecessors and successors).³⁰

Chang Yintan was vehemently opposed to the British and wanted to eradicate their influence in Tibet. He tried to repudiate the Lhasa Agreement of 1904 as an award of a 'private nature', 'replaced' by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906.³¹ The Tibetan ministers who had taken part in the negotiations with the British in 1904 were stripped of their posts. He tried to restrict direct contacts between Tibetans and the British and trade in the latter's market in Gartok, etc.³² In the view of the British commercial agent in Gyantse, Captain W.F. O'Connor, the activities of Chang Yintan were reducing to zero the prestige of the British in Tibet, and the results of the 1903–4 mission.³³ The British authorities, striving to adhere to the spirit of the 1906 Anglo-Chinese Convention, limited themselves to sending a brief cable to the Chinese envoy protesting against the dismissal of the Tibetan ministers who had participated in the 1903–4 negotiations and to seek the recall of one of the most anti-British Chinese officials from Chumbi.³⁴

During Chang Yintan's administration in Tibet a military school was opened, drainage works carried out, financial, and salt reforms undertaken. His recommendations regarding reform of administration that envisaged setting up an advisory body of the Senate type and several departments—military, trade, tax, agriculture, communication, mining etc. were later put into effect by his successors.³⁵

Chang Yintan established normal business relations with Tibetan authorities and simultaneously laid bare the tremendous corruption among his fellow countrymen, the Manchu officials in Tibet. He turned to Peking with the recommendation that they dismiss and punish those who had abused their position.³⁶ However, his political rivals, and principal among them, the then assistant of the Resident and later the Resident of Lhasa, Lien Yu, could not forgive him for this.³⁷ At the end of 1906, Chang Yintan was compelled to resign from his post and was sent to Calcutta to take part in the negotiations that led to the signature of the 'Trade Regulations in Tibet' in 1908.

In the course of 1907–8, Lien Yu completely took over the administration of Tibet, openly pursuing a policy of converting Tibet into a Chinese province. He introduced Manchu laws and customs both into the state administration and the private life of the people. Tibetan garments were replaced by Chinese, the number of lamas was reduced, monasteries destroyed, etc.³⁸ Specialized schools were opened in Tibet to teach the Tibetan and the Chinese languages, the use of small Chinese copper coins began; in Yatung and Gartok, open to international trade, Chinese customs administration was introduced. In 1907, a Census of the Tibetan population was proposed, the strength of the regular army increased, construction of roads begun, and the expansion of the area of cultivated land and of mining of gold, borax, and salt, etc. were planned.³⁹

Much attention was paid to the creation of Tibet's own army. Large sums of money were allocated to the organization of military schools, construction of barracks, and supply of victuals to the army. True, the Resident often utilized these supplies to meet his personal requirements and the foodstuffs for the Tibetan troops were provided by the local inhabitants.⁴⁰ Attempts to convert some monasteries into military forts gave rise to acute discontentment amongst the population.⁴¹

Lien Yu himself obviously realized the instability of his position and therefore the garrison under his command was constantly increased.⁴² He drew the attention of the Peking authorities to the

important strategic position that Tibet occupied given the contiguity of its borders with India and Russia, and therefore insisted upon the dispatch of additional contingents of troops to Tibet: 1000 soldiers to Chamdo, 3000 to Lhasa, and 2000 soldiers to other parts of Tibet.⁴³

In early 1908, Chao Erfeng was appointed the Manchu Resident in Lhasa, at the same time retaining the governorship of the frontier provinces.⁴⁴ The combination of these two posts in the hands of one man created conditions for the actual implementation in Tibet of policies pursued in the frontier provinces. As reported in the *North China Herald* in April 1908, a conference was held in Peking of the Supreme Council and the government, which discussed the measures undertaken in Tibet.⁴⁵ To reinforce the position of the imperial Residents it was decided to send additional contingents of troops there. In the course of the conference a point of view was expressed that there was no sense of taking any action in Tibet until the Dalai Lama returned there, since, as the newspaper wrote, 'the Tibetans believe nothing and nobody except the high priest'.

In all fairness, it should be said that many of the reforms undertaken by the Manchus in Tibet did help to overcome the centuries-old socio-economic and political backwardness. However, these were also accompanied by the use of military force, brutal suppression of the local people, attempts at forcible destruction of the traditional economic, socio-political, and religious institutions (which perhaps needed to be reformed but not through violence and brutality).

Thus, relying on their military superiority and the commitments of Russia and Great Britain not to interfere in Tibetan affairs, the Manchu authorities firmly consolidated their position in Tibet, giving it in essence the same status enjoyed by the other Chinese provinces. Back in March 1908, the British trade agent in Gyantse, Captain W.F. O'Connor, wrote that one result of the British mission to Tibet in 1903–4 which made 'the Tibetans more compliant and disciplined' had been that it made it possible for China to consolidate its control there.⁴⁶ In April 1909, the Russian diplomatic representative reported from India that 'China has lately managed to restore its suzerainty over Tibet, thanks, according to the Anglo-Indian Press, to the British fully ignoring the advantages lawfully obtained by the Younghusband expedition, which as a matter of fact, was a natural consequence of the punctual fulfilment by the Chinese of the terms of the 1904 treaty'.⁴⁷

The uncertain position of the Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama, who, since his flight from Tibet in 1904, was still outside his country

and in the course of five years had travelled across Mongolia and China, prevented the final implementations of the Manchu plans for Tibet. He spent several weeks in Peking where he was received by the Emperor and the Empress with due honour and reverence.⁴⁸ However, all his pleas that equal relations be established between the two countries came to nought. It was during that period that Manchu policies were apparently greatly activated. In February 1908, Chang Yintan proposed to the Chinese foreign ministry that the return of the Dalai Lama to Lhasa be hastened because in his opinion this would 'consolidate the suzerain rights of China in the country and soothe the inhabitants'.⁴⁹ According to the Indian press, in the beginning of 1909, as a result of the restoration of China's suzerain rights over Tibet, the Peking government 'demonstrated the desire to get rid of the Dalai Lama as an undesirable person; the focus of all sorts of intrigues'.⁵⁰ The British government, on their part, informed the Peking government that they would not prevent the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet. The British ambassador in Peking, John Jordan, was instructed to hold consultations on that question with the Russian ambassador,⁵¹ and both of them paid the Dalai Lama 'courtesy visits' in Peking.⁵²

In November–December 1908 the Tibetan authorities, in a letter to the Dalai Lama, requested him to return to Tibet as soon as possible. In the letter they quoted the memorandum to the Amban Lien Yu which stated that brutalities indulged in by Chao Erfeng in Kham province might finally destroy the relations between Tibet and China. They therefore requested his recall from Tibet. In his reply to the memorandum the Amban wrote that Chao Erfeng 'by punishing the evil benefits us' and therefore it is impossible to recall him. However, in a letter to the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan ministers confirmed the firm resolve of the government and its subjects 'not to permit Chao to become the Resident of Tibet'.⁵³

Finally on 21 December 1908, showered with 'honours and gifts', but actually recognizing his temporal dependence on China,⁵⁴ the Dalai Lama set out from Peking for Tibet. By the Emperor's decree, his title was restored with the caveat 'a loyal and submissive Vicegerent bound by the laws of the sovereign state'.⁵⁵ With a view to further limit the temporal power of the Dalai Lama in Tibet, additional posts of assistants to the Imperial President were introduced, and high-ranking Manchu officials were sent there. Finally, at the beginning of 1909, the Dalai Lama arrived in Tibet.

On acquaintance with the situation in Tibet, the Dalai Lama sent a messenger to Peking with a letter, dated 30 October 1909, addressed to the Russian envoy Korostovets, requesting him 'to stand up for the country of Tibet and to dissuade China from imprudent introduction of the new posts'. He also reminded him that 'Russia and Britain have concluded an agreement to protect Tibet and it is desirable that others adhere to it too'. The Tibetan messenger delivering the letter vouchsafed that the Dalai Lama 'is very much concerned about the situation in Tibet and the steps adopted by the Chinese Resident, Lien Yu, who has captured all administrative affairs by totally disregarding the Council of Tibetan Lamas'.⁵⁶ Subsequent events were to show that the Dalai Lama's apprehensions were not unfounded; Manchu policy in Tibet underwent grave, unhappy changes.

CHINA HARDENS ITS POLICIES IN TIBET;

CHAO ERFENG IN LHASA

The Manchu authorities, having restored their suzerain rights over Tibet, sought a pretext to convert it into an ordinary province of China. Throughout 1908, measures were adopted to strengthen the Manchu strategic position there: Chao Erfeng was appointed the Resident, and the strength of the Chinese garrisons in eastern Tibet were significantly increased.

These activities of the Manchu authorities met with stiff resistance both from the local inhabitants and the Tibetan ruling circles. In 1908, revolts continued in the Pa-t'ang and other regions in eastern Tibet,¹ which were brutally suppressed by Manchu troops.² The news about the intended arrival of Chao Erfeng with troops in the capital, Lhasa, caused particular concern. The Tibetan National Assembly discussed the matter and decided that such a man as Chao Erfeng should not be allowed to enter Lhasa with troops. Amban Lien Yu was informed of the decision and stated that Chao, being a high ranking Manchu official, might do as he felt necessary, and the Tibetans had no right to oppose him. In this connection, in a discussion with the Nepali Resident, Regent Ti Rimpoche said that the present situation demanded much caution on the part of the Tibetans so that they do not invite the suspicion of the Manchus. The only argument that might be advanced by the Tibetan side against

sending Chao and his troops to Lhasa was that the Manchus would inevitably be hard pressed for food in Tibet. The Regent went on to say that the money given by the Chinese government to carry out reforms in Tibet was being misappropriated by the Amban, Lien Yu, for his personal use and he was thus deceiving not only the Tibetans but also the Manchus.³ The Tibetan authorities accordingly repeatedly informed the Peking government that Lien Yu and Chao Erfeng were not suitable for the posts they were holding and asked that they be dismissed.⁴ The Manchu Residents themselves sought to utilize the discontent of the Tibetans in their intrigues. For example, Lien Yu endeavoured to undermine the career of Chao Erfeng: in his reports to Peking, he exaggerated the danger of the anti-Manchu disturbances of the Tibetans and ascribed them to the discontent of the local population with the measures implemented by Chao Erfeng in the frontier regions.⁵

The Manchu authorities at the same time strove to provoke and justify their intended aggression into Tibet by instilling a fear of foreign penetration. The Chinese newspaper *Celestial Empire* would publish reports of Manchu officials from Tibet regarding the Dalai Lama's plan to visit Russia, about new trade privileges extended to Britain, Russia, etc.⁶ In a discussion with the Nepalese representatives in Lhasa the Amban, Lien Yu, frankly stated that Britain and Russia aspired to consolidate their positions and influence in Tibet.⁷ There were also reports about the inflow of arms and ammunition to Tibet and also allegations that 'the Dalai Lama is offering strong resistance to all orders from the Peking government', posing obstacles to the administrative reforms in Tibet because of his discontent in not being able to visit Russia.⁸

On 6 November 1909, Chao Erfeng informed the Peking government about the planned uprising by three thousand Lamas, defying his orders. He recommended immediate incorporation of Tibet as a province of China.⁹

At the end of September 1909, the Resident Lien Yu published a proclamation stating that Tibet had been a colony of China for over 200 years, and Tibetan subjects and monasteries were under the patronage of the Great Empire. At that point in time it was important for China to restore its prestige. Therefore, the Emperor despatched a thousand soldiers from Szechuan under the command of Chao Erfeng to maintain order in the trade marts and guard the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama. Lien Yu maintained that it would lead to

the further prosperity of religion and the welfare of the people of the country. Troops from Szechuan would soon cross the eastern border of Tibet, and the transportation and food necessary for further advance would be purchased from the local people. Lien Yu called upon everyone not to be taken in by any groundless rumours or panic.¹⁰

In this way, the Peking authorities made the decision to send their own troops to Tibet. In addition, they implemented their intention of long standing to divide the administration of the country between the Dalai Lama, who would henceforth deal with religious matters only, and the Manchu officials who would hold all administrative power.¹¹ Through telegrams to the various diplomatic missions in Peking, the Chinese government informed them that henceforth all questions relating to Tibet's diplomatic relations with foreign states would be exclusively dealt with by the Chinese government. No agreement or treaty with the Dalai Lama, signed without the knowledge of China, would be regarded as being valid.¹²

On 8 and 9 December 1909, the British Trade Agent in Gyantse, Captain R. Kennedy, reported that the Tibetan representatives had approached him with a request that he forward the Dalai Lama's telegrams to the government of Britain, all European countries, and to the Chinese authorities. Kennedy stated that the Indian government would not intervene in matters relating to the relations between Tibet and China. On the basis of discussions with the Tibetan representatives, he had concluded that the Manchu policies in Tibet 'stand almost on the verge of decency', that the Tibetans planned to resist the Chinese army, that over 300–400 Tibetan soldiers were getting ready with military equipment and ammunitions in Lhasa itself, and that similar preparations were being made in other regions of the country. Captain Kennedy therefore pointed out that in the event of China sending troops into Tibet under Chao Erfeng's command, serious disturbances would result.¹³

Kennedy handed over the telegrams to the political Resident in Sikkim, Charles Bell, who, in turn, passed them on to the Anglo-Indian authorities. The first telegram was addressed to the British government and to all European governments and said that the Manchu military and officials in Tibet had joined hands against the Tibetan authorities and had in every possible way misinterpreted their reports to the Emperor about their actual intentions, had deployed a contingent of troops and were subjugating the Lamaist religion. The Tibetan authorities therefore appealed to the governments of Great

Britain and other European countries to intervene and to send to the Manchu emperor telegrams demanding that the advance of Chinese troops into Tibet be halted.¹⁴ The second telegram was to be sent, if the first received no response. The third telegram was sent to the Chinese government, informing them also about the advance of the Chinese troops into Tibet, against the wishes of the Tibetans, and requesting their withdrawal since it would give rise to serious difficulties and result in the starvation of the Tibetan people.¹⁵

Initially, the Dalai Lama did not believe that the troops were marching into Tibet at the Emperor's instruction, taking it for granted that it was Chao Erfeng's initiative,¹⁶ and requested the British authorities to inform Peking about what was happening. In response the Viceroy of India only confirmed that Britain could not interfere in the matters concerning relations between Tibet and China.¹⁷

In the later part of 1909, a detachment numbering two thousand soldiers under the command of Colonel Chung Yin marched towards the Tibetan borders.¹⁸ The Amban, Lien Yu, tried to assure the local Tibetan population that it was exclusively a peace mission, but simultaneously threatened 'dire consequences' if they put up armed resistance.

In early 1910 the detachment was approaching Lhasa, destroying everything that came in its way, and meeting resistance only from small detachments of Tibetan troops. The Dalai Lama continued to appeal to the Manchu officials to halt the army and not to allow it to enter Lhasa since Tibetans were facing food shortages and to feed an additional two thousand soldiers would lead to famine. At the same time, as was reported in the Chinese press, the Viceroy of Szechuan, Chao Erhsen and Chao Erfeng, telegraphed Peking requesting that Tibet be officially declared to be a province of China in order to stave off foreign aggression.¹⁹

By the end of January and early February 1910, the Manchu troops reached the vicinity of the Tibetan capital, Lhasa. On the outskirts of the city there were skirmishes between the soldiers and the Tibetans in which the secretary of the Dalai Lama was killed and one of the chief officials was seriously wounded. The Dalai Lama himself fled Lhasa to India in the direction of the Chumbi valley. Lien Yu issued an order to detachments of Manchu troops to bring the Dalai Lama back 'with utmost caution' and stated that whoever could murder Lonchen Shatra and other Tibetan officials would be well rewarded.²⁰

On 12 February 1910, the Manchu troops entered Lhasa.²¹ They captured the houses of high-ranking Tibetan officials, including the property of Lonchen Shatra, which was partly plundered; the arsenal and the mint where money was minted in accordance with the Chinese model were brought under the Chinese control, the police and the court were taken over; the building materials from the governmental depot were looted, etc.²² Armed skirmishes continued between the Manchu troops and the Tibetans in various regions of the country where Chao Erfeng's troops entered.²³

On 25 February 1910, an Emperor's decree was promulgated in Peking which charged the Dalai Lama with defying imperial commands and instigating the Tibetans to hostility and revolt. The decree went on to state that on 12 February 1910, the Dalai Lama had for the second time fled the country and had showed 'ingratitude' to the Emperor and unable 'to respond to the expectations of the people below him. He is not a fit head of the saints'. He would therefore be stripped of his status and 'be treated as an ordinary person'.²⁴ The Amban Lien Yu invited all prominent Tibetan lamas headed by the Regent Ti Rimpoche, acquainted them with the Emperor's decree, and entrusted them with the task 'to search for a number of male children bearing miraculous signs, inscribe their names on tablets, and according to precedent, place them in the gold urn, from which one shall be drawn as the true re-incarnation of the previous generations of Dalai Lamas'.²⁵ In response the Tibetan ministers and the National Assembly wrote to the Viceroy of India protesting against the violence being perpetrated on the Tibetan people and the Buddhist religion. The Tibetan Assembly and the ministers hoped that all the 'enlightened nations of the world' would not tolerate it and would extend support and help to Tibet, and that the Anglo-Indian government would negotiate with the Chinese authorities regarding the matter.²⁶

The Manchu authorities, in turn, maintained that the sole intention of the expedition to Tibet was to maintain peace and protect the commercial markets. The Chinese Ministry of External Affairs stated that all questions arising in connection with Tibet would be resolved in accordance with the treaties between Britain and China.²⁷

The Chinese press printed comments on the events taking place in Tibet. The newspaper *Celestial Empire*, on 26 February 1910, wrote that the conflict in Tibet was not surprising to those who paid some attention to the events in Tibet. After the signature of the Anglo-Russian Convention, when Britain and Russia had agreed not to intervene in

Tibetan affairs, and thus given freedom of action to China, disturbances had taken place in Tibet. This non-interference by Britain and Russia, the newspaper continued, could be considered to be a plausible cause for the conflict, although at that time China had not yet seriously laid claim on its suzerain rights. From time immemorial the Chinese Ambans have been living in Lhasa, but their real participation in the administration of the country had come to nought. The Chinese troops stationed in Tibet had been reduced to a handful of men. The Amban had a censor from Peking and therefore he himself bore no responsibility. After the Younghusband mission the situation has changed, the newspaper wrote. China had begun taking an interest in Tibetan affairs and the 1908 Anglo-Tibetan-Chinese Convention was signed with the direct participation of Peking. Then the Anglo-Russian agreement came as the last straw, and at that moment China has begun to take vigorous measures to establish its control over the country.²⁸

Thus, the newspaper laid the responsibility for the revolts in Tibet at that time not so much on China who had activated its policies there, as on Britain and Russia for adhering to their policy of non-interference in Tibetan affairs. However, on 5 March the same newspaper revised its earlier viewpoint and wrote that China had deployed troops in Tibet only to protect its markets, and that the Tibetans were not ill-disposed to the Chinese troops. The resistance was expressed only in this strict order of the Dalai Lama to resist the Chinese troops, whom the Tibetan troops indignantly obeyed. Nevertheless, the Tibetans ran at the sight of the Chinese troops and the latter entered Lhasa unopposed.

China has no intention of provoking any movement against the Dalai Lama, said the article, but the latter had ordered his troops to start military action and set fire to governmental stores, which has resulted in serious discontent. The Dalai Lama, apprehending retribution, had fled, though the Imperial Resident, on the orders of the Emperor, had been friendly and kind to him. The Resident had despatched his own men to detain him, but it was already too late.²⁹ A comparison of the two articles shows some change in the views of the Peking ruling circles regarding the events in Tibet. They sought to shirk responsibility for the bloodshed in the country and feigned friendliness towards the Dalai Lama.

The world press also commented on the Tibetan events and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India. The Russian newspaper *Novoye Vremya* (New Times) wrote:

Russia and Great Britain have given up their legitimate influence in Tibet in favour of China and are now reaping the fruits of their old rivalry. Instead of a peaceful and harmless country, they now will have China as their neighbour, the national awakening of which has become now pronounced by clenching fists and victories over the weaker ones.

Attention was drawn to the fact that the Dalai Lama had fled to India and had not attempted to go to Russia. Thus, the Russian press tried to show that it had happened accidentally, due to reasons beyond the Dalai Lama's control. For example, the newspaper *Russkaya Zemlya* (Russian Soil) wrote: 'It is beyond any doubt that the Dalai Lama would have fled to Russia, had not the road from the residence of the Tibetan high priest been firmly barred by his enemies who had foreseen such an outcome and had taken appropriate steps.' It, at the same time, stated that the attitude of the Russian ruling circles towards Tibetan affairs had 'cooled down'. *Utro Rossii* (Morning Russia) wrote that the 'Dalai Lama was again compelled to flee from his residence but not to Russia which is far and whose power seemed to him questionable but to the British in India whom he hated'.³⁰ The press noted also the advantages that the British had gained by giving asylum to the Buddhist high priest. The German newspaper *Silesische Zeitung* wrote that while Russia had strictly observed the text of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 and 'did not heed the repeated requests for help from the Dalai Lama', the British, who understood well the political significance of the Buddhist 'Pope being in British territory', rendered hospitality and gave due respect to the Dalai Lama.³¹ The French newspaper *Action* also wrote: 'Our friends, the British, have acquired free of charge the living incarnation of Buddha. They have swindled splendidly, especially when not less than 10 million Buddhists are British subjects'.³²

The disadvantageous position of Russia was noted by the *Saint-Petersburg Vedomosti* (Saint Petersburg Gazette) which wrote that 'justice demands that the Dalai Lama passes a certain amount of time in India and then the same amount of time with us at least in St Petersburg, where now, with the gracious permission of the White Tsar, the Kalmyk and Buryats construct a Buddhist temple'. The *Novoye Vremya* took a slightly different line: 'Russia can hardly afford to involve itself in such problems, as to support and preserve the cult the Dalai Lama'. Apparently, Russian diplomacy was also of that view.³³

Summarizing the events occurring in Lhasa, the Moscow newspaper *Utro Rossii* wrote:

At the present moment Tibet is echoing the concluding accords of the diplomatic symphony which we had started playing 10 years ago, dreaming to create in the centre of Asia a threat both to Britain and China. Due to our inability, we failed to properly execute the well-conceived combination. We lost our influence in Tibet forever. In the course of five years, we forfeited our influence which, thanks to the preceding events, we were quite favourably placed to exert.³⁴

Whatever the comments of the Russian and foreign press on the events taking place in Tibet and whatever the suggestions made by it, Russian diplomacy on the Tibetan question, 'clung to the spirit and letter' of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. The Russian representative in Peking, I.Y. Korostovets, in a secret telegram to the foreign ministry dated February 24/9 March 1910, formulated the attitude of Russia in relation to Tibet and the Dalai Lama as follows:

Although the signs of attention shown to the Dalai Lama, in the form of gifts and financial loans bestowed on him as well as in our friendly and trustworthy relations, made us morally responsible, an active move to protect the high priest connected with the demand to restore him, would be construed by China as an interference in her internal affairs and would rather harm him. It will be difficult for us to explain such intercession by the existence of our Buddhist subjects, because such a significant number among British nationals is much larger. The British probably do not contemplate any active actions and meanwhile accept the Chinese explanation. As regards the relations of the Dalai Lama with the Russian lamaists, they, as it is known, are rather weak, and it is not probable that they will show a special sympathy, if of course, the agitation is not supported among them.³⁵

Thus, the Russian diplomat continued to adhere to the line, so far as Tibet was concerned, which the Tzarist government had followed when negotiating with the British on the Tibetan issue.

Perturbed by the events in Tibet and the possible changes in the general situation in Central Asia due to the occupation of Tibet by the Manchu authorities, by the Dalai Lama's flight to India and the Imperial decree on his deposition, the ruling circles of Great Britain and Russia requested the Chinese authorities to explain the events and to inform them about their future plans concerning Tibet.

In February 1910, the British envoy in Peking requested the Manchu government 'for an explanation of the events in Tibet',

pointing out that they may create unrest in the frontier regions of India and affect the Buddhists there'.³⁶ The representatives of the Chinese Ministry of External Affairs explained that the aim of the Chinese government was to maintain the law and more effective control bearing in mind stricter fulfilment of Tibetan obligations towards its neighbouring states. The Chinese government further assured the government of Great Britain that they had no intention of changing the status quo in Tibet and interfering in its internal affairs or of depriving the Dalai Lama of his power.³⁷ The Russian envoy in Peking, I.Y. Korostovets, wrote that 'according to several hints dropped, Britain does not intend to be a silent spectator of the development of events in Tibet'. On the whole, according to Korostovets, in Peking diplomatic circles a view was afloat that the 'China step testifies to its government's intention to strengthen its suzerain rights over Tibet'.³⁸

Korostovets, on his part, wanted directives from the Russian foreign ministry in St Petersburg as to whether or not he should ask the Peking authorities about the events. In reply to his telegram the Russian Foreign Minister informed him that 'having no wish to interfere in China's internal affairs, we cannot turn a blind eye to the fate of the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of the Russian Buddhist subjects'. In connection with this, he wanted Korostovets to request information from the Chinese government 'about the circumstances that led the Dalai Lama to flee from Tibet, the adoption of such an extreme measure as the promulgation of the decree about his removal, and about the election of his successor, which can lead to a religious ferment amongst our Buddhists'.³⁹

Korostovets did so. The Chinese Ministry of External Affairs clarified to Korostovets on 15 February 1910, that the 'removal of the Dalai Lama was due to his intrigues and constant resistance to the reforms that should be carried out in accordance with the obligations earlier agreed upon. Acting in such a way, the Chinese government had only executed its right to punish its recalcitrant subjects for violating the vassal-lord relationship, not acknowledging the Chinese authority and interfering in administrative affairs rather than pursuing religious aims'.⁴⁰

'In general, on the removal of the Dalai Lama, the Chinese government is of the opinion', wrote Korostovets,

that the temporal power of Tibet for a long time belonged to the Chinese Resident, and the Dalai Lama has only the authority to preach Buddhism,

abstaining from the civil administration. The same attitude was publicized by the Chinese press, and a newspaper even made an attempt to draw a parallel between the measures taken by China and the division of temporal and spiritual power in Catholicism. By this, the Peking newspapers are in every possible way justifying China's stand and blaming the Dalai Lama for all disturbances, to confirm which the newspapers hinted at underhand plotting by Russia against China with the help of the Dalai Lama ... The removal of the Dalai Lama is a sequel to the policy of China to make broadest possible use of the position, which had been guaranteed by the Anglo-Russian Agreement on Tibet confirming the non-intervention of Russia and Britain in the internal affairs of the country, and the Anglo-Chinese Treaty, by confirming China's suzerain rights over Tibet.⁴¹

On receiving Korostovets's report from Peking on Tibetan affairs, the Russian government instructed him to notify the Manchu authorities that 'they hope that China would refrain from too hasty measures regarding the Dalai Lama and Buddhism thus preventing any unfavourable interpretations by the numerous followers of this yellow religion'.⁴²

In response the Chinese government stated that 'the measure adopted by it was caused by the behaviour of the Dalai Lama and applied only to him personally having nothing to do with Buddhism, and that the Russian Buddhist subjects have no cause to interpret it otherwise'. Korostovets believed that the Chinese had sought to persuade Russia that peace and tranquillity reigned amongst the Chinese followers of the Dalai Lama.⁴³

Explanations of that kind were made to the Russian and British governments, but the Chinese government and the press, referring to the Agreement of 1904, asserted that China was not a foreign state and therefore nothing could prevent it from interfering in the internal affairs of Tibet, and that therefore its actions of 1909–10 were an actual implementation of the already established sovereignty of China over Tibet. China's references to treaties and agreements are hardly convincing. On the other hand, it is true that the Peking authorities took advantage of the intricate internal and international situation to consolidate their sovereignty over Tibet *de facto*.

Consolidating the Manchu position in Tibet could not but change the general situation along the Sino-Indian border. Thus, the Viceroy of India deemed it necessary to draw the attention of the Chinese government to the fact that the Indian government could not remain indifferent to the change in the status quo on the Indian border and

the creation of a situation incongruous to the Agreements of Great Britain with Tibet and China stipulating the preservation of the position of the Tibetan government in office. In view of this the Indian government considered it necessary to inform the Chinese government about its intention to reinforce its garrisons in Gyantse and Yatung to guarantee the safety of the British nationals there. At the same time, China and Peking should be assured that the sole aim of Great Britain was to restore the status quo established by the Treaties and Trade Regulations. The Viceroy of India added that the Government of Nepal could also hardly refrain from steps to guarantee the safety of its frontiers.⁴⁴

It was not by chance that the Russian Defence Minister V.A. Sukhomlinov wrote to the Foreign Minister, S.D. Sazonov, on 20 November 1910, that 'China's awakening and entering the road to become a formidable military power in recent years have naturally attracted significant attention amongst British political circles'. The subjugation by China and Britain of semi-independent and independent possessions along the border, wrote Sukhomlinov, 'brings the two states closer to one another, and the commenced conversion of Tibet into a province of China is the greatest advantage in this direction'. 'By observing the general situation on the north-eastern frontier of India', the letter stated,

it is impossible not to notice the gradual, but steady change of the mutual positions of Britain and China, and British attention being more and more diverted from its north-western frontier of India towards its north-eastern frontier ... There are reasons to believe that the waning spectre of Russian threat from the north-west has been replaced by the appearance of the new spectre of Chinese threat in the north-east.⁴⁵

In the following years the Sino-Indian border issue was becoming more and more acute. On 28 October 1911, the Russian diplomatic representative Reveliotti, reported from India that 'the Celestial Empire and Indian Empire ... are on the verge of a serious border conflict'.⁴⁶

Meanwhile, as was already mentioned, the Dalai Lama had fled from Lhasa and moved towards India. The British representatives in Gyantse, Pari, and Yatung were extremely worried by this development and the victimization of the Dalai Lama by the Chinese troops, so, naturally, the question arose regarding British reactions in the event of an immediate threat to the Dalai Lama's life.⁴⁷ The Tibetan officials in Pari even requested the British commercial agents

to call in additional troops from Yatung to protect the Dalai Lama.⁴⁸ The Anglo-Indian authorities however instructed their officials to extend hospitality to the high priest, to provide him with a place to live in, etc., but refused to send additional troops. The British troops guarding the commercial agencies should remain strictly neutral in the event of clashes between the Tibetans and the Chinese.⁴⁹ If however, the Dalai Lama's life was in danger and he appealed for help, then such assistance, at the Viceroy's directive, should be provided to him.⁵⁰

On 22 February 1910, the Viceroy of India informed London of his intention to meet the Tibetan high priest at Darjeeling with all the honours due to him, but to regard his visit as 'private'. The Viceroy also stated that the Dalai Lama's flight would greatly influence the public not only in Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal but also in India. It was therefore necessary to hold him in high esteem. He added that it was also advisable to demonstrate to the border states that the Anglo-Indian authorities were not afraid of China.⁵¹

On 27 February 1910 the Dalai Lama, accompanied by a retinue of followers and servants (over 100 persons), arrived at Darjeeling where the local authorities had prepared a residence for him. The next day the British political representative in Sikkim, Charles Bell paid a visit to the Dalai Lama. In their discussion the Dalai Lama expressed the hope that

the British government ... would demand from the Chinese Emperor's government that Lien [*amban*] and other officials be replaced, that it would withdraw its troops from Lhasa, restore the monasteries destroyed by the Chinese troops, return the stolen sacred articles, and to allow him, the Dalai Lama, to return to Tibet with all honours, befitting the head of the Buddhist religion.⁵²

In response Charles Bell expressed his sympathy but warned that in compliance with the existing treaties he could not interfere in the internal affairs of China, 'whose supreme right over Tibet is not in doubt'.⁵³

On 24 February 1910, the former Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, inquired in the House of Lords about the situation in Tibet in connection with the flight of the Dalai Lama. In his reply, the Secretary of State for India Lord Morley detailed the events on the basis of information provided by a Tibetan official who had specially arrived in Gyantse to talk with the British Trade agent. 'The British

government,' Lord Morley said, 'has immediately issued orders to all its representatives to be strictly neutral, which was conscientiously maintained. The only existing information is the report from Yatung that the Dalai Lama has left for India, to request the British government for advice and protection.'⁵⁴ Lord Morley reported that they at the time were exchanging opinions with the Chinese government on the matter.⁵⁵

On 14 March 1910, the Dalai Lama met the Viceroy of India, Lord Minto, and requested the British government to intervene in Tibetan affairs to secure the right of Tibetan authorities to have direct relations with the British, and to compel the Chinese government to recognize Tibet as a friendly state on a par with China. In reply, Lord Minto said that the British government did not deem it fit to intervene in Tibet's affairs.⁵⁶ At the same time, it is known that on 8 April 1910, the British Foreign Secretary, Edward Gray, had telegraphed the British diplomatic representative in Peking M. Muller to 'voice to the Chinese government most vigorously and resolutely that the British government will not tolerate any changes in Tibet which would harm or threaten the interests of the three border states of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim'.⁵⁷

The memorandum of the British government to the Chinese ambassador in London of 14 April 1910 stated that the Government of Great Britain was perturbed by the impact of the changes taking place in Tibet on the trade and political relations of British India and Tibet, and also the relations of China and India with Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal. On the first issue the Chinese government stated that they would rigorously fulfil all the terms of treaties and agreements regarding Tibet. These assurances were favourably received by the British government. Regarding the second issue, the British authorities said that in the event of administrative changes in Tibet endangering the integrity of the three Himalayan states, they were ready, if necessary, to protect their interests. The memorandum spoke about the inadvisability of the deployment of troops in the neighbourhood or along the borders with India and the adjoining states which, in the opinion of the British government, cannot be justified by the implementation of the usual police functions envisaged in Article XII of the Trade Regulations of 1908.⁵⁸

On 11 April 1910, the Viceroy of India, Lord Minto, reported to Lord Morley that the Tibetan authorities had proposed the conclusion of an alliance between India and Tibet, on the same lines as the existing

Agreements between Nepal and India. The Tibetan Minister also requested the dispatch of a British detachment to Tibet, to investigate the actions of the Chinese authorities there.⁵⁹

The tense situation in Tibet, the fear of the Anglo-Indian authorities about the safety of the north-eastern frontier of India, and the Dalai Lama's request for help from Britain against China could not but attract the interest of the British press. The *Times* (London) published an article by Colonel F. Younghusband, head of the British armed mission to Tibet in 1903–4. He wrote that at the present moment both the Dalai Lama himself and virtually the entire Tibet government had turned to Britain for help. In view of their treaty obligations, the British could not, on their own initiative, interfere in Tibetan affairs, but neither could they be expected to show indifference towards the Tibetans.

'We have no objections against the legal right of China to consolidate its suzerain—not sovereign—rights,' he continued.

But if the Chinese go further than that and clearly attempt to deprive Tibet of self-government, if they start to instigate the Tibetan population against us, and at every step show animosity toward us and endeavour to stand between the Tibetans and us, then we can have a reason to intervene in the Tibetan affairs.⁶⁰

The British press expressed apprehensions about the threat to the security of the Indian borders and the Himalayan princedoms of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim generated by the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet. Younghusband added that 'presently the Chinese pursue the same hostile policies towards India as previously, and on top of that, they make the Tibetans to act so'.⁶¹ A specialist on Tibetan affairs, P. Landon, in an article in the *Daily Telegraph* entitled 'A New Danger to India' wrote that Tibet 'has been reduced from a buffer state into a Chinese province governed with incredible brutality by a pro-Consul enjoying unlimited power and by the occupation army which is standing at the gates of India'. By easily taking possession of Tibet, Landon continued, 'China's lust has increased and is undoubtedly directed towards Indian possessions. It has already been proposed that Sikkim return to its old position as a Chinese vassal. The Maharaja of Nepal regards the situation so seriously that he told the author about preparations to annex, if necessary, the southern part of Tibet, to ensure the kingdom's own safety'. Even Lord Morley considered it necessary to assure the British government that it could

always count upon Indian troops against any Chinese intrusion. The author of the article considered a future clash on the Indian border 'inevitable'.⁶²

Finally, on 16 July 1910, the correspondent of the Reuter agency reported from Shimla that owing to the alleged disturbances in Tibet and with a view to taking measures necessitated by the movement of Chinese troops, two Indian regiments and a battery of mountain artillery had been stationed ready to move into Tibet, if and when the necessity arose. In Sikkim, troops had been mobilized ready to protect the British commercial agencies in Gyantse and Yatung in Tibet, if they were attacked or found themselves in peril. The troops had been ordered to maintain strict neutrality in the event of a clash between the Chinese and Tibetans. As soon as circumstances permitted the troops would be withdrawn.⁶³

The following day, 17 July 1910, Reuter reported that this could be purely a precautionary step, not a regular expedition, and did not even contemplate the dispatch of the troops across the border, especially in the present situation. These measures aimed only at protecting the British commercial agencies in Tibet in accordance with the existing treaties.⁶⁴

The British press rallied in favour of more active Anglo-Russian collaboration in Tibetan affairs, in consonance with the provisions laid down in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Thus, the same F. Younghusband opined that Russia and Britain 'should jointly settle the Tibetan question ... take joint actions in Lhasa, as they are now doing in Kashgar, Peking and Teheran'. The Russian press, however, did not respond to this proposal. As far as Russian diplomatic circles were concerned, the St Petersburg correspondent of the *The Times* (London) wrote that they had assessed Younghusband's article as a proposal to review the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention on Tibet. 'The Russian Government', wrote *The Times*

does not contemplate coming forward with any initiative on this question, but if Great Britain takes the lead then of course it would be met with the most favourable attention. Russia recognizes that British interests in Tibet are much greater than hers. Nevertheless it should be noted that it is the mode of actions of Great Britain in Tibet, where she voluntarily gave up the privileges she received, have restrained Russia from interfering in Afghanistan.⁶⁵

On the basis of the reports in the British press and actions undertaken by the Anglo-Indian governmental circles, as well as the reports of the

Russian diplomatic representatives in India and China, it may be concluded that the British government was greatly perturbed by the growing power of China in Tibet, which could pose a threat to the British empire in the Himalayan region along the borders of India and Burma. An order was therefore given for the concentration of units of British troops on the north-eastern frontier of India. At the same time, British diplomacy strove to adhere to the spirit of the Anglo-Russian agreement on the most important Asiatic problems, and therefore the measures that had been taken were explained exclusively on the basis of the necessity to ensure the safety of the British subjects in Tibet, which was in full compliance with the text of the Agreement.

Meanwhile, after the intervention of the Chinese troops and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India, the entire power in Tibet lay in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief of the army, Chung Yin and the Chinese Amban, Lien Yu. The Panchen Lama refused to head the temporal administration of Tibet, and the Tibetan National Assembly, also hostile to China, maintained continuing relations with the Dalai Lama, repeatedly sending letters to the Indian government protesting against Chinese behaviour in Tibet. Active resistance to the Chinese authorities continued in south-eastern Tibet, where rebellion had broken out which was quickly repressed by Chung Yin.⁶⁶ In Peking itself 'reports of various reforms allegedly planned by the government in Tibet, were spread. On verification it was learnt that no decision regarding that had yet been taken, and all measures were shelved for the want of sources for defraying expenses'.⁶⁷ The *Celestial Empire* too had published reports of the reforms intended by the Peking authorities in Tibet, particularly relating to an increase in the number of the Chinese troops, about the appointment of numerous high ranking officials to govern Tibet, etc. The State Council also chalked out a programme of future Chinese policies in Tibet, which included the election of a new Dalai Lama, training new recruits for the army, granting some of the Tibetan demands, organizing effective defence of the Chinese troops with the help of a broad network of agents, etc. Special hopes were pinned on Chao Erhfeng, the Supreme Commissar of the border provinces, and on his brother Chao Erhsun, the 'Viceroy' (Governor-General) of Szechuan Province.⁶⁸

The situation in Tibet remained tense. Besides the constant clashes between the Tibetans and Chinese troops, there was dissatisfaction

amongst the soldiers of the Chinese army itself, caused by irregular payment of salary that was leading to hunger among them. The Amban, Lien Yu, was considered to be the culprit, and resentment against him grew especially vehement when he passed on the blame for non-payment of salaries to the military commander, who was extremely popular amongst the soldiers. That commander was sentenced to eighty blows of a wooden staff and banished from Tibet,⁶⁹ creating unrest amongst the soldiers. The Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese army, Chung Yin, undertook vigorous measures to prevent a mutiny, including the distribution of gifts among the troops on behalf of Lien Yu, purchased from his personal resources. The soldiers however learnt the truth and their hatred for the Resident grew manifold. Several extremely serious incidents occurred, which ended peacefully thanks to the personal prestige of Chung Yin who was able to persuade them not to embark on open rebellion. The soldiers demanded that an order for Lien Yu's arrest be issued.

This tense situation prevailed till the beginning of November 1911, when information was received from Chengtu that on 10 October 1911, the Chinese revolution had begun, and in November, Yuan Shih-kai, a notable politician, had become the Prime Minister (on 16 March 1912, the President of the Chinese Republic). On receipt of this news, the acute discontent of the soldiers with the protégé of the Manchu Resident, Lien Yu could no longer be contained even by their commander Chung Yin.

On 13 November 1911, the Chinese soldiers and a large section of the personal guards of the Resident, rose up in revolt.⁷⁰ The Chinese newspaper, *China Press*, quoting the *Statesman*, wrote that the Chinese soldiers in different towns, including Lhasa, announced a mutiny against Lien Yu. They looted the treasury, and the Amban was imprisoned by Chung Yin,⁷¹ who was in fact protecting Lien from the mutinous soldiers. Initially the rebellion was directed against Lien Yu, but the soldiers in general stopped obeying their commanders, and the loot of the Resident's treasury was followed by the property of other Chinese officials being looted. For several days only the Chinese were harassed, and the Tibetan population and the monasteries remained completely unharmed. In keeping with the soldiers' demand, on 28 November 1911, Chung Yin officially occupied the post of the Chinese Amban in Lhasa. The revolt of Chinese troops spread to the Chumbi valley.⁷²

The *Statesman*, Calcutta, carried a feature describing the events in Tibet, which was passed on by a Russian Consulate official,

Reveliotti, on 10 December 1911, to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Reveliotti wrote:

Serious disturbances took place in Tibet, owing to the revolt by the Chinese garrison in Lhasa. Unpunctuality in paying the salary, on the one hand, and the new revolutionary developments, on the other, have sparked off the rebellion of the Chinese troops in Lhasa, resulting in overthrowing the local Amban and a number of pillages and outrages. From Lhasa the rebellion has quickly spread to Chumbi, Gyantse and Yatung. The Lhasan inhabitants, in order to appease the rebels, offered them a redemption of 110,000 taels, but the latter evidently have not been satisfied and continued the revolt, calling upon the Tibetans to march to China and loot the governmental establishments.

In Chumbi and Yatung too there was plunder and violence, after which the Chinese officials and soldiers attempted to take refuge outside Tibet, in India, from where they could wend their way to China. Reveliotti further reported that

the Tibetans, however, soon gathered their forces and vigorously resisted the insurgents. Their ringleader, a certain Ko Laochjui, was captured and executed. The mobilized Tibetan troops took the restoration of order into their hands and military rule was declared in the country. The mutineers can do nothing but submit and make conciliatory concessions, with both sides working out a conciliatory compromise under condition of mutual disarmament.⁷³

The Anglo-Indian press also published a description of the Tibetan events by an 'Outside Observer', who had lived in Lhasa and its outskirts for some months, from the autumn of 1911 to mid-May 1912. He reported that of the 800 Chinese soldiers in Lhasa, 60 had not participated in the mutiny as they were guarding Lien Yu, and a 100 soldiers were with Chung Yin. The rest of the soldiers were quartered in the new barracks, two versts (2.12 km) from the town. The barracks were for one and a half thousand soldiers, but very few remained there, for soon small detachments began occupying various posts. Of the Tibetan dignitaries, the Regent administered under the control of the Amban and, as the chief of the Tsomoling monastery, he exercised great influence over the monks in Lhasa; the President of the Council was loyal to the Chinese. The one member of the Council hostile to them was the Tibetan Commander-in-Chief who did not possess an organized army. Initially, a split occurred among

thousands of monks in large monastic communities. Thus, one of the largest monasteries, Drepung, and later a small monastery, Tengaling, sided with the Chinese. In December discontent spread amongst the Chinese troops. The soldiers expected that the Amban elected by them would immediately pay them their salary. Two hundred of them marched up to his house demanding to be paid. This being refused, probably because there was no money, the soldiers plundered the arsenal situated in the house of one of the Tibetan ministers, and seized weapons, money, and provisions. There was absolutely no violence in the town, for at that time the soldiers were on good terms with the inhabitants. The success of this first mutiny naturally led to further acts of disobedience. The troops went to the Regent demanding their dues, whereupon he allotted them Rs 28,000, collected from the Nepalese merchants in Lhasa. After a few days however they threatened a general massacre and the destruction of the sacred Potala monastery, if Rs 250,000 were not paid. This demand was based on the allegation that the Central Republican Government had recalled them to Peking and they needed the means to move to Szechuan. There were several acts of plunder and soon there was ferment among bellicose local Tibetan monks, and arms were distributed among the people. In the meantime, the Chinese garrison was strengthened by 900 men returning from the expedition to Pomed. The new arrivals, learning that their comrades had succeeded in getting paid, demanded their share too. Being totally indisciplined, they looted houses and shops. The Tibetans resisted them and street fights ensued. The Tibetan monks armed themselves, surrounded the Chinese troops, and cut off their supplies. Then the latter left a small detachment in the barracks and fortified their positions in several houses. One of their detachments attacked Sera monastery but was repulsed by the monks, who barred their retreat and killed all its members. Towards the beginning of April, some 1500 Chinese soldiers remained in Lhasa armed with modern rifles, one battery with six guns, five of which had been put out of action by the rebels as early as January. Initially there was no dearth of cartridges but these were wasted by the Chinese. In May, the Chinese garrison was reduced to 800 soldiers who were stationed in the eastern and south-eastern parts of Lhasa. The Tibetans armed with about 1000 long range rifles, certain of success, displayed valour and enterprise. In Lhasa there were two cartridge factories and the number of armed monks had grown. No one believed that Chinese reinforcements would arrive.

Lhasa had suffered heavily as had the Nepalese and Ladakhi merchants. Chinese power lay discredited and disgraced, and indeed had in effect ceased to exist.⁷⁴

The 'Notes' cited show the complete degradation of the Chinese army in Tibet, actual non-existence of China's power there, and the inability of the Peking authorities to combat Tibetan resistance to the Chinese troops.

Notwithstanding the fact that the information about events in Tibet, as reported by the press, was somewhat contradictory, and its nature depended on who sent the reports, it was nevertheless evident that a bitter struggle was going on there and the losses on both sides were heavy. The Chinese authorities in the south-eastern provinces of Tibet were wholly impotent; the garrisons in Chumbi, Farilong, Gyantse and Shigatse numbered a mere 100 soldiers each, and they sold their arms to the Tibetans and fled to Sikkim through Djelatse. The Chinese garrison in southern Lhasa held on, but was constantly attacked by a Tibetan detachment concentrated in the northern part of the Tibetan capital. The Tibetan troops were repulsed with heavy losses. In the southern part of the town the Chinese burnt down residential houses and public buildings, but the three sacred edifices of Lhasa, Potala palace, Sera monastery, and the main cathedral, remained intact. Although the Chinese continued to hold back the onslaught of the Tibetan detachment, their situation was extremely critical as their stock of food and ammunition was getting exhausted. Their only hope lay in reinforcements from Batan (Pa-t'ang)⁷⁵ but by May 1912 the Chinese garrison in Lhasa was surrounded by a Tibetan detachment numbering about 20,000 soldiers, and there was no hope of the rescue party from Batan (Pa-t'ang) arriving.⁷⁶

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Tibetan Question in Anglo-Chinese Relations after the Chinese Revolution of 1911 and Russia's Attitude

Soon after commencement of the Revolution in China and Yuan Shih-kai coming to power as Prime Minister on 30 December 1911, a conference was held in Shanghai of representatives of the different political forces in the country, at which it was decided that the National Assembly called to settle the question of the new government of the country, would include representatives of Tibet, Manchuria, Mongolia, and Turkestan as well as other eighteen provinces of China.¹ Condemning the aggressive policy of their predecessors, the Manchus, the government of Yuan Shih-kai, nevertheless, immediately made clear their intention to preserve all territories taken over since the inception of the empire. On 21 April 1912, a President's Order was promulgated, stating that all 'the five races are joined in democratic union, the lands comprised within the confines of Mongolia, Tibet, Turkestan all became a part of the territory of the Republic of China' and 'are regarded as being on an equal footing with the Provinces of China Proper'. The new national flag of China had five colours.²

The British government assessed these statements as a confirmation of the intention to transform Tibet into a Chinese province. As far back as January 1912, the British ambassador in Peking made a representation to the Chinese government regarding the actions of the Chinese authorities in Tibet after 1910, pointing out that the Anglo-Indian authorities attached great importance to the creation

of an effective Tibetan government. Its final usurpation by the Chinese administration would create complications in the relations between China and British India and between China and Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan. In a verbal reply the Peking representatives explained that they had no intention to altering the existing situation in Tibet or of interfering in its internal administration, let alone its conversion into a Chinese province. This reply did not satisfy the British authorities. Written explanations were even less convincing. Therefore, the British Foreign Secretary, Edward Gray, placed the following questions for the consideration of India Office:

(1) Whether His Majesty's Government are justified by their treaty rights in opposing the inclusion of Tibet in China proper. (2) Whether British interests would be best served by such opposition, or whether it would not be likely to lead to an anti-British outbreak and the dismemberment of other outlying portions of Chinese Empire. (3) What steps could be taken to give effect to such opposition if it is decided upon.³

In response, the British Resident in Sikkim, Charles Bell, in a letter dated 27 February 1912, wrote that in his opinion the agreements of 1890, 1906, and 1907 did not give China sufficient grounds to transform Tibet into a Chinese province. He was convinced that neither in Mongolia nor in Tibet would there be anti-British movements. As regards the steps, other than military, Charles Bell suggested the following measures: '(1) we should refuse passage through India to the Chinese officials proceeding to Tibet' (the road through eastern Tibet is very long and dangerous), 'and (2) that we should join with Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim in preventing the export of rice to Tibet' and other items necessary to the Chinese soldiers in Tibet, which would compel them to leave the country. On the whole, Charles Bell believed, the question regarding a restoration of autonomy, that had existed in Tibet before Chao Erhfeng's arrival there could be raised, i.e. to demand the same status that Mongolia had achieved with Russia's help.⁴

The Viceroy of India, Lord Minto, expressed his opinion in a letter dated 23 March 1912, in which he stressed, *inter alia*, that Tibet was always considered an autonomous state under Chinese suzerainty. In the event of Tibet becoming a province of China, the 'Tibetan administration', referred to in the official documents, would cease to exist. The fulfilment of all the treaties and agreements signed by China was not obligatory in the case of Tibet which, according to Lord Minto, affirms its special status. The opposition of Great Britain

regarding the transformation of Tibet into a Chinese province would create a favourable impression on the Dalai Lama who was grateful for the hospitality extended to him and strove to revive his position. Lord Minto recalled that Russian policy towards Mongolia had not resulted in anti-Russian sentiments in other parts of China, so the British government need not apprehend the growth of anti-British sentiments in Tibet. Finally, the Viceroy proposed that Great Britain could suggest a satisfactory settlement of the Tibetan question as a condition for diplomatic recognition of the new Chinese republican government.⁵

The issue concerning recognition of the new government in China was also discussed in the foreign office and in connection with Japan's memorandum to the governments of Great Britain, Russia, and other interested countries, in which the recognition of the new government was linked to a guarantee from China to fulfil all its treaty obligations and to observe the interests of the foreign states in the territory of the country. On principle, the British government accepted that proposal and authorized the British ambassador in Peking to maintain continuing contact with the diplomats of other countries to establish the time and conditions for recognition. Russia also accepted this proposal, as it directly affected her rights in North Manchuria, Mongolia, and West China.⁶ Nevertheless, London believed that such an initiative should not be taken before the formal election of the National Assembly, although Edward Gray had sanctioned it as a condition for the preservation of Tibet's autonomy under Chinese suzerainty.⁷

On 12 July 1912, Yuan Shih-kai promulgated an ordinance sanctioning the establishment of a Committee on Mongolian and Tibetan affairs which was subsequently approved by the House of Representatives of the Chinese Parliament. As a Russian diplomatic representative, V.N. Krupensky wrote from Peking, this legislative measure 'places all affairs concerning the two above mentioned countries under the direct authority of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers'. 'Not touching upon the question about the practical consequences of these measures', wrote Krupensky, '... the Chinese government once again emphasizes its reluctance to recognize the demands of the parts of Mongolia that seceded from China, and its firm intention to regard them as indivisible parts of China, governed by the Central government on a general basis'. According to Krupensky, the debates that took place in the House of Representatives, on the number of deputies from Mongolia to be allowed in the Lower

House were of equal significance. In consequence, the Committee working on the draft 'Statute of the Parliament' was opposed to Mongolia and Tibet being given the right to send their deputies in the Lower House, since 'they are uncivilized regions'. Nevertheless, the majority of the members of Parliament 'found it impossible to support that view, as a contradiction to the principle of equality of five nationalities inhabiting China and therefore is unjust and dangerous for the state'. Therefore, the House of Representatives passed a resolution that '27 members from Mongolia, 3 from Koko-Nor, and 10 from Tibet will sit' in the Lower House of the future Parliament.⁸

The Russian Consul-General in India, S. Nabokov, evaluated the situation in Tibet on the basis of reports in the Anglo-Indian and the Chinese press, and also the accounts of eyewitnesses coming to India. Analysing the information so received, he informed the Russian Foreign Ministry that 'if the formation of Tibet into a Province of the New Chinese Republic is not mere words but a fact, it would present a lot of difficulties to it and would call for large-scale sacrifices'. He wrote that judging by the reports 'the Chinese garrisons have already been driven from several points on the way from Lhasa to the Chinese border, and in Lhasa they are holding their ground with great difficulty waiting for reinforcements and daily facing the threat of being routed'. It was noted by the observers that the Tibetans 'were learning to master the use of modern weapons and would offer stiff resistance to the new Chinese forces, if they come'. Nabokov expressed doubt that the Yuan Shih-kai government would at that moment be able to despatch troops to help the Chinese in Tibet. It was also reported that the Chinese Amban had entered into negotiations with the Tibetan authorities on the surrender.⁹

In a letter dated 1/14 July 1912, Nabokov quoted the reports of eyewitnesses that 'in Lhasa a majority of houses have been demolished in the exchanges of fire between the Tibetans and Chinese. The peasants are deserting their lands surrounding the city and fleeing into the interior of the country and Lhasa is threatened by famine'. According to them, 'the streets of Lhasa presented an absolutely awful sight. Dogs feeding on the abandoned corpses lying in the streets have become so ferocious that they attack anyone who ventures out of home at night'. The eyewitnesses also asserted that 'the Tibetans' bitterness towards the Chinese had reached the stage when they were at the end of their tether. Several Tibetan officials sympathetic towards

the Chinese were executed, the Chief of the Tengyelin monastery was subjected to severe torture and crucified.' From the Chinese sources it was learnt that the armed clashes were continuing in Lhasa, and in spite of the Tibetans outnumbering their enemies, they 'have been completely routed, hundreds of them were driven into the river and drowned and more than 800 lamas killed'. Nabokov also noted that according to the existing information, the clashes were also continuing in east Tibet. The Russian Consul thought that time and a large military force was required to 'pacify' the Tibetans and restore Chinese power in Lhasa. He was convinced that the return of the Dalai Lama to the capital could unite the Tibetans and give them strength in their struggle against the demoralized remnants of the Chinese troops.¹⁰ As regards the Dalai Lama himself, 'at present the awakening of Tibet has created ... the necessity to take immediate and resolute actions. He was compelled even to risk his life and render leadership to the movement as the spiritual head and a recognized leader'. Thus, despite the fact that travel from India to Tibet was 'very difficult owing to rains changing into snowstorms', and the crossing of the Brahmaputra 'presents a real danger',¹¹ the question of the necessity of the Tibetan leader to return to Lhasa was placed on the agenda.

Meanwhile, the Dalai Lama, residing in Darjeeling, unsuccessfully turned for help to the Anglo-Indian authorities, who followed the spirit and letter of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, and did not think it proper to extend active assistance to him. Moreover, they were concerned about the possibility of aggravation of the situation along the north-eastern frontier of India in connection with the situation in Tibet.

Through his agents in Peking and Calcutta, and principally through Dorjjeff, who was in Russia, the Dalai Lama attempted to enlist the support of the Russian government, expressing his immutable devotion to Russia and his permanent desire to follow her advice and instructions. He sent a detailed account to the Russian foreign ministry of the events that had taken place on the eve of and during the Chinese invasion.¹²

Conveying the Dalai Lama's messages to the foreign ministry, Dorjjeff appealed on his behalf to extend help and requested that pressure be exerted on China so that 'it puts a brake on its brutal

polices in Tibet, stops ravaging, plundering, assassinations, and desecration of its holy places, and finally, for the sake of science, stops demolishing and pillaging the historical monuments of Tibet'.¹³ In December 1910, the Dalai Lama requested the Russian representative in India, V.N. Arsenyev, via his trusted messenger, to find out how the Russian government would regard his coming to Russia from London, where he wanted to go.¹⁴ In response to Arsenyev's inquiry, a telegram was sent to him from St Petersburg stating that if the Dalai Lama arrived in Europe, the Russian government would be ready to receive him though it would be strongly undesirable in the light of their agreement with Britain. It would therefore be best if the Dalai Lama's request was 'politely turned down'.¹⁵

In early 1911, a famous Russian Tibetologist, Professor F.I. Shcherbatskoy, was in Darjeeling. He met the Dalai Lama several times, and it was through him that the latter sent Nicholas II his own letters and those of members of his retinue. The content of his letters provided evidence that he still hoped for Russian support: he requested that a scientific expedition be sent to Tibet and that a Russian political representative be assigned to Lhasa to help him in the struggle 'against the arbitrary actions of the Chinese'.¹⁶ In a letter to Dorjief, the Dalai Lama asked him 'to stubbornly insist that the Imperial government takes decisive steps'.¹⁷ His retainers thought it necessary to find out 'to what extent the British might render . . . ' help to Tibet. If they could not 'take upon themselves the great cause of the defence of the Tibetan faith', the Dalai Lama should be invited to Russia.¹⁸

On 31 May 1911, F.I. Shcherbatskoy submitted to the Russian foreign ministry a note 'On the necessity of establishing diplomatic relations with the Dalai Lama'¹⁹ in which, on the basis of his personal discussions with the high priest, stated the latter's point of view on the prospects of further development of Tibet and his own opinion on the events taking place in Tibet, and the possibilities of settling the Tibetan question. Shcherbatskoy wrote that the Chinese government had failed to 'get rid' of the Dalai Lama or to replace him by another priest and 'now they have invited him through their representative to return, promising that his position will not change, i.e. the autonomy of Tibet will be respected'. The Dalai Lama, as Shcherbatskoy wrote,

has laid as a condition for his return the presence of the representatives of Russia and Britain, irrespective of how they would be named: consuls, agents for religious affairs, travellers, scholars or in some other capacity. He justly

believed that the presence itself of representatives from Russia and Britain is sufficient to cause China to give up its characteristic ways of governing and so that his personal security will be more or less guaranteed ... in the present state of the Anglo-Russian relations no unsurmountable obstacles to the establishment of proper relations between the Russian government and the Dalai Lama would be placed by the British.

The total aloofness of Russia was very undesirable because the British refer to it in their negotiations with the Dalai Lama and state that they 'cannot do anything for him because Russia allegedly opposed them'. Moreover, Russia was interested in enhancing its prestige in Mongolia, where the Dalai Lama exercised enormous authority. Shcherbatskoy writes also about the desirability of organizing a scientific expedition from Russia 'through Darjeeling, in full agreement and with the assistance of the British government', which would 'lay the foundation for the establishment of proper relations'.

On receiving news of the China Revolution of 1911 and the intensification of the struggle in Tibet, Dorjjeff wrote a letter to the Russian Foreign Ministry dated 17 October 1911 and a Memorandum on 10 December. These documents reflected some changes in the attitude of the members of the Dalai Lama's retinue in view of the changes in China and Tibet. Dorjjeff wrote that 'the present events taking place in China, undoubtedly will greatly affect the situation in Tibet as an autonomous political unity in general, and particularly, its relations with Russia and Britain'. 'Britain', he continued, 'having direct contact with Tibet at least because the Dalai Lama now is residing in her possessions, is in a more advantageous position than Russia. So it is unthinkable that Britain would not use the advantage of this position to consolidate her influence in Tibet, in some form or other'.²⁰ The Dalai Lama, in Dorjjeff's words, was anxious 'because of a possibility of the British occupying his country, in the event of further complications with China'.²¹ 'Therefore the Tibetans firmly believe', Dorjjeff continued, 'that the fate of their country will depend upon the intercession of Russia who has always showed a just and impartial attitude towards the Tibetan people and their leader'.²² He, himself, at the Dalai Lama's behest, intended to leave Russia and go to Tibet.

It was obvious that the Tibetan authorities were seriously concerned that Britain would use her more advantageous geographical position vis-à-vis Tibet than Russia, and the changes taking place in China. These apprehensions were also shared by Nabokov, who believed that

'the hospitality' accorded to the Dalai Lama and the 'seeing off' of the Chinese troops from Tibet would be used by Britain at an opportune moment'.²³

Nevertheless, the Russian Imperial government continued to abide by the terms of the Anglo-Russian Agreement on Tibet and actually refused to provide active support to the Dalai Lama. In reply to Dorjjeff's Memorandum, the standpoint of Russian diplomacy was summed up as:

In view of the remoteness of Tibet the Imperial government does not recognize the existence there of any major Russian political or economic interests. The existing interests of a purely religious nature are connected with only Russian Buddhist subjects, whereas Britain's interests in Tibet are mainly political and economic. When this is the case, Tibet's external policy should be based on the principles of friendship and peace with Britain. Tibet may enter into various political and economic agreements with Britain. The former goodwill of Russia towards Tibet will thus be preserved. Tibet will find lively support in Russia in religious matters.²⁴

Thus, Russian diplomacy not only refused to help Tibet and regarded all political relations that had existed for the past ten years as only religious, but also showed its readiness to deviate from the terms set by the 1907 Anglo-Russia Agreement on Tibet, not for its own benefit but for Britain's acknowledging her preferential rights in Tibet. Even Dorjjeff was compelled to agree that the stance of the Imperial government was in keeping with the 'real conditions of contemporary political life in Tibet'.²⁵ However, he thought it advisable

to establish a joint patronage of Russia and Britain over Tibet, based on some contractual act ... The presence of the Russian and British representative in Lhasa would instil in the Tibetans the conviction that they need not be afraid of any measures of compulsion and that being under the protection of the two great powers, the Tibetans may, finally, settle their internal affairs peacefully and make use of their natural resources.²⁶

Indeed, he called upon Russia and Britain to revise the terms laid down in the 1907 Convention and to come to an agreement not on refusal but on joint action in Tibet.

In January 1912, Russia's Foreign Ministry instructed the Russian diplomatic representative in India, Reveliotti, to call on the Dalai Lama in Darjeeling to deliver to him a holograph letter from Nicholas II which was a reply to the high priest's letter passed on by F.I.

Shcherbatskoy. Through the ambassador in London, the Russian foreign ministry notified the British government of the planned visit and informed it that Russia would agree that 'the meeting between Reveliotti and the Dalai Lama is held in the presence of a British official'.²⁷

The meeting took place in the beginning of February 1912, in the presence of the British Resident in Sikkim, Charles Bell, and two Tibetan ministers. Reveliotti read out the Russian Tsar's message which expressed an 'unfailing kind disposition' towards the Dalai Lama, the hope that his fate would change for the better and, what was most important, advised him 'to pursue the policy of kind accord with Great Britain's government regarding Tibetan issues', which would help Tibet 'to defend its lawful rights within the framework of the existing treaties'.²⁸

Thus, the Russian Tsar confirmed the stand of Russian diplomacy on the matters relating to Tibet by the beginning of 1912: the lack of any wish to intervene in Tibetan affairs and placing responsibility for this on Great Britain. Reveliotti's visit was not given political colour though the Dalai Lama again intended 'to petition the Russian government to exert pressure jointly with the British government, on the Chinese government, so that the latter gave up its claims on Tibet', and accorded him the permission to return to Lhasa.²⁹

It was clear however that the Chinese authorities did not intend to give up their claims on Tibet but did not object to the Dalai Lama's returning there.

Finally, on 24 June 1912, the Dalai Lama undertook a long and arduous journey to Lhasa from Darjeeling. In August, when he was not far from Lhasa, Yuan Shih-kai stated his intention to restore the title of the Dalai Lama and to allow him to return to Tibet. He sent him a telegram expressing 'regret' for the excesses of the Manchu regime and of its protégé Lien Yu and also informed him that it was his duty 'to reinvest' the Dalai Lama with his former rank and title and 'reinstatate' him as the head of the Yellow Church.³⁰ The Dalai Lama replied that he did not need any ranks or posts bestowed upon him by the Chinese authorities, and that he himself takes upon himself both the spiritual and temporal administration of Tibet. This message from the Dalai Lama was taken in Tibet as an official declaration of independence. On 15/28 October 1912, a

Presidential Order was promulgated by Yuan Shih-kai which said that 'the Chinese Republic was based on the union of the five races, and all the five nationalities of China should be considered as members of one family'. As regards the Dalai Lama, who, as was stated in the Order, moved by his sincere devotion, desired to revive his links with China, all his 'blunders' should be forgiven and he will be reinstated in his high rank, even receiving the honourable appellation ... of 'sincere, submissive, promoter of education, great, virtuous and blissful Tibetan incarnation', in order to support the Buddhist religion and to assist the establishment of peace and harmony in the Chinese Republic.³¹

The text of the decree laid bare the fact that the Chinese republican government had ignored the declaration of independence of Tibet by the Dalai Lama and continued to regard it as its province. The Dalai Lama and his followers were outraged by the use of the word 'submissive' in the titles offered to the high priest by Yüan Shihkai. At the same time, the new authorities in Peking were clearly interested in the revival of a normal atmosphere in Tibet and realized that without the direct participation of the Dalai Lama this aim would be very difficult to attain. In a discussion with Russian diplomat Krupensky, John Jordan, the British envoy in Peking, said that the 'restoration of the former titles and ranks of the Dalai Lama is explained by the Yüan Shih-kai's desire to win the favour of the Tibetan sovereign and with his assistance to retain the Chinese Amban with his detachment of troops and renew the links of Tibet with China on the previous basis'. Jordan added that it was this purpose that the government of Great Britain also 'has in mind'.³²

Meanwhile, as far back as 19 July 1912, when the Dalai Lama was already on his way to Tibet, a truce was brokered and an agreement signed after lengthy negotiations in Lhasa, which said:

- (1) The Amban will remain in Lhasa along with a small retinue.
- (2) He will maintain about 200 Chinese soldiers to guard his person.
- (3) All the remaining Chinese troops will surrender their arms and ammunition and return to China via India; Tibetans providing food, etc. on the way to India.
- (4) The arms and ammunition that remain in Lhasa will be stored under the charge of representatives of both the parties and the Nepalese.
- (5) The Tibetans who had sided with the Chinese were promised pardon.³³

By the order of the Peking authorities, Lien Yu was officially discharged from his post of Resident, and Chung Yin appointed in his place. The local inhabitants however refused to accept him either. On 25 September, he and his soldiers were surrounded in the Amban's residence and the siege was lifted only on condition that Chung Yin and all remaining Chinese soldiers and officials in Lhasa vacated Tibetan soil. They were allowed to take their rifles (minus the bolts).

On 25 June 1912, the British foreign office presented a memorandum to the Russian government in which, beside the information about the occurrences in Tibet, it was stated that 'the Chinese and the Tibetan authorities in Lhasa have approached the Indian government with a request that an official be sent to Lhasa to work out the terms of the surrender of the Chinese troops and their safe passage to India'. The Dalai Lama was informed through the Anglo-Indian authorities that the government of Great Britain aspired 'to see the internal autonomy of Tibet under the Chinese suzerainty supported without Chinese interference, till the terms of the Treaty between Tibet and India are observed and till cordial relations are maintained between them'. According to the British foreign office, the principal condition would be 'the end of the internal strife and restoration of order'.³⁴

Eventually the Anglo-Indian government agreed to allow 2000 Chinese soldiers to pass through the territory of India. In December 1912, the troops under Chung Yin's command reached the Indo-Tibetan border where they were met by a British officer sent specially to meet and see off the detachment. By the end of February of 1913, 'the separate detachments of Chinese troops departed from Calcutta to China',³⁵ 'the soldiers being in such a miserable, ragged and deplorable condition that it was impossible to recognize them as soldiers'. By the end of January, after a two year absence, the Dalai Lama ceremoniously entered his capital.

Thus, the Chinese invasion of Tibet did not lead to the attainment of the aim of subjugating the Dalai Lama and his subjects, either by the agonizing Manchus or the new Republican government. The actions of the Peking government only provoked the growth of anti-Chinese sentiments and the ousting of Chinese troops from that country. Tibet was actually no longer under Chinese influence and its ruling circles endeavoured to consolidate their independence.

THE MONGOLO-TIBETAN TREATY AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
DETERMINING TIBET'S POLITICAL STATUS

Dorjjeff's request, earlier in December 1911, to the Russian government to allow him to return to Tibet was complied with. He visited Tibet, where 'he got a first-hand opportunity to see the situation in the country after the fateful events resulting in the ousting of the Chinese troops and authorities'. Then Dorjjeff went to India and was received by the Dalai Lama who affirmed his authority as 'the sole actual mediator in Tibet's relations with Russia', and also sent through him a letter and gifts for the Russian Tsar.¹ After this he went to Mongolia, where 'he made an announcement of the independence of Tibet, established his authority to conclude a treaty between Tibet and Mongolia, and also stated his intention to enter into negotiations ... about the joint protectorate of Russia and Britain over Tibet'.² During this period the Russo-Mongolian negotiations in Urga concluded with the signature of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement on the 3 November 1912, under which Russia was to render help to Mongolia to preserve her 'autonomous system' and to obtain a number of economic advantages.³

On 6 January 1913, the Russian diplomatic representative in Mongolia, I.Y. Korostovets, sent from Urga the text of the Mongolian-Tibetan treaty, signed on 29 December 1912, with a postscript that the text had been handed to him personally by Dorjjeff. According to Dorjjeff, the Dalai Lama himself was the force behind the treaty, 'always aspiring to unite the two countries of the same faith and ethnic origin equally suffering from Chinese domination'.⁴

The preamble of the treaty stated that 'whereas Mongolia and Tibet, having freed themselves from the Manchu dynasty and separated themselves from China, have become independent states, and whereas the two states have always professed the one and the same religion, and to the end that their ancient mutual friendships may be strengthened', have agreed to sign the treaty, containing nine articles. The first and the second articles mutually recognize the independence of each other. Further, Mongolia and Tibet 'shall take measures, after mutual consideration, for the prosperity of the Buddhist faith', 'shall henceforth, for all time, afford each other aid against dangers from without and from within', would conduct trade, help 'the subjects, travelling officially and privately on religious or on State business', etc.⁵

Assessing quite soberly the significance of that Treaty, Korostovets wrote, that for 'Tibet and especially for the Dalai Lama, this agreement with Mongolia seemed desirable as a means of manifesting Tibet's independence and to show that Lhasa does not want to recognize Chinese sovereignty'. The Russian diplomat believed that 'although the Agreement between Mongolia and Tibet, because of their legal incapacity, cannot have a political significance and does not deserve the name of the People's Act, yet it constitutes a protest against the imposition of Chinese sovereignty both on Tibet and Mongolia'.⁶

Actually, the signing of the Mongolian-Tibetan Treaty demonstrated their striving to be firmly established as states independent of China, as independent actors in international relations, free to enter into agreements with foreign nations. Judging by the situation, the Republican government in China could not exercise full control over far-flung territories which had been parts of the Imperial China. It was also clearly evident that Russia and Great Britain would not take any action to help the new Peking government to maintain its stranglehold on the outlying areas of the former empire.

In February 1913, Dorjjeff arrived in St Petersburg. On 11 February, he presented a 'Memorandum on the situation of Tibet' to the Russian Minister of External Affairs, in which he stated that 'Tibet is now virtually out of China's power, and the British government is not only sympathetic, but is also rendering very active support'. Dorjjeff believed that 'the British are now making efforts to develop Tibet's relations with the outside world since it is in the interests of trade', but he regretted that 'due to some misunderstanding, access to Tibet has remained difficult' only for the Russian Tsar's subjects.⁷

On 6 April 1913, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers V.N. Kokovtsov, gave to the Minister of External Affairs, Sazonov, Dorjjeff's 'Notes on the Tibetan Question', suggesting measures which would be desirable to implement in Tibet. Thus, independent Tibet 'enters into friendly agreement with Russia and Britain' who are accorded 'preferential trade rights in comparison with other countries' and render joint 'help to avert reintroduction of the Chinese troops in Tibet'. The Tibetan government should invite army instructors and import weapons only from Russia, and its mining and natural resources can be worked only with Russian permission. It allowed Russia and Britain to open branches of their State banks. Finally, it envisaged the developments of communications with Russia and the use of Russian banknotes, etc.⁸

In his letter to the Tsar, the Dalai Lama informed him about Tibet's declaration of independence. He wrote that the British had a vested interest in Tibet remaining under Chinese control and therefore feared 'a possible invasion of Tibet by Chinese, Bhutanese, and Nepalese troops ... with Britain's consent before we are prepared for armed resistance'. This, he thought, 'would make it possible for the Chinese to interfere in our affairs and bring to nought what has been gained by bloody struggle'. Therefore, he requested the Russian Tsar to: (1) help establish friendly relations between Tibet and Britain and to patronize and recognize Tibet's independence by Russia and Britain; (2) let Russia and Britain despatch their diplomatic representatives to Lhasa; (3) sell weapons and send their military instructors, etc.⁹ It was obvious that it was difficult for Tibet to rid itself of its traditional fear of the British. Russia however was still regarded by the Dalai Lama as a distant but kindly neighbour that aroused no apprehensions.

The second note from Dorjjeff's and the personal letter from the Dalai Lama were also given for examination to the Russian foreign minister. On 25 April 1913, in a secret letter to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers V.N. Kokovtsov, Sazonov formulated the basis of Russian diplomacy on the Tibetan question in the changed conditions of early 1913. He wrote, *inter alia*, that

our interests in Tibet are greatly limited and are based exclusively on the fact of the Russian Kalmyks and Buryats professing Lamaism headed by the Dalai Lama. But the great distance of Tibet from Russia and the difficult communications between that country and Russia never permitted the establishment of close connections between our Lamaists and the Tibetan high priest.

Sazonov was apprehensive of strengthening that contact which 'may only lead to the emergence of separatist tendencies among our Buddhist subjects'. Such a stand was linked with the apprehension that the Russian Buddhist subjects might use the experience of the struggle for the independence of the Mongolians and Tibetans from the central power in Peking which might create a threat to the integrity of the Russian empire.

Sazonov went on to say that 'in contrast to Russia, Britain through her Indian possessions is contiguous to Tibet, has trade relations and has concluded a series of international acts with China on Tibet'. The minister recalled that the essence of the Agreement signed in 1907 with Britain on Tibet 'is to recognize Tibet as a Chinese territory,

and for both Russia and Britain, to abandon any attempt to include this territory in the sphere of their exclusive influence. Thus, we, to the detriment of no serious Russian interests, 'restricted the British in Tibet'. Hence, the Russian minister did not consider it advisable to revise this Agreement as 'Britain strove only to widen her sphere of influence and restrict Russian influence in Tibet'. Then he said that a revision would be possible only if the British 'give us compensation in other regions'. Nevertheless, the initiative to hold negotiations of that kind should come from the British government', Sazonov insisted.¹⁰

Thus, the Russian authorities in mid-1913, restricted the interests of their country in Tibet only to a wish to facilitate contacts between Russian Lamaists and their religious head, but specified that it should not intensify separatist tendencies among them. Russia, abandoning all political interests in Tibet, at the same time recognized British political and trade interests, activation of which were limited by the terms of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement recognizing China's suzerain rights in Tibet. However, the situation in comparison to that of 1907, had changed. After the Chinese troops had been ousted the suzerain power of the Peking government in Tibet was practically nonexistent. In these conditions, Russia, as viewed by the foreign ministry, could declare her readiness not only to refuse to participate any further in deciding Tibet's fate, but to revise the terms of the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907, to give Britain special rights and privileges in Tibet, true not out of pure magnanimity but on condition that there was a quid pro quo in other parts of Asia (more important to Russia from the military-strategic and economic point of view), for instance in Afganistan.

BRITAIN AND CHINA IN TIBET EN ROUTE TO THE SHIMLA CONFERENCE OF 1913-14

In August 1912, the government of Great Britain instructed its envoy in Peking, Jordan, 'to notify the Chinese government that by acknowledging the suzerain rights of China, Britain has disclaimed its rights to unilaterally and actively interfere in the administration of Tibet, as it goes against Article I, of the 1906 Convention'. Therefore Britain refuses to agree to the filling of the administrative posts in Tibet with the Chinese and disagrees with the Yuan Shih-kai's doctrine

to confer on Tibet the status of a Chinese province. The British government objects to the increase of the contingents of Chinese troops in Tibet and Lhasa and considers it necessary to obtain 'written Anglo-Chinese Agreement on this issue'. Meanwhile, the Cabinet in London notified 'the discontinuation of communications between Tibet and China through India with the exception of the withdrawal of the troops back to China'.¹

According to Krupensky, in a letter dated 25 August, this declaration by the British government was received in Peking with 'unconcealed irritation'. The British Envoy in Peking, Jordan, explained that actually the London demands mean only 'to secure the existing status quo in Tibet, based on the treaties between Britain and China'. These demands were a condition for the recognition by Great Britain of the new republican government of China.²

In connection with this condition, the world press expressed apprehension that Great Britain would be followed by Russia, Japan and France, who would demand separate agreements regarding Mongolia, Manchuria, and Yun-nan. *The Frankfurter Zeitung* on 5 September 1912, wrote that the recognition issue 'should be decided not on the basis of concrete motives, but depending upon the legal capability of the new regime'. The London newspaper *London and China Telegraph* sought to explain that Britain's only wish 'is to preserve the calm and quiet in Tibet, and not support the aspirations of the Tibetans to get rid of the suzerainty of China ... she is compelled to insist on the observance of the Treaties signed with both China and Tibet'.³

Only in December 1912 did the Chinese government respond to the August declaration of the British government. In a telegram of 13 December Krupensky reported that 'according to the British envoy, their reply is absolutely unsatisfactory and makes the situation very difficult; the more so as the Chinese were acting aggressively both on the Tibetan border and even in the direction of Assam'.⁴

As regards the Anglo-Indian press, the Russian Consul-General in Shimla, Nabokov, kept a close eye on it. According to his information, governmental circles object to the more active action in Tibet, to the extent of the signature of a new treaty to replace the Lhasa Convention of 1904, and the despatch of a British Resident to Tibet. This amounted 'to the renunciation of the 1907 Convention'.

Hence, Nabokov wrote, 'it is considered more reasonable to try to convince China that any 'punitive' expeditions would only be

detrimental, and that the Dalai Lama and his Advisory Council should be given full power and to retain the Amban as the representative of the sovereignty of China'. However, Nabokov himself believed that a compromise of this kind was hardly possible, since 'protesting against the augmentation of the Chinese troops in Tibet if new detachments with "punitive" functions are brought in, would make it necessary to take more stringent measures to protect the "oppressed" Tibetans'. If the British were themselves 'compelled' to take such measures, then 'they will gain greater influence and advantage in Lhasa than those envisaged in the 1904 Lhasa Convention'.⁵

Nabokov believed that 'it was hardly probable that the British had taken such an active and expensive part in settling the Lhasa crisis and pulling out the Chinese soldiers to their native land, exclusively motivated by compassion and ideological sympathy for Tibet's independence'. In his cable dated 6/19 October 1912, he wrote that 'the broader their activities are, the greater will be their desire to reap more fruits, and it will be more difficult to repudiate their right to compensation for their philanthropic sacrifices'.⁶

Indeed, it was hardly possible to suspect the highly experienced British colonial authorities of unselfishness: they, no doubt, had calculated that strengthening their position in that strategic region was important to the security of the Indian frontiers, particularly taking into account the intensified expansion of the Chinese on the north-eastern frontiers of India and Burma. Nabokov believed that it was the right moment for Russia 'to come to an agreement with Great Britain once and for all, and perhaps by recognizing her preferential interests in Tibet, to make headway in achieving more urgent political advantages in other regions where our interests are contiguous to those of Britain'.⁷

In December 1912, the Anglo-Indian authorities were informed about Dorjjeff's negotiations in Mongolia and the continuation of Russo-Tibetan contacts. Nabokov reported that the press close to government circles asserted that 'the government of Great Britain cannot permit making Tibet a 'joint protectorate of Russia and Britain'. They had noted that Russian interests in Tibet were 'trifling', whereas the 'long border forced Britain to be seriously concerned about the fate of Tibet both in the political field, and for the sake of the trade interests'. The future of Tibet, Nabokov asserted, 'depends on London and Peking'. Dorjjeff's wish to involve Mongolia is facetious because by doing so Russian diplomacy would be invited to

take part in negotiations, which neither Britain nor China can allow'. Nabokov was convinced that they would prefer 'to discuss the controversial issues on Tibet without anybody's interference, however difficult their decision is'. *The Times* (London), as reported by the Russian Consul, considered it necessary to send a British resident to Lhasa and, in its opinion, this would be done: 'the British would not want the Chinese troops to be sent packing, to construct roads, and to detain any "suspicious" person, coming to Lhasa'. The recognition by Russia of Britain's right to penetrate into Tibet would now have the character not of a forced recognition of the fact but of a voluntary concession 'compensated' by the 'rights where we need them more, for instance on the Afghan border'. One should not lose the favourable opportunity to revise simultaneously the Afghan and Tibetan articles of the Agreement: 'We will lose in Tibet and will gain nothing from Britain in Afghanistan', Nabokov asserted. He also thought that the recognition of some control of Britain over Tibet 'for the sake of protecting the borders and her indisputably broad trade interests, should not shake the prestige of the Eastern Pope in the eyes of his Russian congregation'.⁸

The government of Great Britain did not categorically oppose the idea of sending a British resident to Tibet, but believed that Article III of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement stood in the way of this being implemented.⁹ British Indian government circles also claimed that India's real interests were sacrificed for 'the principle of suzerainty' recognized in Article II of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. It is known, however, that the suzerainty was now no more 'than a mere empty phrase'.¹⁰ Therefore, Nabokov asserted, in the view of the Indian government, it was still early to send an official Resident to Lhasa but the attempt should be to 'secretly and cautiously force "peaceful penetration" into south-west Tibet, and raise the question of sending a representative to Lhasa, which means revision of the agreement with Russia, only when the ground is fully laid'.¹¹

The government of Great Britain was faced with the necessity of deciding on its future policy in relation to Tibet, taking into account the entire gamut of political, strategic, trade, economic, and religious interests. It was interested in ensuring the security of the Indian frontiers and guaranteeing Britain's trade interests in Tibet. It was important for London to consolidate its positions in that strategically important region in Central Asia and also in order to exert, if necessary, influence on the new Republican government by recourse to the

Tibetan question. At the same time, the British government did not want to violate the Articles of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, so as not to strain its relations with Russia in the context of the aggravation of the contradictions of the two countries with Germany and the necessity to strengthen the Entente. The British government decided to summon an Anglo-Tibeto-Chinese conference on the Tibetan issue, which was reported in a special Memorandum to the Russian government in May 1913. Along with this, it was also stated that the British Government 'is continuing to consider as the best policy for Tibet the beginning of international non-interference in its internal affairs'. In response to the Memorandum, the Russian minister of external affairs expressed the hope that

negotiations undertaken on Great Britain's initiative, would remove the uncertainty and favourably appease all sides. The Russian government would with interest await the promised information about the course of the negotiations, in the belief that Britain's participation in them would ensure that no decisions concerning the principles of the Agreement named above might be taken without the knowledge of the Imperial government.¹²

The British government, however, declared that it did not intend to inform the Russian government about the course of the Anglo-Tibetan-Chinese negotiations, but at the same time, acknowledged Russia's preferential interests in Mongolia. In mid-October 1913, the 'Tripartite Conference' opened in Shimla, marking the commencement of a new stage in British and Chinese policy towards Tibet.

Thus, availing themselves of the Chinese revolution, which weakened Peking's power in its outlying possessions, Russia and Britain, without any revision of the terms of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, divided between themselves the spheres of interests in the regions that had been under Chinese control. Russia received preferential rights in Mongolia and Britain in Tibet. The prospect of Russia receiving as 'compensation' for Tibet the regions more important for her, e.g. the Afghan border, was not fulfilled. Less than a year after the beginning of the Shimla conference, World War I broke out in the European Continent and its short-term and long-term consequences changed the entire world system.

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38. S. Turner, *An Account of an Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama*, London, 1800.
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40. G. Bonvalo, *Unknown Asia: Journey to Tibet*, Tashkent, 1897; Sarat Chandra Das, *Journey to Lhasa and Central Tibet*, London, 1902; V. MacGovern, *Pereodetye v Lhasu*, M-L., 1924; A. Landor, *Na Zapretnom puti*; M-L., 1924; W. Rockhill, *Diary of a Journey through Mongolia and Tibet in 1891 and 1892*, Washington, 1894; E. Teichman, *Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet*, Cambridge, 1922; E. Kawaguchi, *Three Years in Tibet*, London, 1909; E. Candler, *The Unveiling of Lhasa*, London, 1905, etc.
41. For the text of the Convention, see H. Richardson, *op. cit.*, p. 249.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 250–1.
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 251–3.
45. A. Waddell, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
46. National Archives of India (henceforth NAI), 1899, Government of India, Foreign Department, From April 1899, No. 93–139, Docs 100, 97.

47. Ibid., Docs 103–4
48. A. Waddell, op. cit., p. 28.
49. NAI, Aug. 1899, Doc. 57.
50. Ibid.
51. A. Waddell, op. cit., p. 48.
52. It must be said that the London authorities considered Curzon's attempt to embark on a personal correspondence with the Dalai Lama as a rather rash step.
53. P. Fleming, *Bayonets to Lhasa*, New York, 1961, p. 21.

II. THE FAR-EASTERN AND TIBET POLICIES OF RUSSIAN TSARISM

1. A. Lamb, *Britain and Chinese Central Asia*, London, 1960, p. 61
2. See F. Younghusband, *India and Tibet*, London, 1910, p. 291
3. A.M. Pozdneyev, *Mongolian Reader for Elementary Teaching*, St Petersburg, 1900.
4. A.M. Pozdneyev, *Tale about a Journey in the Tibetan Land of the Malo-Dorbot Baza-Bakshi*, St Petersburg, 1897, p. iii.
5. P.K. Kozlov, 'The Dalai Lama of Tibet', *Historical Bulletin*, vol. 107, 1907; *Tibet and Dalai Lama*, Petrograd, 1920; *Three Years of Travelling across Mongolia and Tibet*, St Petersburg, 1913; 'The British Expedition in Tibet', *Historical Bulletin*, 1907, vol. 109.
6. G.S. Tsybikov, *Buddhist Pilgrim in Tibet's Sanctuaries*, Petrograd, 1919.
7. *Za kulisamy czarisma (Behind the Scene of Tsarism)*, Archives of Tibetan Doctor Badmayev, Leningrad, 1925, p. iii
8. Ibid., p. iv.
9. Ibid., pp. 49–75.
10. Ibid., p. 78. Report of the Finance Minister S. Witte to Alexander II regarding Badmayev's Report.
11. Ibid., p. 105. Report to Nicholas II about his visit to China and Mongolia, 15 Jan. 1897.
12. Ibid., pp. 23–24. Report of S. Witte to Nicholas II, 3 May 1896.
13. B.A. Romanov, *Ocherki diplomaticheskoy istorii pussko-yaponskoy voyny (Notes of the Diplomatic History of the Russo-Japanese War)*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1955, p. 296.
14. Materials from Dorjjeff's Autobiography were used in this section. AVPRI, Chinese Desk, File 1448, pp. 162–7.
15. Ibid., pp. 162–3.
16. Ibid., p. 163.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 164.
19. Ibid., pp. 16–7.
20. Ibid., p. 26.
21. Ibid., p. 7.
22. Ibid., p. 19.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 20.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 35.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 21. Dispatch from official envoy A.M. Shchekin deputed by the Foreign Office to meet the Tibetan envoy.
26. The Russian Vice-consul in Colombo Shneider reported that in May 1901 a person called on the consulate and said that he was one of the seven Russian Buryats who had come from India. At the time Shneider was absent from the office. The consulate made confidential inquiries and found that the seven men lived in an Indian hotel posing as Nepalese. Realizing that the Buryats had some reason to conceal their Buryati origin, Shneider decided not to contact them in order not to arouse the suspicions of the British authorities. Only on 18 May 1901, when a ship, *Tambou*, arrived at Colombo, did Shneider meet the leader of the group, Dorjjeff, and his interpreter Ovshe Norzunoff, who told him that they were on a mission from the Dalai Lama to the Russian Tsar and sought assistance. Shneider immediately ordered that all members of the mission be taken aboard the ship. On 18 May 1901 the Vice-Consul telegraphed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and requested them to allow the members of the Mission to pass through Odessa as some of them had no passports. (*Ibid.*, pp. 38–40.) In response to Shneider's request, the Foreign Office asked the ministries of finance and home affairs to allow the members of the Mission and their luggage in the *Tambou* to pass through the customs (*ibid.*, pp. 41–4).

At Nicholas II's personal order an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A.M. Shchekin, was dispatched to Odessa to meet and escort the members of the Tibetan mission.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 39–40. It turned out that the Mission had left Tibet on 2 March 1901. Its members had ridden on horseback to the Tibetan border town of Niapan, travelled on foot for eight days through Nepal, and reached Yamdo. To go to India they had to have special tickets which were issued only when the owner of the flat in which they were living guaranteed that the travellers would return. For such a document, the Tibetans had to leave some of their belongings in the flat as security. In the tickets they were described as pilgrims who should be let through without delay after careful examination of their papers. For every hundred rupees they possessed, they had to pay five rupees as customs duty. After walking for nearly eight hours the members of the Mission boarded a train at Ragapur from where, after six days, they reached Tuteguren; there they boarded a ship and after twelve hours reached Colombo. The Tibetans succeeded in posing as Nepalese pilgrims and it appeared to them that they had avoided arousing the suspicions of the British authorities. (p. 52.)
28. Fund Chinese desk, file 1448, p. 54.
29. *Odesskiye Novosti*, 16 June 1901; *Novoye Vremya*, 15, 16 June 1901.
30. *Novoye Vremya*, 16 June 1901.
31. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1448, pp. 63–4. Maintenance of the dignitaries in Odessa cost 452 roubles 40 kopecs (*ibid.*, pp. 68, 87).
32. *Novoye Vremya*, 18 June 1901.
33. *Ibid.*, 19, 22 June 1901.

34. *Ibid.*, 20 June 1901.
35. The Tibetan officials referred to are Lubsang Kainchok and Djantsang Piunchok.
36. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1448, p. 70.
37. *Novoye Vremya*, 24 June 1901.
38. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1448, p. 99.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
40. *Novoye Vremya*, 27, 28 June, 2, 3, 5 July 1901.
41. *Ibid.*
42. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1448, p. 100.
43. *Ibid.*, file 1443, p. 108
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Novoye Vremya*, 12, 19 July 1901.
48. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1448, p. 146.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 185–6
51. V. Baraev, 'Nerushimiy Utyes' (Indestructible Cliff), *Buddhism*, no 1, 1992, pp. 20–1
52. A.S. Suvorin, *Diary, Moscow-Petrograd, 1923*, pp. 223, 235, 324, etc.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 225.

Press Reports on Russia's Secret Treaties with China and Tibet, and British Reactions

1. A. Lamb, *Britain and Chinese Central Asia*; London, 1960, p. 268.
2. *Ibid.*
3. National Archives of India (henceforth NAI) Feb. 1903, no. 1–88. Doc. 46
4. *Ibid.*, Feb. 1903, no. 1–88, Doc. 73
5. *Ibid.*
6. A. Lamb, *op.cit.*, p. 269.
7. NAI, Feb., 1903, no. 1–88, Doc. 26.
8. Papers relating to Tibet, Cd 1920, 1904, p. 141.
9. NAI, Feb. 1903, no. 1–88, Doc. 37
10. *Ibid.*, Doc. 54.
11. A. Hamilton, *Problems of the Middle East*, London, 1909, pp. 216–7.
12. NAI, Feb. 1903, no. 1–88, Doc. 55.
13. A. Lamb, *op. cit.*, p. 270.
14. NAI, Feb. 1903, no. 1–88, Docs. 55, 76.
15. *Ibid.*, Doc 58.
16. A. Lamb, *op. cit.*, p. 170.
17. NAI, Feb. 1903, no. 1–88, Doc. 58.
18. A. Lamb, *op. cit.*, p. 271.
19. NAI, Feb. 1903, no. 1–88, Doc. 77.
20. A. Lamb, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

The Question of the Establishment of a Russian Consulate in Kandin (Da-Tszin-Lu)

1. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1449, list 4–5, Lamsdorff-Nicholas II, 27 June 1901.
2. *Ibid.*, file no. 1448, list 187–8. Information from Dorjjeff about the situation in Da-tszin-Lu, Report, 10 Dec. 1901.
3. *Ibid.*, file no. 1449, list 16.
4. *Ibid.*, file no. 1449, list 17.
5. *Ibid.*, file no. 1448, list 187–8.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, list 188. Dorjjeff believed that it was necessary for the Russian Agent to have an assistant, a clerk, and that the Tibetan government should provide him with a servant, messenger, etc. As food and lodging in Kandin were not expensive, the maintenance of the Agent would cost 2000 roubles a year and for the clerk 1000 roubles (*Ibid.*, file no. 1449, list 5).
8. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1448, list 168: Consul in Urga to Gartvig, 14 Aug. 1900.
9. *Ibid.*
10. It was probably that discussion that led to Hardinge's report to the foreign office.
11. *Ibid.*, file no. 1449, list 30.
12. *Ibid.*, list 31: Memorandum regarding the question of sending Buddu Rabdanov to Da-tszin-Lu (Kandin).
13. *Ibid.*, file no. 1449, list 31–32.
14. *Ibid.*, list 50, Dolbezheff from Urga, 11 Jan. 1903.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid.*, file no. 1449, list 62. It cannot be ruled out that rumours about Rabdanov's journey reached the British intelligence service.
17. *Ibid.*, list 62.
18. *Ibid.*, list 75–81.
19. *Ibid.*, list 77.
20. *Ibid.*, file no. 1449, list 78.
21. *Ibid.*, list 87.
22. *Ibid.*, list 95–96.
23. *Ibid.*, list 117.
24. *Ibid.*, file no. 1449, list 117.
25. *Ibid.*, list 93. secret teleg.: Timchenko-Ostroverkhoo, from Hankow, 31 Jan. 1904.
26. *Ibid.*, list 118.
27. *Ibid.*, list 121.
28. *Ibid.*, file no. 1449, list 121.
29. *Ibid.*, list 119.
30. *Ibid.*, list 122.
31. *Ibid.*, list 123.
32. *Ibid.*, file no. 1449, list 125.
33. *Ibid.*, lists 128–52.
34. *Ibid.*, list 153.

35. *Ibid.*, list 126, Lessar from Peking, 16/29 Jan. 1905; list 159, Lyuba from Urga, 15 June 1905.
36. *Behind the Scenes of Tsarism (Za kulisami tsarizma)*, p. 110.
37. *Ibid.*
38. S.Yu. Witte. *Reminiscences*, vols. 1–3, Moscow, 1960.

III. RUSSIA'S 'THREAT TO INDIA' AND LORD CURZON

1. NAI, Jan. 1901, no. 80–95. Doc. 90.
 2. *Ibid.*, Doc. 95.
 3. A. Lamb, *Britain and Chinese Central Asia*, London, 1960, p. 225.
 4. Lord Ronaldshay, *The Life of Lord Curzon*, London, 1928, vol. II, p. 205.
 5. A. Lamb, *op.cit.*, p. 260.
 6. Lord Ronaldshay, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 205.
 7. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
 8. A. Lamb, *op. cit.*, p. 225.
 9. AVPRI, Fund Central Asian desk, file no. 915, list 58.
 10. A. Lamb, *op. cit.*, p. 256.
 11. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1448, list 112.
 12. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Papers relating to Tibet, Cd 1920, p. 116.
 13. *Ibid.*
 14. Papers relating to Tibet, Cd 1920, p. 117.
 15. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
 16. A. Lamb, *op.cit.*, p. 256.
 17. Lord Ronaldshay, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 207.
 18. A. Lamb, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 258.
- Curzon believed that Britain's diplomatic failure was one of the most significant outcomes of the transfer of political functions to the local administrations (in this case of Bengal), who were incompetent and inexperienced and lacked the staff to do such work. The British intelligence service suffered a serious setback and it was necessary to prevent in future such things as Dorjief's mission. Curzon therefore thought it urgent to personally take full control of Anglo-Tibetan relations, demanding that all information from the border reached him without delay. (NAI, July 1901, no. 81–6, Docs 82–4.)
19. A. Lamb, *op. cit.*, p. 262.
 20. AVPRI, Fund Central Asia desk, file no. 920, list 81.
 21. *Ibid.*
 22. A. Lamb, *op. cit.*, p. 276.
 23. *Ibid.*
 24. *Ibid.*
 25. *Amrita Bazaar Patrika*, 3 Dec. 1902.
 26. P. Fleming, *Bayonets to Lhasa*, New York, 1961, p. 55.
 27. NAI, Feb. 1903, no. 1–88, Doc. 61.
 28. A. Lamb, *op. cit.*, p. 275.
 29. *Ibid.*, p. 276.

30. NAI, Feb.1903, no. 1-88, Doc. 82, Papers relating to Tibet, Cd 1920, pp. 150-3.
31. A. Woddell, *Lhasa and Its Monasteries*, London, 1906, pp. 37-8.
32. NAI, April 1903. no. 130-72, Doc.145, Enc. 1.
33. Papers relating to Tibet, Cd 1920, p. 179.
34. NAI, April 1903, no. 130-72, Doc. 142, Enc. 2.
35. Ibid., Doc. 145. Enc.3.
36. Lord Ronaldshay, op. cit., vol. II, p. 275.
37. NAI, April 1903. no. 130-72, Doc. 131.
38. Ibid, Doc. 132.
39. Lord Ronaldshay, op. cit., vol. II, p. 275.
40. F. Younghusband, *India and Tibet*, London, 1904, p. 75.
41. NAI, April 1903, no. 130-72, Doc. 142.
42. Ibid, Doc. 149.
43. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1455, lists 37-8.
44. NAI, July 1903, no. 38-95. Doc. 42.
45. Ibid., no 130-72, Doc.164.
46. Ibid., Docs. 169, 170.
47. F. Younghusband, op. cit., p. 82.
48. NAI, April 1903, no. 130-72, Doc. 130.
49. Ibid., July 1903, no. 38-95, Doc. 41.
50. Ibid., April 1902, no. 130-72, Doc. 170.
51. Ibid., July 1903, no. 38-95, Doc 43.
52. Ibid., Doc. 44.
53. Ibid., July 1903, no. 38-95, Doc. 46.
54. Ibid., Doc. 48.
55. Ibid., July 1903, no. 38-95, Doc. 49.
56. Ibid., Doc. 55.
57. Ibid., Doc. 77.
58. Ibid., Doc. 55.
59. Ibid., July 1903. no. 38-95, Doc. 69.
60. Ibid., Nov. 1903, no. 118-58, Doc. 129, Enc.1
61. Ibid., Doc. 139.
62. Ibid., July 1903, no. 38-95, Docs. 56, 58, 67, 79.
63. Ibid., Nov.1903, no. 118-58, Doc.152.
64. Ibid., Nov.1903, no. 118-58, Doc. 155.
65. Ibid., Doc. 137.
66. Ibid., July 1903, no. 38-95, Doc. 66. Enc.1.
67. F. Younghusband, op. cit., p. 82.
68. NAI, Nov.1903, no 118-58. Doc. 152.
69. P. Fleming, *Bayonets to Lhasa*, p. 82.
70. NAI, Nov. 1903, no. 118-58, Doc. 155.
71. Ibid., Nov. 1903, no. 159-234, Doc. 66.
72. Ibid., Nov. 1903, no.118-58. Doc. 127.
73. Ibid., Nov. 1903. no. 159-234, Doc. 174.
74. Ibid., Doc 186, Enc.
75. Ibid., Doc. 194.
76. Ibid., Nov. 1903, no. 159-234, Doc. 201.

77. Ibid., Doc. 207.
78. Ibid., Doc. 223.
79. Ibid., Doc. 224.
80. Ibid., Doc. 226.

British Invasion into Tibet of 1903-4 and Russia's Attitude

1. For details about the British intervention in Tibet see the works of the Russian, Indian, and European authors, among them: V.P. Leontiev, *The Foreign Expansion in Tibet, 1888-1919*, Moscow, 1956; F. Younghusband, *India and Tibet*, London, John Murray, 1910; P. Mehra, *The Younghusband Expedition, An Interpretation*, Asia, 1968; B. Nand, *British India and Tibet*, Oxford & IBH Pub. Co., New Delhi, 1975; S. Ghosh, *Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations, 1899-1914*, Sterling, New Delhi, 1977; A. Lamb, *Britain and Chinese Central Asia*, London, 1960; H. Richardson, *Tibet and its History*, London, 1962; Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History*, Potala Publications, New York, 1984; P. Hopkirk, *The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia*, John Murray, London, 1990.
2. NAI, July 1904, no. 483-619, Doc. 534b.
3. Ibid., Feb. 1904, no. 208-59, Doc. 225.
4. Ibid., Doc. 245, Enc. 1.
5. Ibid., Feb. 1904, no. 208-59, Doc. 244, Enc. 3.
6. Ibid., Feb. 1904, no. 208-59, Doc. 245, Enc. 5.
7. Ibid., Doc. 245, Enc. 4.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., Doc. 227, Enc. 1, Doc. 228.
10. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1456, list 36.
11. Wai Chiao Pao, 10 April 1904, Shanghai, NAI, July 1904, no. 483-619, Doc. 584, Enc.
12. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1456, list 36.
13. Wai Chiao Pao, op. cit.
14. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1450, list 2: Lessar's teleg. from Peking, 2. XII, 1903.
15. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1450, lists 131-2.
16. Ibid., lists 135-6
17. See A. Popov, *Russia and Tibet*, 'New East' ('Novy Vostok'), vol. 18, 1927, p. 109
18. NAI, Feb. 1904, no. 208-59, Docs. 209, 227, 228.
19. Ibid., July 1904, no. 258-387, Docs. 300, 301, 317, 322; Feb. 1904, no. 208-59, Doc. 216; July 1904, no. 483-619, Docs. 486, 496, etc.
20. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1451, list 6.
21. V.M. Khvostov, *The History of Diplomacy*, vol. II, pp. 543-4, Moscow, 1963.
22. NAI, July 1904, no. 258-387, Doc. 350.
23. Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, vol. II, London, 1908. Ch. 48, 'Anglo-French Agreement', pp. 389-91.
24. See A. Popov, *Russia and Tibet*, 'New East', vol. 18, 1927, p. 113.
25. NAI, July 1904, no. 483-619, Doc. 534.
26. Ibid., July 1904, no. 483-619, Doc. 534a.

27. Ibid., July 1904, no. 483–619, Doc. 534b.
28. *British Documents on the Origin of the War. 1898–1914*, London, 1927, vol. II, no. 417, pp. 404–5.
29. NAI, July 1904, no. 483–619, Doc. 534b.
30. Ibid., July 1904, no. 483–619, Doc. 587, Enc. 1, Doc. 588
31. Ibid., Doc. 587.
32. Ibid., Sep. 1904, no. 102–94, Doc. 102.
33. A. Popov, *Russia and Tibet*, 'New East', vol. 18, 1927, pp. 118–9.
34. NAI, July 1904, no. 483–619, Doc. 389.
35. Ibid., Sep. 1904, no. 102–94, Doc. 127.
36. Ibid., July 1904, no. 258–387, Doc. 284, Enc.
37. Ibid., Doc. 310.
38. Ibid., Doc. 383.
39. Ibid., July 1904, no. 483–619, Doc. 497, 508.
40. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no 1451, lists 33–4; the secret report of Nekrasov, Bombay, 2 June 1904, NAI, July 1904, no. 483–619, Doc. 508
41. NAI, July 1904, no. 258–387, Docs. 380, 264.
42. Ibid., Doc. 380.
43. Ibid., July 1904, no. 483–619, Doc. 491.
44. Ibid., July 1904, no. 258–387, Doc. 277.
45. Ibid., July 1904, no. 483–619, Doc. 536.
46. Ibid., Doc. 563.
47. Ibid., Doc. 564.
48. Ibid., Sep. 1904, no. 102–94, Doc. 130. Enc.
49. Ibid., Sep. 1904, no. 102–94, Doc. 130.
50. Ibid., July 1904, no. 483–619, Doc. 609.
51. Ibid., Sep. 1904, no. 102–94, Doc. 145.
52. Ibid., Doc. 192, Enc 1.
53. Ibid., Sep. 1904, no. 103–94, Enc. 2.
54. Ibid., Doc. 192, Enc. 2.
55. Ibid., Sep. 1904, no. 102–94, Doc. 141, Enc.
56. Ibid., Doc. 142, 143.
57. Ibid., Doc. 165.
58. Ibid., Doc. 184, 189.
- 59a. A. Woddell, *Lhasa and its Mysteries*, pp. 500–1.
59. Ibid., pp. 414–5.
60. Ibid., p. 418
61. Text of the Convention, see: H. Richardson, *Tibet and its History*, Oxford University Press, London, 1962, pp. 253–6.
62. C. Bell in his work *Tibet: Past and Present* pointed out in particular, that having recognized Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, the British government questioned the legality of the Lhasa Convention as it did not bear the signature of the legitimate representatives of Tibet or the Chinese Resident. This Convention could be compared with a kind of 'new treaty signed with the France by the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Chief of the Council of London County', i.e. persons not authorized by their governments, pp. 287–9, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924.

63. B. Nand, *British India and Tibet*, Oxford, and IBH Publishing Co., New Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta, 1975, New Delhi, 1975, pp. 86–7
64. NAI, Sep. 1906, no. 373–425A, Doc. 397, Enc.
65. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1451, list 77–9: Sazonov's teleg. from London, 17/30 Sep. 1904.
66. *Ibid.*
67. A. Popov, 'New East', no. 20–1, p. 35.
68. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1451, list 61: secret teleg. from Lessar, Peking, 7/20 Sep. 1904.
69. *Ibid.*, file no. 1451, list 112, Lamsdorff to ambassador in London, 25 July 1905; Memorandum of the British government, 20 Sep. 1905, about Tibet.
70. *Ibid.*, lists 116–7.
71. NAI, March 1905, no. 19–44, Doc. 36.
72. *Ibid.*, Docs. 34, 19.
73. For text of the Convention, see H. Richardson, *ibid.*, pp. 256–8.
74. NAI, Sep. 1906, no. 373–425 A., Doc. 408 A.
75. *The Far East Review (Dalnevostochnoye Obozrenie)*, 1910, p. 11.
76. NAI, Sep. 1906, no. 272–425 A., Doc. 396.
77. *Ibid.*, Doc. 422.

IV. THE DALAI LAMA'S SOJOURN IN MONGOLIA AS GAUGED THROUGH RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY

1. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1454, list 15.
2. *Ibid.*, list 14.
3. *Ibid.*, file no. 1454, list 90–1.
4. *Ibid.*, list 92.
5. *Ibid.*, lists 20–1.
6. *Ibid.*, file no. 1454, list 23.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, lists 90–1
9. *Ibid.*, list 71. The Russian consul-general in Urga, Lyuba, believed that the Dalai Lama's principal reason for fleeing to Mongolia was Dorjjeff's influence. According to Lyuba, the other Lamas had scarcely 'sympathized with this decision'. 'At present', Lyuba wrote, 'Agvan Dorjjeff is the closest and most trusted man of the Dalai Lama, but at the same time this closeness and the Dalai Lama's readiness to obey Dorjjeff's advice placed him in a very dangerous position in his relations with the Chinese and the local Mongolians' (AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1454, list 62).
10. *Ibid.*, file no. 1454, list 61, Report of Lyuba from Urga 29.11.1904. It must be said that the Dalai Lama was somewhat anxious because the consular officials at Urga were comparatively reticent and particularly because not the Consul but his secretary met him on his arrival in Urga. He requested the appointment of a Russian official to him to conduct negotiations, undertake office work, etc., but it was explained that the 'restraint' of the Russian officials was due to their desire to guard the Dalai Lama against any unfavourable actions on the

- part of the Chinese who were wary of any contact between the Dalai Lama and Russia. Serious unpleasantness might therefore result if the Russians appointed an official of their's to assist the Dalai Lama, (AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1455, list 38; secret teleg. from Leut.-Gen. Nadarov to the Gov.-Gen. of the Far East Alekseev, referring to the Chief of the Selenginsk Uyezd [region] who had met the Dalai Lama. list 41, Lessar from Peking, 19.1.1905).
11. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1454, list 85: secret teleg. from Lessar in Peking, 13 Dec.1904.
 12. *Ibid.*, list 21.
 13. *Ibid.*, list 82; secret teleg. from Lyuba, Urga, 9 Dec.1904.
 14. In Peking, the Mongolian representatives attempted in a roundabout way to seek Lessar's advice on how they should treat the Dalai Lama. Lessar explained that 'the Dalai Lama will always be honoured by our side as the head of the Buddhist religion, but in the present political situation it is inopportune to raise any questions. Haste or a small aggravation of the situation may be disastrous to the Dalai Lama.' (AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1454, list 30, secret teleg. from Lessar in Peking, 29 Oct. 1904).
 15. *Ibid.*, file no. 1454, lists 33–4: Khitrovo's note 'About the Dalai Lama and His Activities', 14 July 1906.
 16. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1454, list 64: secret teleg. from Lyuba, 24 Nov.1904.
 17. *Ibid.*, list 75.
 18. *Ibid.*, list 51.
 19. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1454, list 73: Instructions of the envoy in Peking to the Consul in Urga, 15 Dec. 1904.
 20. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1455, list 75.
 21. *Ibid.*
 22. *Ibid.*, list 74.
 23. *Ibid.*, file 1454, list 74: Lyuba to Lessar, 30.12.1904.
 24. *Ibid.*, file 1454, list 36.
 25. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file no. 1454, list 46.
 26. *Ibid.*, file 1454, list 44.
 27. *Ibid.*
 28. *Ibid.*, file 1454, list 62.
 29. *Ibid.*, list 60.
 30. See the text.
 31. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1454, list 60.
 32. *Ibid.*, list 69.
 33. *Ibid.* Despite the notification, both Lyuba and Lessar continued to worry that Dorjieff and Iroltuev might 'spoil the affair'. According to them Iroltuev was at that time really dangerous since he aspired to persuade the Dalai Lama to go to Selenginsk and receive Russian subsidies (*ibid.*, lists 50, 86).

The Question of the Dalai Lama's Passage to Russia

1. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1455, list 40.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*, list 29.

4. Ibid., list 78.
5. Ibid., file 1455, list 29.
6. Ibid., list 88.
7. Ibid., list 29.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid., file 1454, list 51.
10. Ibid., list 85.
11. Ibid., file 1455, list 30.
12. Ibid., list 68.
13. Ibid., list 91. This attitude of the Chinese government towards Lessar could probably be accounted for by their knowledge that Russia would be virtually in no position to assist Tibet; on 15 Jan. 1905, Port Arthur fell and the revolutionary movements got underway.
14. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1455, list 88.
15. Ibid., list 82.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., file 1455, lists 93–4.
18. Ibid., list 102.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., list 111.
21. Ibid., list 124.
22. Ibid., list 130.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., list 117.
25. Ibid., list 118. Kozakov from Peking, 20 April 1905; Lyuba from Urga, 1/14 May 1905.
26. Ibid., list 151. All the advisers to the Dalai Lama, barring Dorjjeff, believed that the high priest's trip to Russia would result in a split with the Chinese government (ibid., list 150). Dorjjeff was afraid to return to Tibet without the Dalai Lama because the Chinese authorities and a majority of Tibetans were ill-disposed towards him, evidently having lost faith in assistance from Russia. According to Lyuba, Dorjjeff held his position solely due to the Dalai Lama, who had grown up under his stewardship and trusted him unconditionally. Ibid., list 121: Report of Lyuba, 2 March 1905.
27. To set a precedent, the Dalai Lama requested that a meeting between him and Prince Friedrich Leopold of Prussia be arranged (AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1455, list 150).
28. Ibid., list 140.
29. Ibid., list 3.
30. Ibid., file 1455, list 5.
31. Ibid., file 1456, lists 3–5.
32. Ibid., list 14.
33. P. Kozlov, 'The Tibetan Dalai Lama', *Historical Bulletin (Istorichesky Vestnik)*, Jan. 1907, pp. 231–2.
34. Ibid., p. 246. The Russian diplomatic representatives noted the desire of the Japanese to establish friendly relations with the Dalai Lama. Regarding this, Lyuba reviewed a telegram from the foreign ministry on 28 June 1905 in which it was *inter alia* stated: 'It is advisable that the Dalai Lama does not

yield to the crafty instigations of Japan, who intends to strip the independence of all Mongolian countries, including Tibet, of the protection of the rights and advantages of which Russia cares'. (AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1456, list 21).

35. *Historical Bulletin*, p. 247.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 248.
37. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1456, list 26.
38. *Ibid.*, list 36.
39. *Ibid.*, list 23.
40. *Ibid.*, file 1456, list 41.
41. *Ibid.*, file 1456, lists 45–6. The Dalai Lama had requested that a Russian convoy be sent to Datsin-Razvan (Khandatsinvan) and 'expressed his wish to take the Cossaks as instructors to Tibet who at the same time would maintain postal contacts with Urga' (*ibid.*, list 46).
42. It is interesting that on his arrival to Urga the Dalai Lama said that he had come to Mongolia to establish close contact with Russia, the only power that could, according to him, save Tibet from foreign domination. In the present case the Dalai Lama first of all referred to his discussions with the Chinese emperor. The high priest probably realized that as he would receive no help from Russia it would be better to remain dependent on the emperor of China.
43. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1456, list 35.
44. *Ibid.*, list 51.
45. *Ibid.*, file 1456, list 18.
46. *Ibid.*, list 30.
47. *Ibid.*, lists 29–31.
48. *Ibid.*, list 44. Report from Kuzminsky, Urga, 4 Sep. 1905.
49. The authorities of the Chinese empire pursued an active policy of colonization of the land on the borders of the country. The Chinese peasants settled on the most fertile lands in Tibet, Mongolia, and in other areas, received privileges in the sale of their produce, and assistance in the cultivation of the land. This facilitated the assimilation of the Chinese population with that of the Tibetan and Mongolian and the extension of the borders deeper into Tibet and Mongolia.
50. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1456, list 44.
51. *Ibid.*, list 56.
52. *Ibid.*, list 55.
53. From the Chinese desk, file 1456, lists 81–2.
54. *Ibid.*, list 96.
55. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1456, lists 79–80. Pokotilov writes, according to Badmazhapov, that the 'Urganian Khutukhta, scheming against the Dalai Lama, does not spare gifts to Urganian rulers and useful persons in Peking. The Dalai Lama, perhaps out of pride, and probably because of miserliness did not find it possible to give them a part of considerable sum which he had gathered during his sojourn in Urga ...' (*Ibid.*)
56. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1456, lists 79–80.
57. *Ibid.*
58. *Ibid.*, list 60.
59. *Ibid.*, list 61.

60. Ibid., list 59.
61. Ibid., list 75.
62. Ibid., list 77.
63. Ibid., list 78.
64. For a translation of the correspondence of the Dalai Lama with the Chinese authorities regarding Yan Chi's demand that he leave Khandatsinvan and also about the recall of the secretaries, *see*: *ibid.*, lists 67–74.
65. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1456, lists 85–8.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid., list 89.
69. Ibid., file 1452, list 19.
70. Ibid., file 1456, list 97. Simultaneously with this, Pokotilov reported that the Japanese had invited the Dalai Lama to visit Japan to meet the Japanese emperor, promising to help him resolve the Tibetan question. The Dalai Lama, however, ordered that the offer be declined for the time being.
In Peking too the Japanese flirted with the Dalai Lama. Pokotilov requested Badmazhapov to inform the Tibetans, that 'if they start contacts with the Japanese they should not count upon ... [his, Pokotilov's] help'. He asked Badmazhapov to explain to the Tibetans and the Dalai Lama that establishing relations with the Japanese, the allies of the British, would be absolutely senseless from the point of view of Tibet's interests (*Ibid.*, pp. 97–8).
71. Ibid., lists 100–1.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., file 1456, lists 110.
75. Ibid., file 1452, list 14. Pokotilov's telegram, Peking, 30 Jan. 1906. It was precisely because of this that the Chinese authorities were apprehensive and insisted on the Dalai Lama's speedy departure from Mongolia.
76. Ibid., file 1452, list 15.
77. Ibid., list 17: the Dalai Lama to the Russian envoy in Peking, 3 Dec. 1905.
78. Ibid., file 1456, lists 176–9: 'Khandadorchji's Report to His Holiness, the Dalai Lama.'
79. Ibid. As mentioned earlier, The Russo-Chinese Bank financed the Mongolian princes, supporters of the Dalai Lama, providing them with funds to bribe the Chinese officials. In this way, the Bank was actively utilized by Russian diplomacy in the Far East.
80. Ibid., file 1456, list 176–9.
81. Ibid., file 1452, lists 60–1. Dorjieff thought that it was very important for China to uphold the Dalai Lama's prestige and title which would guarantee tranquillity in Tibet. Therefore, in his opinion, it was desirable for the Chinese government to make an official statement refuting the rumours that the Dalai Lama had been dethroned and that the Panchen Lama had been appointed in his place, and stated that the Dalai Lama would be returning to Lhasa in the near future to, as hitherto, head the administration of the country. (*ibid.*, list 32.)
82. Ibid., file 1456, list 103: Pokotilov, Peking 29 Dec. 1905.
83. Ibid., file 1452, list 15: Pokotilov's teleg. from Peking of 30 Jan. 1906.

He wrote: 'It is positive that the urgent requests [of the Mongolian Princes] to the Chinese government will end with the latter's assurances of their full readiness to guard Tibet and Mongolia from the encroachment of foreigners in general, and the British, in particular, in Tibet, stating however, their inability and the necessity to enlist the help of the Mongolians themselves, who should wake up from their age-long sleep and seriously engage in the use of their natural resources and thus find funds for the training and maintenance of a powerful army. 'Thus, the Mongolians have been taken to the road of political renovation, and because the known loyalty to the religion of the nomads, the presence at the moment of the Dalai Lama among them will add to the entire movement the nature of something charming and sacred and will greatly assist the speedy and successful development of the movement (ibid.) The Russian diplomat evidently believed that Chinese advice and the Dalai Lama's stay in Mongolia had resulted the political regeneration of the Mongolians.

84. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1452, list 48: Pokotilov's telegram from Peking, 23 March 1906.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., file 1452, lists 48–9.
88. Ibid., list 15.
89. Ibid., file 1457, list 33–7.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid., file 1456, list 33–7.
92. Ibid., list 110.
93. Ibid., file 1456, list 107.
94. Ibid., file 1456, list 106.
95. Ibid., list 135.
96. Ibid., list 110.
97. Further papers relating to Tibet, Cd 5240, London, 1910, p. 43.
98. In this section material was used from the memorandum 'On the Leningrad Buddhist Temple', written by Dorjjeff's nephew S.D. Dylykov, Ph.D. (history) kept in his personal archives, and also from the article by Vladimir Baraev entitled 'Nerushimy Utes' (Indestructible Rock), the *'Buddhism' Magazine*, 1992, no. 1, pp. 20–4.

Perspectives of the Dalai Lama's Return to Tibet and the Russian Position

1. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1457, list 31 Lyuba from Urga, 7.7.1906. On 13 July the Chief of the General Staff wrote to Izvolsky that there could be no expedition to Tibet until the foreign ministry issued a special order (ibid., file 1452, list 194).
2. Ibid., file 1457, list 40.
3. Ibid., file 1456, lists 160–3.
4. The Dalai Lama did not trust the Chinese princes and believed that their arrival was due to a desire to isolate him from Russian influence and to persuade him to return to Lhasa (ibid., file 1456, lists 160–3; file 1457, lists 25–6).

5. A copy of Kuzminsky's secret note to the Russian Imperial Consulate General in Urga, dated 26 July 1906 (AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1457, list 48).
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, list 49.
8. W. Filchner. *Strum ueber Asien*, Berlin, 1924, pp. 110–11.
9. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1457, list 73.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*, list 76.
12. *Ibid.*, list 78.
13. *Ibid.*, lists 81–94.
14. *Ibid.*, list 85.
15. *Ibid.*, lists 52–6.
16. *Ibid.*, file 1457, lists 86–8.
17. *Ibid.*, list 100.
18. *Ibid.*, lists 93–4.
19. *Ibid.*, list 95.
20. *Ibid.*, list 96.
21. *Ibid.*, lists 108–9.
22. *Ibid.*, file 1456, list 104.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*, list 107.
25. *Ibid.*, list 104.
26. *Ibid.*, list 111.
27. *Ibid.*, file 1457, list 103.
28. *Ibid.*, file 1453, list 132.

V. THE TIBETAN QUESTION IN THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION, 1907

1. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1456, list 110.
2. *Ibid.*, file 1452, lists 37–9.
3. *Ibid.*, list 74.
- 3a. *Ibid.*, list 78.
4. NAI, Sep. 1906, nos. 373–425 A, Doc. 400.
5. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1452, list 131.
6. *Ibid.*, lists 147–8.
7. *Ibid.*, list 147.
8. *Ibid.*, file 1452, list 123. For details of the Anglo-Russian negotiations see R.S. Churchill, *The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907*, Torch Press, 1939; H. Nicolson, Sir A. Nicolson, London, 1930; S. Ghosh, *Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations 1899–1914*, Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 1977; H. Richardson, *Tibet and its History*, Oxford University Press, London, 1962; B. Nand, *British India and Tibet*, Oxford & IBH Pub. Co, 1975; also: A.F. Ostaltseva's Thesis 'Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907', Saratov, 1960, etc. Unpublished, Moscow State University, Moscow, 1962.
9. M.R.D. Foot, *British Foreign Policy since 1898*, London, 1956, p. 35.
10. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1452, list 123.

11. Ibid., file 1457, lists 18–20: Benckendorff's letter, London, 13/26 June 1906.
12. Ibid., file 1452, lists 164–5.
13. Ibid., file 1457, list 27. Pokotilov again opposed any compromise with Britain (Pokotilov's secret teleg., Peking, 24 June/7 July 1906).
14. Ibid., file 1452, lists 183–9.
15. Ibid., file 1457, lists 214–5.
16. Ibid., lists 226–9.
17. For the text of the Convention, see H. Richardson, *Tibet and its History*, pp. 258–60.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. S.Yu. Witte, *Vospominaniya (Reminiscences)*, vol. III, Moscow, 1960, p. 461.
21. Ibid., p. 266.
22. A.W. Ward and G.P. Goochi (eds.), *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783–1919*, vol. 1–3, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1922–3, vol. 3 1866–1919, 1923.
23. Ibid., p. 363.
24. *British and Foreign State Papers, 1907–8*, vol. CI, pp. 170–5.
25. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1458, list 24, 9/22 Feb. 1909.
26. Charles Bell, *Tibet: Past and Present*, Oxford, 1924, p. 90.
27. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1453, list 117.

VI. THE POLICY OF MANCHU CHINA IN TIBET 1903–13, THE TIBETAN RESPONSE AND THE REACTION OF RUSSIA AND GREAT BRITAIN.

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1. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 129, list 282.
2. Ch'ing Shih Kao, vol. 530, Lie Chuan 311, Fan Pu 8, pp. 20, 12–25b, 6; Archive Orientalni, 32, 1, Praha, 1964, p. 87.
3. NAI, Dec. 1905, nos. 44–116, Doc. 55.
4. Ch'ing Shih Kao, *ibid.*, pp. 86–92.
5. NAI, Dec. 1905, nos. 44–116, Doc. 59.
6. *Ibid.*, Doc. 55, Enc. 63.
7. *Ibid.*, Doc. 65.
8. *Ibid.*, Aug. 1906, nos. 516–37.
9. *Ibid.*, Dec. 1905, nos. 44–116, Docs. 67, 103.
10. Ch'ing Shih Kao, Archive Orientalni, pp. 86–92.
11. NAI, Dec. 1905, nos. 44–116, Doc. 63, Enc. 71.
12. Ch'ing Shih Kao, Archive Orientalni, *ibid.*, pp. 86–92.
13. NAI, Dec. 1905, nos. 44–116, Doc. 85.
14. Ch'ing Shih Kao, *ibid.*, pp. 86–92.
15. NAI, Sep. 1906, nos. 293–9, Doc. 295.
16. *Ibid.*, May 1906, nos. 12–34, Doc. 20.
17. *Ibid.*, Sep. 1906, nos. 293–9, Doc. 297.

18. Ibid., June 1907, nos. 690–7, Doc. 690.
19. Ibid., Feb. 1907, nos. 560–74, Doc. 567.
20. G. Clark, *Tibet, China and Great Britain*, Peking, 1924, pp. 21–2, NAI, June 1908, nos. 55–94, Doc. 57.
21. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1458, list 27.
22. NAI, June 1907, nos. 690–7, Docs. 692, 694.
23. Ibid., nos. 690–7, Doc. 691.
24. Ibid., Sep. 1907, nos. 560–74, Doc. 572.
25. Ch'ing Shih Kao, *ibid.*
26. NAI, June 1908, nos. 55–94, Doc. 572.
- 26a. Ibid., June 1907, nos. 690–97, Doc. 695, Enc.
27. Ibid., June 1908, nos. 55–94, Doc. 91; Aug. 1906, nos. 516–37, Docs. 529, 533, 534; Feb. 1907, nos. 560–74, Doc. 561.
28. Ch'ing Shih Kao, *ibid.*, pp. 86–92.
29. NAI, June 1908, nos. 55–94, Doc. 65.
30. G. Clark, *Tibet, China and Great Britain*, Peking, 1924, p. 22.
31. NAI, June 1907, nos. 544–602, Doc. 588. Feb. 1907, nos. 295–353, Doc. 341.
32. H. Richardson, *Tibet and Its History*, London, 1962, p. 96.
33. NAI, June 1907, nos. 544–602, Doc. 588.
34. H. Richardson, *ibid.*, p. 96.
35. NAI, June 1907, nos. 544–602, Doc. 564.
36. Ibid., Docs. 562, 598.
37. Ibid., Doc. 562.
38. Ibid., Aug. 1910, nos. 58–546, Doc. 133.
39. Ibid., Feb. 1908, nos. 467–82, Doc. 467.
40. Ibid., Jan. 1908, nos. 565–601, Doc. 584.
41. Ibid., Feb. 1907, nos. 560–74.
42. Ibid., Feb. 1908, nos. 467–82, Docs. 469, 470.
43. Ibid., Jan. 1908, nos. 565–601, Doc. 566.
44. Ibid., June 1908, nos. 55–95.
45. 11 April 1908.
46. NAI, March 1910, nos. 385–510, Doc. 412.
47. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1458, list 14: Chirkin's report from Bombay, 1 April 1909.
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49. TSGIAL, Fund 560, inventory 28, file 64, list 40.
50. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1458, list 14.
51. Further Papers Relating to Tibet, Cd 5240, p. 160.
52. Ibid., p. 168.
53. NAI, June 1909, nos. 484–503, Doc. 497, Enc.
54. *World's Chinese Students' Journal*, vol. III, 1909, no. 44, p. 223.
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56. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1458, lists 33–4: Korostovets's telegram, Peking, 11 Feb. 1910.

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2. Ibid., Docs. 490, 494.

3. *Ibid.*, June 1909, nos. 484–503, Doc. 484.
4. *The Celestial Empire*, Shanghai, 24.12.1909.
5. G. Clark, *ibid.*, p. 24.
6. *The Celestial Empire*, Shanghai, 11.12.1909.
7. NAI, March 1910, nos. 385–510, Doc. 431, Enc.
8. *The Celestial Empire*, Shanghai, 24.12.1909.
9. *Ibid.*
10. NAI, March 1910, nos. 385–510, Doc. 388.
11. *The Celestial Empire*, Shanghai, 4.12.1909.
12. *Ibid.*, 18.12.1909.
13. NAI, March 1910, nos. 385–510, Doc. 403, Enc. 1. Kennedy refused to send the Dalai Lama's telegrams because he did not want to show 'complicity' in Tibetan intrigues against China.
14. NAI, March 1910, nos. 385–510, Doc. 404, sub-Enc.1.
15. *Ibid.*, sub-Enc. 2, 3.
16. *Ibid.*, Doc. 403, 425.
17. *Ibid.*, March 1910, nos. 385–510, Docs. 420, 425.
18. *Ibid.*, Docs. 400, 412, Enc.1
19. *North China Herald*, 19 Jan. 1910.
20. NAI, Aug. 1910, nos. 58–246, Doc. 73.
21. *Ibid.*, March 1910, nos. 385–510, Doc. 448.
22. *Ibid.*, Aug. 1910, nos. 58–246, Doc. 73.
23. *Ibid.*, March 1910, nos. 385–510, Doc. 473.
24. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1458, lists 52–3; NAI, March 1910, nos. 385–510, Doc. 507.
25. *Ibid.*, Aug. 1910, nos. 58–246, Doc 73.
26. *Ibid.*, Doc. 74.
27. *Ibid.*, March 1910, nos. 385–510, Doc. 507.
28. *The Celestial Empire*, Shanghai, 26.2.1910.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Dalnevostochnoye Obozrenie (The Far East Survey)*, Petersburg, 1910, pp. 29, 20
31. *Ibid.*, p. 20
32. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
35. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1458, list 59.
36. *Ibid.*, file 1458, list 41: secret teleg. from Korostovets, Peking, 13/26 Feb. 1910.
37. NAI, March 1910, nos. 385–510, Doc. 506.
38. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1458, lists 50-51: Korostovets from Peking, 18 Feb.1910.
39. *Ibid.*, file 1458, list 44: Korostovets from Peking, 17 Feb./ 2 March 1910.
40. *Ibid.*, list 48.
41. *Ibid.*, file 1458, lists 50–1.
42. *Ibid.*, list 72: Peking, 2 March 1910.
43. *Ibid.*, lists 72–3.
44. NAI, March 1910, nos. 385–510, Doc. 425.
45. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1453, lists 207–8.

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47. NAI, March 1910, nos. 385–510, Docs. 456, 459, etc.
48. Ibid., Doc. 454.
49. Ibid., Doc. 456.
50. Ibid., Doc. 466.
51. Ibid., March 1910, nos. 385–510, Doc. 493.
52. Ibid., Doc. 500, 505. AVPRI; Fund Chinese desk, file 1458, list 80.
53. Ibid.
54. *Far East Survey*, Petersburg, 1910, p. 19
55. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1456, list 37.
56. *Far East Survey*, pp. 32–3.
57. Ibid., p. 32; *see also* NAI, Aug. 1910, nos. 58–246, Doc. 59.
58. NAI, Aug. 1910, nos. 58–246, Doc. 84.
59. *Far East Survey*, Petersburg, 1910, p. 32.
60. Ibid., 36–7.
61. *Far East Survey*, Petersburg, 1910, p. 37.
62. Ibid., pp. 40–1, *see also* NAI, Aug. 1910, nos. 58–246, Docs. 138, 151, 159.
63. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1458, list 112.
64. Ibid., file 1458, list 112; *see also* NAI, Aug. 1910, nos. 58–246, Docs. 138, 151, 159.
65. *Far East Survey*, Petersburg, 1910 pp. 37–9.
66. H. Richardson, *ibid.*, p. 101; NAI, Jan. 1912, nos. 208–98, Doc. 215.
67. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1458, list 109; Shchekin's teleg., Peking, 5 July 1910.
68. *The Celestial Empire*, Shanghai, 22.1.1910; 26.2.1910; 12.3.1910; 19.3.1910. etc.
69. NAI, Jan. 1912, nos. 208–98, Doc. 228.
70. G. Clark, *ibid.*, p. 29; NAI, Jan. 1912, nos. 208–98, Doc. 226, 228.
71. *China Press*, 21 Dec. 1911.
72. NAI, Jan. 1912, nos. 208–98, Doc. 221.
73. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1458, lists 286–7; *see also* NAI, Jan. 1912, nos. 208–98, Docs. 227, 228, 230, 240, etc.
74. AVPRI, from the Chinese desk, file 1458, lists 338–40: Nabokov to Neratov, Shimla, 4/17 June 1912.
75. AVPRI, Fund Central Asian desk, file 967, lists 77–80.
76. TSGIAL, Fund 560, inventory 28, file 456, list 67.

VII. THE TIBETAN QUESTION IN ANGLO–CHINESE RELATIONS AFTER THE CHINESE REVOLUTION OF 1911 AND RUSSIA'S ATTITUDE

1. NAI, Oct. 1912, nos. 12–45, Doc 13.
2. Ibid., Doc. 36, Enc. 3.
3. Ibid., Oct. 1912, nos. 12–45, Doc. 13.

4. Ibid., Doc. 14.
5. Ibid., Doc. 16.
6. Ibid., Doc. 23.
7. Ibid., Doc. 19, 24, 26.
8. TSGIAL, Fund 560, inventory 28, file 64, list 84.
9. AVPRI, Fund Central Asian desk, file 967, lists 77–80.
10. TSGIAL, Fund 560, inventory 28, file 456, lists 82–4, *see also* NAI, Oct. 1912, nos. 59–242, Doc. 76
11. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1458, lists 332–4.
12. Ibid., lists 149, 194, 110–11: the Dalai Lama to Dorjjeff, April 1910.
13. Ibid., file 1458, list 74.
14. Ibid., list 153: secret teleg. from Arseniev from Calcutta, 22.12.1910
15. Ibid., list 158 b.
16. Ibid., file 1458, lists 213–4: Dorjjeff's letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 2 April 1911.
17. Ibid., list 215.
18. Ibid., lists 226–7.
19. Ibid., lists 230–1.
20. Ibid., file 1458, list 277.
21. Ibid., list 246.
22. Ibid., list 277.
23. TSGIAL, Fund 560, inventory 28, file 64, list 102.
24. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1458, list 290.
25. Ibid., file 1458, list 290.
26. Ibid., list 291.
27. TSGIAL, Fund 560, inventory 28, file 455, list 45.
28. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1481, lists 3–7. An account of the visit in a letter of Reveliotti to Neratov dated 14 February 1912, (*ibid.*, file 1458, lists 299–306).
29. TSGIAL, Fund 560, inventory 28, file 456, list 54.
30. H. Richardson, *Tibet and its History*, London, 1962, p. 105.
31. TSGIAL, Fund 560, inventory 28, file 64, list 101.
32. Ibid., list 100.
33. AVPRI, Fund Central Asian desk, file 967, lists 121–5.
34. Ibid., file 971, list 19.
35. TSGIAL, Fund 560, inventory 28, file 64, list 83.

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1. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1480, lists 68–9.
2. Ibid.
3. V.M. Khvostov, *The History of Diplomacy*, vol. II, pp. 731–2, Moscow, 1963.
4. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1480, list 42; H. Richardson, *Tibet and its History*, pp. 265–7.
5. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1480, lists 43–4.
6. Ibid., file 1480, list 42.
7. Ibid., file 1480, lists 68–9.

8. *Ibid.*, lists 62–3.
9. *Ibid.*, lists 64–5.
10. TSGIAL, Fund 560, inventory 28, file 64, lists 118–9.

Britain and China in Tibet En Route to the Shimla Conference

1. TSGIAL, Fund 560, inventory 28, file 64, list 86.
2. *Ibid.*, list 92.
3. *Ibid.*, list 94.
4. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1480, list 22.
5. AVPRI, Fund Central Asian desk, file 967, lists 121–5.
6. TSGIAL, Fund 560, inventory 28, file 64, list 99.
7. AVPRI, Fund Central Asian desk, file 967, lists 121–5
8. AVPRI, Fund Chinese desk, file 1481, lists 8–10.
9. AVPRI, Fund Central Asian desk, file 971, list 19.
10. *Ibid.*, list 20.
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